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V
CONTRACTS CONTAINING

A.

No CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSE

Contracts Where a Choice of Law Can Be Clearly Inferred

Often a contract will contain no express choice of law clause, yet
the circumstances are such that an inference may be drawn that the
parties intended a certain law to govern. This inference may as strongly
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indicate a particular law as would a specific choice of law clause. In
both England and America, as long as it can be established "that the
parties have chosen the state of the applicable law," 479 the case will be
treated as if the parties had actually made an express choice.4 0 But
in America at least, "[i]t does not suffice to demonstrate that the parties, if they had thought about the matter, would have wished to have
the law of a particular state applied."481
Although there are limitless circumstances in which a court might
be justified in inferring a choice of law from the terms of a contract,
one group of cases deserves special mention: those involving contracts
containing a clause selecting an arbitral forum. Until 1969, English
courts treated contracts containing such clauses as cases in which an inference should be drawn that the parties intended to select the law of
that forum to govern their obligations. Such a clause was thus tantamount to an express choice of law, "since for better or for worse English law [was] committed to the view that qui elegit judicem elegit
jus." 482 This is no longer the rule, and a clause selecting an arbitral
forum is now merely evidence of intent as to choice of law, or simply a
factor to be taken into account in considering with which law the con483
tract is most significantly connected.
B.

Contracts Where a Choice of Law Cannot Be Clearly Inferred

1. Statement of the Significant Contacts Rule
According to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, where
a contract contains neither an express nor a clearly inferable choice of
law, the American rule is as follows:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an
issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to
the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties
(see § 187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the
479 REsrATEmENT (SECoND) OF Cowmcr OF LAws § 187, comment a at 561-62 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as RwrATEmENT (SECOND)].
480 See, e.g., Buono Sales, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 363 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1967); Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v. Compagnie

d'Armement Maritime SA., [1971] 1 A.C. 572, [1970] 3 All E.R. 71 (1970); Whitworth Street
Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller & Partners Ltd., [1970] 1 A.C. 583, [1970] 1 All
E.R. 796. In the opinion of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Tunisienne probably falls into
this category of case. [1971] 1 A.C. at 586, [1970] 3 All. E.R. at 75.
481 RESrATEmENT (SECOND) § 187, comment a at 562.
482 G. CHuESR & P. NORTH, CHESHIRE'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 205 (8th

1970). See also authorities cited id. at 205 n.8.
483 See cases cited in note 480 supra.

ed.
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principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue-include:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

the place of contracting,
the place of negotiation of the contract,
the place of performance,.
the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.
(3)If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of
performance are in the same state, the local law of this state will
usually be applied, except as otherwise provided in §§ 189-199
4
and 203 8
When sections 187485 and 188 of the Restatement (Second) are
read together, it becomes apparent that American law, as formulated
by the Restatement (Second), divides contracts into three categories
for choice of law purposes. The first group, contracts containing an
express choice of law, are decided under the rules of section 187. The
second group, which may be called inferable intention cases, are those
in which it is established "that the parties have chosen the state of the
applicable law. 48 6 These cases are also governed by section 187.
Finally, where there is no expressed or inferable intention, section 188
governs.
English law divides cases into three categories which are very
similar to the American classifications. However, the category of inferable intention cases is wider in England than in the United States. 4 7
A second difference between English and American law is the method
of formulating the choice of law rule applicable to the third category
of cases. Restatement (Second) section 188 refers to the law with "the
most significant relationship" to the transaction, while English judges
generally speak of the "system of law by reference to which the contract
was made or that with which the transaction has its closest and most
48 8
real connection."
484 RESTATEMENT (SEcoD) § 188.

485 See Prebble, Choice of Law To Determine the Validity and Effect of Contracts:
A Comparison of English and American Approaches to the Conflict of Laws, Part I, 58
CoRmNLL L. Rav. No. 3 (1973), notes 257-478 and accompanying text [hereinafter cited as
Prebble, Part 1].
486 See notes 479-80 and accompanying text supra.
487 See text following note 502 infra.
488 See, e.g., Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia, [1951] A.C. 201, 219 (P.C. 1950)

(AustI.).
The wider limits in England of the second category of cases may occasionally be
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Probably the dearest description of the three categories is found
in Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller &
PartnersLtd.48 9 The following passage from the opinion of Lord Justice
Widgery in the Court of Appeal's decision 9 ° was adopted by Viscount
Dilhorne on appeal in the House of Lords:
To solve a problem such as arises in this case one looks first at the
express terms of the contract to see whether that intention is there
to be found. If it is not, then in my judgment the next step is to
consider the conduct of the parties to see whether that conduct
shows that a decision in regard to the proper law of the contract
can be inferred from it E4911 ....Finally, if one fails in this inquiry also and is driven to the conclusion that the parties never
applied their minds to the question at all, then one has to go to
the third stage and see what is the proper law of the contract by
considering what system of law is the one with492which the transaction has its closest and most real connection.
The similarity to the three categories of the Restatement (Second) is
evident. But an examination of the facts of the Whitworth case reveals
that the similarity is deceptive, given the broader sweep of the English
inferable intention category of cases.
Whitworth, an English company owning premises in Scotland,
contracted there with Miller, a Scottish construction company, to make
certain alterations in those premises. The architect was English. At
his request, the English standard form of the Royal Institute of British
Architects (RIBA) was used to formalize the contract, rather than a
Scottish version which was available. The English form reads in relevant part:
[1In case any dispute or difference shall arise between the employer
or the architect on his behalf and the contractor.., then such dispute or difference shall be and is hereby referred to the arbitration
and final decision of a person to be agreed between the parties,
or, failing agreement,... a person to be appointed on the request
for the time being
of either party by the president or vice-president
498
of the Royal Institute of British Architects.
of deisive significance in choice of law decisions. On the other hand, the different methods

found in England and America of expressing the choice of law rule for the third category
of cases, as well as the English internal dispute as to what the correct formulation should
be, serve more as sources of confusion than as potential causes of significantly divergent
results in category three cases before the courts of the two countries.
489 [1970] 1 A.C. 583, [1970] 1 All E.R. 796.
490 [1970] 1 W.L.R. 377, 383, [1969] 2 All E.R. 210, 215 (C.A. 1969) (Widgery, LJ.).
491 Apart from questions of estoppel, only conduct up to the time of making the
contract may be considered. See [1970] 1 A.C. at 611, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 805.
492 Id. (Viscount Dilhore).
493 See id. at 585, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 800.
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Disputes arose, and Miller commenced an action against Whitworth in England. The action was stayed pending arbitration. Since
the parties were unable to agree on an arbitrator, Miller applied to the
RIBA president, who appointed a Scottish architect to arbitrate. The
architect in turn appointed a Scottish solicitor as clerk in the submission.494 The clerk told Whitworth by letter that he intended to
follow Scottish procedure. There was no objection, and the arbitration
commenced in Scotland. Points of law arose, and the English company
asked for the arbiter49 5 to state his award as a special case for the
opinion of the High Court. 49 6 Since that procedure is not available
under Scottish law, the arbiter refused. Accordingly, Whitworth obtained an order from a Master that the arbiter state a case. On appeal,
this order was rescinded by a judge of the High Court, restored by the
Court of Appeal, and again rescinded by the House of Lords in the
decision now under discussion.
The issue, as stated by Lord Reid, was quite simply whether this
was a Scottish or an English arbitration. 497 Only if the curia1498 law
was English was the Master's order correct. The House was unanimous
in holding that the curial law of the arbitration did not have to be the
same as the law governing the substance of the contract. In this case
the curial law was Scottish, but because the Court of Appeal had concluded that the arbitral procedure was properly governed by English
law, it was necessary for the House of Lords to discuss that issue. Their
Lordships decided by a majority of three 499 to two 5°° that the proper
law of the contract was English. At the same time, the majority
softened this holding by their decision that since the arbitration itself
was to be governed by Scottish law, the arbiter could not be compelled
to state a special case for the High Court.
On these facts, Whitworth appears at most to be a case where it
was "demonstrate[d] that the parties, if they had thought about the
matter, would have wished to have the law of [England] applied ' 01
as the proper law of the contract. The second category of the Restatement (Second) would apparently be inapplicable. Nevertheless, Vis494 See id. at 583, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 796.
495 The Scottish term for arbitrator.
496 Under the Arbitration Act of 1950, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 27, s. 21, either party
to an arbitration may require the arbitrator to state his award as a special case for
judicial opinion on a point of law.
497 [1970] 1 A.C. at 602, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 798.
498 "Curial" was used to refer to the procedural laws applicable at the arbitral forum.
499 Lords Hodson and Guest, and Viscount Dilhorne.
500 Lords Reid and Wilberforce.
601 RMTATEmENT (SECOND) § 187, comment a at 562.
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count Dilhome clearly determined that Whitworth was a stage two
case according to the test enunciated by Lord Justice Widgery and himself. 02 Two important consequences follow. First, less conclusive
evidence is needed in England for a court to infer an intention to make
a choice of law. Second, the third class of cases, where the test is what
constitutes the law of either the most significant relationship (America)
or the closest and most real connection (England), is necessarily more
restricted in England than in America.
Cases with identical facts may thus be categorized differently in
English and American courts, resulting in different judicial choices
of law. Whitworth itself is almost certainly such a case, for Viscount
Dilhorne clearly states that
[i]f in this case one had to reach the third stage and consider with
which system of law the transaction had its closest and most real
connection, . . . I would hold without any hesitation that the
Scottish system of law was the one ....
I do not, however, think that in this case one gets to that
stage for ... both parties intended
that the contract should be
503
governed by the law of England.
In an American court adhering to the Restatement (Second),
Whitworth probably would have reached the third stage.
The Widgery-Dilhorne test is believed to formulate accurately
the English rule for the third category of cases, that is, cases containing
no express choice of law clause. But English courts have always been
more willing than their American counterparts to give effect to the
intention of the parties. English judicial opinions, even in category
three cases, ascribe to contracting parties a presumed intention as to
choice of law where no expressed or inferable intention is found.
Lord Atkin, in Rex v. International Trustee, held that "the intention
will be presumed by the Court from the terms of the contract and the
5 0 4 The rule was put even more
relevant surrounding ciumstances.'
strongly in Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd.:
The parties may not have thought of the matter at all. Then the
Court has to impute an intention, or to determine for the parties
what is the proper law which, as just and reasonable persons, they
ought or would have intended if they had thought about the question when they made the contract. 505
See note 492 and accompanying text supra.
[1970] 1 A.C. at 611, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 805.
504 [1937] A.C. 500, 529, [1937] 2 All E.R. 164, 166.
505 [1938] A.C. 224, 240, [1937] 4 All E.R. 206, 214 (P.C. 1937) (N.Z.).
02
503
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In addition to sharing the weakness of any legal fiction, the
presumed intention approach also raises a question of whether the
court should attempt to presume what these parties would have decided
(the approach of Lord Atkin) or what reasonable persons ought to have
intended in the circumstances of the case (the Mount Albert approach).
Lord Atkin's reasoning has in fact been almost entirely abandoned in
English cases. 0 8 But the law has gone further.
In attempting to determine the parties' presumed intent, a court
can only consider the terms and circumstances of the contract to see
what law the parties most probably would have stipulated had they
considered the matter. A court must usually assume that this would
have been the law most closely and significantly connected with the
contract. Consequently, reference to a presumed intent is redundant;
it is an unnecessary intermediate step that does not advance the court's
reasoning. It follows that the proper law of a contract where there is
no express or inferable choice, as stated in Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia, is simply "the system of law by reference to which
the contract was made or that with which the transaction has its
5 07
closest and most real connection."
The Bonython formulation, which is clearly reflected in the passage quoted from Lord Justice Widgery and Viscount Dilhorne, appeared to have become indisputably the English rule. 50s Here the matter
should have rested. Unfortunately, not all of Their Lordships who took
part in the recent Whitworth5 9 and Tunisienne510 cases agreed with
this appraisal.
Lord Hodson briefly observed in Whitworth that the court must
506 See, e.g., The Assunzione, [1954] P. 150, 175, 179, [1954] 1 All E.R. 278, 290, 292
(CA. 1953); G. CHESHnm & P. NORTH, supra note 482, at 201-02.
507 [1951] A.C. 201, 219 (P.C.) (Austl.).
508 It was approved again by the House of Lords in Tomkinson v. First Penn
Banking & Trust Co., [1960] 2 W.L.R. 969, [1960] 2 All E.R. 332 (H.L.). The rule, as

stated in the 1958 edition of Dicey's Conflict of Laws, the leading English text, read:
When the intention of the parties to a contract with regard to the law governing
the contract is not expressed in words, their intention is to be inferred from the
terms and nature of the contract, and from the general circumstances of the
case, and such inferred intention determines the proper law of the contract.
A. Dicm', DicEy's CONFICT OF LAws 731 (7th ed. J. Morris ed. 1958). In the eighth and
latest edition, however, the rule was changed to point to "the system of law with which
the transaction has its closest and most real connection." A. DIcEY & J. MoRRIS,DICEY AND
MoRs ON THE CoNFIuCr or LAws 691 (8th ed. J. Morris ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
DicEY & Moans].
509 Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller & Partners Ltd.,
[1970] 1 A.C. 583, [1970] 1 All E.I. 796.
510 Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime
SA., [1971] 1 A.C. 572, [1970] 3 All E.R. 71 (1970).

1973]

CHOICE OF LAW & CONTRACTS

"fix the presumed intentions of the parties as best it can."'" Although
this statement clearly ignores previous House of Lords authority, without a fuller statement of his rationale it would be difficult to say that
Lord Hodson really intended to direct the law back to the pre-Bonython state. 12 But Lord Hodson was not alone. Lord Wilberforce
questioned "what intention ought to be imputed to [the parties]. 513
Lord Reid agreed with Viscount Dilhorne, but cited Bonython. 5 4
Lord Guest's views are opaque on this issue. 515 The Whitworth result
is therefore inconclusive.
Matters were clarified somewhat in Tunisienne. In that case, a
r and Diplock, 518
clear majority, Lords Reid, 116 Morris,5 17
favored the
closest connection test. Lord Wilberforce re-emphasized his view that
the parties' intention is to be inferred, but found no essential difference
between his view and the Bonython formulation. 519 Viscount Dilhorne
did not expand upon his views in Whitworth, but, somewhat surprisingly, pronounced himself entirely in agreement with the opinion of
Lord Wilberforce.5 20 It can only be assumed that he, too, saw no difference between the imputed intention and the closest connection tests.
Such a position is not unreasonable. Clearly, the law with the
closest and most real connection to the contract is very probably the
law which just and reasonable persons may be presumed to have intended to govern their obligations. 52 1 Furthermore, in no reported case
has the result turned upon whether the court adopted the presumed
intention or the closest connection test. The American significant contacts formulation appears to be so close to the English closest and most
real connection rule that it is difficult to imagine a case of such facts
511 [1970] 1 A.C. at 606,
512 See note 508 supra.

11970] 1 All E.R. at 801.

513 [1970] 1 A.C. at 614-15, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 808.
514 Id. at 604, [1970] 1 All E.. at 799.
515 Id. at 607-08, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 802.
516 [1971] 1 A.C. at 583, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 74.
517 Id. at 587, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 77.
518 Id. at 603-04, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 91. Lord Diplock was particularly emphatic,
stating:
Mhe proper law is that system of law with which the transaction has its closest
and most real connection ....
My Lords, this is applied as a positive rule of English law. It is applied not
because it is the choice of the parties themselves but because they never intended
to exercise their liberty to make a choice, or, if they did, they have failed to
make their choice clear.
519 See id. at 595, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 84.
520 See id. at 593, [1970] 8 All E.R. at 82.
521 See Etler v. Kertesz, 26 D.L.R2d 209, 217-18 (C.A. 1961)(Ont.).
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that the results could turn upon the verbal differences between the
rules of the two countries.
However it is phrased, the choice of law rule for category three
cases is not particularly definite. It has the virtue of flexibility, although
it does admittedly make predictability of results less than certain in
some cases. The situation is certainly not helped by having two conflicting judicial formulations of the rule current in England, even
though those favoring a presumed intention test appear to be in a
distinct minority.
In order to alleviate the confusion, the presumed intention version
of the rule should be discarded. A presumed intention must always
remain a legal fiction. At best, the dignity of the law in the eyes of a
party is not enhanced when he is told that as a reasonable man (doubtless he never considered himself otherwise) he is presumed to have intended to subject his contract to the provisions of a law to which he
honestly knows he never would have acceded had he considered the
matter. At worst, it is conceivable that the same court applying different formulations to the same facts might decide the case differently. 22
In neither Tunisienne nor Whitworth is there overt evidence that
any of Their Lordships recognized that they were at variance with the
English rule for finding the proper law. 2 3 In most cases, this variance
will not be significant, but it is unfortunate that English law has
slightly regressed from the position of certainty seen in Bonython and
5
the rule as it is found in Dicey's eighth edition. 2
If English judicial authority lacks unanimity, American case law
is even more inconclusive. Nevertheless, the trend is dearly towards
the Restatement (Second). Since 1960, leading cases in several jurisdictions have either cited section 188 favorably, 25 or have expressly ap6
plied it.52
Except for the results of Beale's interference, 527 the development
522 The risk that different formulations will result in different deisions is slim, as
illustrated by the Whitworth case. In Whitworth Lords Reid and Wilberforce applied
respectively the Bonython and the presumed intention tests, and both concluded that
the proper law was English, while the majority of the House decided on Scottish. See
notes 511-15 and accompanying text supra.
523 Of course, the lack of unanimity of the result of applying this rule is apparent
enough.
524 See note 508 supra.
525 See, e.g., Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915, 924 (Ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 864 U.S. 911 (1960); Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Radio Foods Corp., 108 N.H.
494, 240 A.2d 47 (1968); Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d
898, 425 P.2d 628 (1966).
525 See, e.g., Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970).
527

See Prebble, Part I, notes 28-87 and accompanying text. The interferente is
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of American case law has been rather similar to that of English case
law; that is, early cases espoused views quite akin to the presumed intention test, while more recent cases emphasize the importance of
"connection" and "contact." In Pritchard v. Norton,5
28
the United
States Supreme Court followed the "principle that in every forum a
contract is governed by the law with a view to which it is made."5 29
Despite the subsequent appearance of the vested rights doctrine, Arthur
Nussbaum, who may be described as an early-modern commentator,
was able to conclude after a detailed examination of the cases that, in
1942,
the law of the country, with which in the expressed or presumed
intent of the parties the contract had its most important connection, shall govern, taking into account the various territorial "contacts" of the contract, such as the place of contracting, 53place
of
0
performance, domicil of the parties, suits of the res, etc.

Since Nussbaum wrote, the deficiencies of the presumed intention
formulation have become more apparent to American judges, and it
has been progressively abandoned. Although it was not the first contract
case to break away from the mechanical vested rights rules and the presumed intention theory, the celebrated decision of Auten v. Auten 53 1
marks a watershed in the development of choice of law rules in contract
cases. In Auten, Judge Fuld, writing for the New York Court of Appeals, clearly repudiated both the mechanical dogmatism of vested
rights and the imputation of fictional intentions to contracting parties.
The court instead adopted the "center of gravity" or "grouping of
contacts" approach in order to apply the policy and laws of the jurisdiction "'most intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] par.
ticular litigation,' "532 and also in order to "give effect to the probable
intention of the parties and consideration to 'whether one rule or the
other produces the best practical result.' "53 Thus, the court recognized
that the closest connection approach is likely to reveal the law intended
particularly obvious in the first Restatement's adoption of the strict rules of lex loci
contractus and lex loci solutionis.
528 106 US. 124 (1882).
529 Id. at 136.
530 Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus the Restatement, 51 YALE
L.J. 895, 896 (1942).
531 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
532 Id. at 161, 124 NE.2d at 102, quoting Note, Choice of Law Problems in Direct
Actions Against Indemnification Insurers, 3 UTAH L. Ray. 490, 498-99 (1953).
533 308 N.Y. at 161, 124 N.E.2d at 102, quoting Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 280
N.Y. 135, 141, 19 N.E2d 992, 995 (1939).
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by the parties, but did not make the mistake of seeking that presumed
intent as an end in itself.
By 1960, Willis Reese was confident that the Auten rule was "soon
to become, if it [was] not so already, the majority rule in [America]."' 4
Since Auten, the center of gravity approach has been developed and
refined into its present "significant contacts" form, found in section
188 of the Restatement (Second).53 5 This section represents the current
majority rule.
If the two rules are correctly stated by the Widgery-Dilhorne test
and by section 188, they are basically similar, at least in form. However,
English and American approaches to the choice of law problem, that is,
jurisdiction selection and interest analysis, are fundamentally quite
different. Because of the importance accorded by both legal systems to
a clear choice of law clause contained in a contract, the differences
between the two approaches are greatly muted when in the case at issue
the contract contains an express stipulation for a particular law. There
are greater differences in cases where this harmonizing element is
absent. English courts do not examine the content of specific competing
rules; they simply select the jurisdiction whose rule is to apply to the
particular case, whatever (within the limits of forum public policy)
that rule may be.586 English courts do not embrace the issue-by-issue
approach; they tend to seek one proper law to govern most aspects of
a contract rather than to concentrate on the particular issue at bar.53 7
Consequently, considerations such as the "better rule of law" or the
interests of the confficting jurisdictions in post-contract events cannot
arise in England.
It could be argued that this limitation is so weighty that English
courts are incapable of applying the significant contacts test in any way
consistent with the spirit of the Restatement (Second), and that although they are superficially similar, the rules of the two countries
have entirely different bases. This argument is difficult to refute on
theoretical grounds. Practically speaking, however, the basic differences
between the English and the American approaches to choice of law are
rarely evidenced by any significant difference in the disposition of con534 Reese, Power of Parties To Choose Law Governing Their Contract, 1960 P:oc.
AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 49, 50.
685 Cases illustrating the development of the significant contacts test are collected
and discussed in Weintraub, Choice of Law in Contract, 54 IowA L. REv. 399, 412-13
(1968).
586 See generally Prebble, Part I, notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
Z87

Cf. id., text following note 12.
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tract litigation. There are two reasons for this similarity of result in
contract cases.
First, the area of private contract law is not one in which government policy or interest tends to be very influential. Therefore, even
under the interest analysis approach, an American court will be unlikely to reach a conclusion different from an English court despite the
fact that English courts do not subscribe to interest analysis.
Second, contract law, at least commercial contract law, is a relatively homogeneous area.581 English courts applying the Widgery-Dilhome rule may not focus specifically on particular issues in quite the
same way as American courts following the Restatement (Second), but
the English closest connection test is sufficiently flexible to produce
much the same result. The general choice of law rules applicable to
contracts not containing express stipulations of governing law exemplify the phenomenon that English and American rules, although based
on widely different theoretical premises, generally yield the same
result.
2. Application of the Significant Contacts Test
The significant contacts test is fundamentally uncomplicated. It is
simply incumbent upon each party to adduce evidence of relevant facts
supporting his side in order that the court may decide with which of
two laws the contract is most closely connected. The matter is not, of
course, wholly one of evidence, and some decisions may appropriately
be referred to by way of precedent in later cases. But because there is
an infinite variety of possible contracts, there is at least theoretically a
similar diversity of possible results when these contracts come to be
the subject of litigation.
Both the strength and the weakness of the significant contacts test
lie in its case-to-case flexibility. Albert Ehrenzweig, with a certain justification, criticizes the test on the grounds that
s88
The Restatement (Second) neatly illustrates this point. Sections 189-97 concern
choice of law in nine different common types of contracts, including transfer of land,
sale of chattels, suretyship, and transportation. In each of these sections, the Restatement
(Second) identifies a particular contact which will usually be the most significant in
relation to the type of contract which is the subject of the particular section. For example,
in a sale of land, the situs of the land will usually be the most relevant contact. See
RSTA
E rT (SECOND) § 189. Each rule is thus a particular application of the significant
contacts rule; to make the point abundantly dear, each section also contains a passage
to the effect that the identified contact will control unless, in the particular case and
with respect to the issue at hand, some other state has a more significant relation to the
transaction and the parties. This formulation of subrules may not be particularly helpful.
See notes 576-79 and accompanying text infra.
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what should be a conclusion reached by the use of a rule of choice
of law, namely the ascertainment of the "center of gravity," the
"most significant relationship" or "the proper law," is offered to
us as a premise for the choice. 5 9
An important consequence of the ad hoc nature of the significant
contacts test is that it is of only limited usefulness to make lists of what
contacts a court should examine to determine whether they are of
significance in any particular case. An attempt at systematization has
been made in section 188(2) of the Restatement (Second),540 but this
list is certainly not exhaustive. English authorities have tried to produce their own lists. Cheshire's inventory, for example, offers considerably greater detail than the Restatement (Second)'s list, but it is
essentially similar in approach.54 ' Cheshire is finally forced to conclude
that any "fact which serves to localize the contract" 54 may be a contact
to be considered by the court.
Every contact between a contract and a particular jurisdiction may
potentially be considered significant by the courts. There is therefore
a great temptation for courts, and even more for partisan counsel, to
emphasize circumstances connected with a contract which, in the case
of that contract, could not reasonably be regarded as legally significant.
Counting rather than weighing contacts has regrettably been a feature
of some cases both in England and America. Enumerating the competing contacts associated with a particular contract, and basing a decision
on numerical strength one way or the other, is easier than evaluating
each contact carefully and rejecting those contacts which, in a particular
case, should not be considered significant.
The Restatement (Second) forbids mere contact counting: "[C]ontacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue. ' 543 This rubric is by no means always
539 A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 464 (1962).
540 For the text of § 188(2), see text accompanying note 484 supra.
541 The court must take into account, for instance, the following matters: the

domicil and the residence of the parties; the national character of a corporation
and the place where its principal place of business is situated; the place where
the contract is made and the place where it is to be performed; the style in which
the contract is drafted, as, for instance, whether the language is appropriate to

one system of law, but inappropriate to another; the fact that a certain stipulation
is valid under one law but void under another; the nationality of the ship inmaritime contracts; the economic connexion of the contract with some other
transaction; the fact that one of the parties is a sovereign State; the nature of the
subject-matter, or its situs; the head office of an insurance company, whose activities range over many countries ....
G. CH EsrE & P. NORTH, supra note 482, at 203-04 (footnotes omitted).
542 Id. at 204.
543 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 188(2).
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complied with. For example, contact counting occurred in the case of
Haag v. Barnes.5 44
The defendant in that case was a Chicago businessman who, on a
trip to New York, caused the plaintiff, a New York resident, to become
pregnant. The subsequent birth was in Illinois, and a settlement for
the care of the baby was entered into there. The contract contained a
stipulation that Illinois law would govern. The arrangements were
made on the advice of the defendant's lawyer, who successfully manufactured several contacts between the settlement contract and Illinois. 45
The plaintiff sued for increased maintenance in New York. Under
the law of New York the settlement was no defense, because it was
subject to judicial review. The New York Court of Appeals based its
decision to apply Illinois law on two alternative grounds. First, it held
that if the intention of the parties was to govern, then the choice of
Illinois law was effective. Alternatively, the court suggested that since
New York probably does not recognize the autonomy doctrine,5 4 6 the
significant contacts test governs. Applying this rule, the court again
concluded that Illinois law controlled.
The matters which, added to the choice of law clause, the court
considered decisively indicated Illinois law included:
(1) both parties are designated in the agreement as being "of
Chicago, Illinois," and the defendant's place of business is and
always has been in Illinois; (2) the child was born in Illinois; (3)
the persons designated to act as agents for the principals (except
for a third alternate) are Illinois residents, as are the attorneys for
both parties who drew the agreement; and (4) all contributions
for support always have been, and still are being, made from
5 47
Chicago.

The court was merely stating the same thing in different waysthat the putative father was a domiciliary and resident of Illinois. Little
was added by saying that the defendant's place of business was in
Illinois and that he paid for the support of the child from there. Despite the contract's terms, the mother was never really "of Chicago,
Illinois," except for a short time before and after the birth of the
baby. Her contacts with Illinois were simply the result of the defendant's asking her to come there for the birth.
On the other hand, the court dismissed as relatively unimportant
the fact that the parties' liaison took place in New York, and that the
544
545
546
547

9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d
Id. at 559, 175 N.E.2d at
Id. at 559-60, 175 N.E.2d
Id. at 560, 175 N.E.2d at

441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
443, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
at 444, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
444, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
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mother and child were resident there at the time of the case, and, presumably, that if the defendant ceased to support the child responsibility
for its welfare would fall on the state of New York.
The court's final choice of Illinois law is not criticized here. The
case was a close one. It would not be unreasonable to say that the parties' choice of law, and the defendant's domicile, justified the application of Illinois law. What is objectionable is the court's splitting of
the domicile-residence contact into several different parts, and giving
them each separate weight. The court's uncritical acceptance of the
genuineness of the contacts between the plaintiff and Illinois, which
were to a large extent engineered by the defendant, is also open to
criticism.
Haag v. Barnes was not an easy case. The plaintiff seems to have
been less than entirely meritorious, while the defendant had been quite
generous in the original settlement, and his contributions to the child's
5 48
support had in fact gone beyond what was required by its terms.
The court therefore had no difficulty in holding that the choice of law
clause need not be struck down to avoid a result contrary to forum
public policy. Following an argument similar to Otto Kahn-Freund's
doctrine of the "'relativity' of public policy," 549 the court pointed out
that its duty was not to decide whether Illinois law, which did not require submission of this agreement to judicial approval, was contrary
to New York policy. Rather, the court was obliged to determine on the
facts of the case before it whether support received by the child under
the settlement satisfied the requirements of New York policy. The court
felt that in the instant case it clearly did.550
The type of reasoning found in the Haag case has received more
than its share of scholarly comment, 5 1 and the specific instructions of
the Restatement (Second) may be expected to alert American lawyers
and judges to the need for care in applying the significant contacts test.
548 Id. at 558, 175 N.E.2d at 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
549 See Kahn-Freund, Reflections on Public Policy in the English Conflict of Laws, 39
GROTus 39, 57 (1954).
550 9 N.Y.2d at 560-61, 175 NE.2d at 444, 216 N.YS.2d at 69-70.
Perhaps the court was not anxious to save the defendant from having to demonstrate
the reasonableness of an obviously fair settlement before the New York courts, at the
instance of a woman who apparently wanted more than her pound of flesh. If this was
its sub silentio inclination, it is regrettable that the court's overt reasoning was not
more respectable. On the facts, the choice of Illinois could have been justified either by
the autonomy doctrine (the public policy exception being inapplicable because the
agreement in question provided for support of the child in excess of New York requirements) or by a significant contacts test, minus undiscriminating contact-counting.
551 See, e.g., Currie, Conflicts, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1,

40-52; Weintraub, supra note 535, at 417-18.
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Haag v. Barnes probably evidences the growing pains accompanying
the adoption of modern choice of law rules, although English judges,
with much longer experience in applying the significant contacts test,
are occasionally open to similar criticism.
English courts do not formally subscribe to a mechanical, contactcounting approach. For example, Lord Wilberforce in Whitworth
indicated that "the correct course [is] to ascertain from all the relevant
contemporary circumstances including, but not limited to, what the
parties said or did at the time, what intention ought to be imputed to
552
them on the formation of the contract."
Lord Reid in the same case agreed; he would not consider just any
circumstance, only relevant ones.553 But his actual treatment of the case
belied any such assurance. His Lordship observed, for example, that
clause four of the RIBA standard form used by the parties,5 54 required
the contractor to comply with Acts of Parliament and bylaws. 555 "As
all the work was to be done in Scotland," Lord Reid continued, "that
can only mean Scottish legislation."es56 But what is the significance of
this conclusion? Clause four requires compliance with local legislation
by the contractor, but the clause would require this compliance wherever the place of performance. That Scotland was the locus solutionis
was of course highly significant, but it added nothing to point out that
Scottish building regulations would therefore apply to the contract,
and that under the contract the builder had to comply with those
regulations. Whatever the proper law of the contract, it would naturally
be incumbent upon the contractor not to break any local bylaws or
557
other legislation pertaining to the work he was doing.
5 8 it was held by Lord
In another leading case, The Assunzioner,
552 Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller & Partners Ltd.,
[1970] 1 A.C. 583, 614-15, [1970] 1 All E.R. 796, 808 (emphasis added).
553 Id. at 603, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 798.

554 See note 493 and accompanying text supra.
555 [1970] 1 A.C. at 604, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 799.
556 Id.

557 There is another possible explanation for Lord Reid's argument. Perhaps His
Lordship had already decided that the proper law of the contract was Scottish law, and
was therefore trying to fit the facts to this conclusion. This hypothesis is supported by
Lord Reid's treatment of certain clauses in the contract which utilized specifically
English terminology. For example, he believed that the contract's reference to "property
real and personal," terms without meaning in Scottish law, must have been intended to
mean "property heritable or movable." Id. In the circumstances, the use of this English
terminology, in a form specially preferred by the English architect, could have been
assumed to show an intention that English law should govern.
558 [1954] P. 150, [1954] 1 All E.R. 278 (CA. 1953).
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Justice Singleton that "we must have regard to ... all the surrounding
facts." 559 He then added that it was necessary to "look at all the circumstances and seek to find what just and reasonable persons ought to
have intended."5 60 If pressed, he would doubtless have conceded that
he meant only relevant facts and circumstances. But, as seen from Lord
Reid's reasoning, such a mental reservation is insufficient to prevent
unwarranted weight from being given to irrelevant matters. The omnibus "consider everything and sift out the irrelevancies later" approach sometimes adopted by English courts lends itself to mechanical
561

contact counting.

Whatever the errors in the opinions of the New York Court of
Appeals in Haag v. Barnes,5 62 and of Lord Reid in the Whitworth
case, 563 these cases demonstrate that the flexibility of the significant
contacts test does make its application difficult. Certain American
scholars believe that this problem can be overcome by refining the test
to form numerous specific rules to cover particular types of, and issues
in, contract cases. Prominent among these scholars is Willis Reese.
Professor Reese believes that the significant contacts test is merely an
"approach," which should be resolved into a series of rules as soon as
conveniently possible. 564
Some of Professor Reese's lack of esteem for the significant contacts test seems to be merely terminological in origin, and in fact to
depend upon his own terminology. Although a directive is formulated
in broad terms, it may still constitute a rule and need not be stigmatized as merely an "approach" which should be abandoned as soon as
possible in favor of a stricter formulation. Professor Reese doubtless
does not intend to deprecate the significant contacts test as both a
widely formulated rule and a mere approach. But by choosing to label
it an "approach," he leaves the unwarranted impression that the rule
is only second-class law, or not really law at all. In reality, it is merely
a rule open to some criticism for its flexibility. And criticisms of the
rule may well be unwarranted. For many years in England the signifi559 Id. at 175, [1954] 1 All E.R. at 289.
560 Id. at 179, [1954] 1 All E.R. at 292.
561 The English approach may be contrasted with the continuous emphasis of the

Restatement (Second) upon the evaluation of contacts according to their relative importance in each individual case. See note 543 and accompanying text supra.
562 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
563 Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller &cPartners Ltd.,
[1970] 1 A.C. 583, [1970] 1 All E.R. 796.
564 See Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach?, 57 CoPN. L. REV. 315 (1972).

The criticism of Reese is directed at his theories insofar as they apply to contract cases.
No judgment is intended to be passed as far as tort cases are concerned.
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cant contacts test has proved itself to be a workable principle. Conversely, Professor Reese's proposal of specific subrules under the umbrella of the significant contacts "approach" would not in fact result
in the greater measure of certainty and foreseeability of result which
he claims.
In England, the concept of the proper law, a fundamental component of which is the significant contacts test, can trace its history
back at least to Lord Mansfield. 5 5 Its very flexibility, which allows it
to take cognizance of the infinite variety of contracts that men may
devise, has been its strength. The rule is applied with general success
-A

without

compint-

from

the

court

r-, that

gives
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guid_

ance. In recent years there has been no attempt to refine the proper law
into a number of more detailed rules of narrower application to cover
particular types of, and issues in, contract cases. On the contrary, the
proper law concept has proved to be the most successful choice of law
rule applied in English courts. There is growing evidence that English
judges intend to substitute this technique for the less flexible choice
of law rules now found in other areas of the law.5 66
Although the proper law concept in English law has developed in
such a fashion as to be satisfactory to both courts and scholars, historically there has been some concern in England, just as there is now
in America, for the lack of specificity of the significant contacts test.
In the nineteenth century, courts developed certain presumptions conceming the proper law to solve this problem. 567 The importance of
such presumptions has declined in recent years. Not only are presumptions apt to mislead courts into overemphasizing one item of evidence
at the expense of another, but they are generally not in accord with
the modem objective of seeking the law of the closest connection
rather than the law that the parties are presumed to have intended.
Nevertheless, there remains a body of opinion, led in England by Professors Dicey and Morris, that the presumption .approach should be
utilized in determining choice of law.
Dicey and Morris formulate two presumptions, one in favor of
the lex loci contractus and the other in favor of the lex loci solutionis,
565 See Prebble, Part I, notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
566 See Schmitthoff, New Light on the Proper Law, 3 MAN. L.J. 1 (1968).
567 For example, a contract of affreightment, not containing a choice of law clause,

would presumptively be governed by the law of the ship's flag. See Lloyd v. Guibert, [1865]
L.R. 1 Q.B. 115. The headnote to this case rather overemphasizes the importance of this

presumption. For cases illustrating the diminishing importance of the law of the flag,
see Dicay & MoRms 796-99. Similar presumptions may be found in pre-interest analysis
American cases. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Hyde, 82 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1936); Kleve v. Basler
Lebens-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft in Basel, 182 Misc. 776, 45 N.Y.S. 882 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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to be used depending on the facts of the case. 68 These presumptions
are advanced tentatively; they "may sometimes"5 69 apply. Dicey and
Morris present a detailed defense of their view of the law based on
an analysis of English cases over the past 150 years. 570 Admittedly, the
totality of these cases does indicate a presumption-like approach. But
insufficient weight is given to the more modem cases, which generally
either repudiate presumptions as unhelpful in this area of the law,57
or simply ignore the presumption approach altogether. 572 This development is to be welcomed. Although there are certain difficulties in
applying the significant contacts test, it is doubtful that burdening the
rule with preconceived presumptions can improve its operation. For example, it is doubtful that Lord Reid's opinion in Whitworth57 3 would
have been at all improved had His Lordship commenced his reasoning
by reference to a presumption about building contract law, rather than
by simply looking for the law of the most significant relationship as he
did. Cheshire concludes:
It is doubtful, even, whether any useful purpose is served by the
traditional practice of regarding certain facts, such as the locus
contractus, the locus solutionis or, in the case of a contract of
affreightment, the nationality of the flag, as presumptive evidence
of the governing law. To enter upon a search with a presumption
is only too often to set out upon a false trail. It may tend to divert
attention from the necessity to consider every single pointer....
The proper course is... to fall back on a presumption only when
the circumstances, viewed as a whole, fail to reveal with reasonable certainty the law to which the contract naturally belongs. 574
568 When the intention of the parties to a contract with regard to the law governing it is not expressed and cannot be inferred from the circumstances, the contract is governed by the system of law with which the transaction has its closest
and most real connection.
First Presumption: If a contract is to be performed wholly in the country
where it is made, it may sometimes be presumed to have its closest and most real
connection with the law of the country where it was made (lex loci contractus).
This presumption is strongest where all parties were present in that country when
the contract was made.
Second Presumption: If a contract is made in one country and is to be performed either wholly or partly in another, it may sometimes be presumed to have
its closest and most real connection with the law of the country or of one of the
countries where performance is to take place (lex loci solutionis). This presumption is strongest where all parties have to perform in one country.
DicEY & Momus 712.
569 Id.
570 Id. at 712-25.
571 See, e.g., The Assunzione, [1954] P. 150, [1954] 1 All E.R. 278 (CA. 1953).
572 See, e.g., Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller & Partners
Ltd., [1970] 1 A.C. 583, [1970] 1 All E.R. 796; Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v.
Compagnie d'Armement Maritime SA., [1971] 1 A.C. 572, [1970] 3 All E.R. 71 (1970).
578 See notes 553-57 and accompanying text supra.
574 G. CnHSmaIE & P. NORTH, supra note 482, at 202-03.
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It is submitted that Cheshire, apart from his final sentence, is correct from the standpoint of both legal theory and the modem authorities. It is, however, difficult to agree with the idea of falling back on
presumptions when all else fails. In a hard case, in which the contract
points almost equally in two directions, any reference to a presumption
to solve the problem could only produce an arbitrary result, depending
upon which presumption the court chose to apply. Also, in a hard case
there would usually be more than one possible presumption available.
English courts, then, have found that to discover the proper law
of a contract it is neither necessary nor desirable to have a rule of
thumb formulated in terms of a presumption. This is not to say that
previous cases presenting similar facts have no precedential value, but
simply that a court will approach each case with an open mind, not
guided by a presumption.
For Professor Reese, this method of tackling choice of law problems is merely an "approach" which leaves the courts with insufficient
guidance.57 5 The Restatement (Second), therefore, contains nineteen
black-letter rules, 57 6 expressed in terms of presumptions or other indefinite terms, 577 to govern particular types of, and issues in, contract
cases. For example, the Restatement (Second) notes that in the absence
of a valid choice of law by the party, the validity of a contract for the
transfer of an interest in land is to be determined
by the local law of the state where the land is situated unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship... to the transaction and the parties, in which
event the local law of the other state will be applied.578
Another section of the Restatement (Second) states that the capacity
of a party to contract "will usually be upheld if he has such capacity
under the local law of the state of his domicil." 579
The problem with such rules is that in easy cases they are unnecessary and in hard cases they will probably not help. It requires
little expertise in the conflict of laws to realize that most cases involving
the sale of land should be governed by the lex situs. Likewise, where
the issue is contractual capacity, a court that has adopted the interest
approach will be unlikely to find any compelling reason to invalidate
575 See generally Reese, supra note 564.
576 See RESTATfEENT (SECOND) §§ 189-207.
577 Generally, the Restatement (Second)'s rules are in the form of presumptions for

specific types of contracts, and are indefinite for specific issues, merely referring the reader
to §§ 187-88. There are a few exceptions where a definite rule is laid down. See, e.g., REsrATEmENT (SECOND) § 206: "Issues relating to details of performance of a contract are deter-

mined by the local law of the place of performance."
578 Id. § 189.
579 Id. § 198(2).
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the contract if the party whose capacity is in question had capacity to
enter the contract under his lex domicilii.
Professor Reese hopes that from the type of rule proposed in the
Restatement (Second) there will develop other specific rules which
may be applied by a court without the necessity of deciding whether
"some other state has a more significant relationship ... to the transaction."58 0 However, the nature of contracts and contract law makes
such an evolution of rules seldom possible, 58 1 and, if possible, unnecessary.
It is currently possible to divide all contracts into two groups:
the mass-produced or standard form, and the custom-made or individual draft prepared for clients requiring unique provisions.
In mass-produced contracts are found certain fairly typical situations, provisions, and geographical contacts between the transactions
evidenced by these contracts and different systems of local law. Specific
rules of the type advocated by Professor Reese could probably be
developed with regard to such contracts. The necessity for such rules,
however, is questionable. For these contracts, the principle of stare
decisis within the framework of the significant contacts test will be
adequate. Granted, the final results of case-by-case development
through stare decisis, or of the adoption of a priori specific rules, would
be somewhat similar. The body of precedent developing from the caseby-case approach could eventually be expected to function similarly
to the framework of rules proposed by Professor Reese. But it is submitted that the law will better reflect the needs of the courts, the individual, and the business community if it is built up gradually, though
precedent. To establish rules in advance is to risk a repetition of the
mistakes of the vested rights period, when facts were awkwardly fitted
to theories that had been developed with insufficient reference to the
practical problems which they were supposed to solve.58 2
Although it may be possible to develop practical (if not very
meritorious) specific choice of law rules for mass-produced contracts, the
same cannot be said for custom-made agreements. The possible variety
of fact situations, provisions, and contacts with different jurisdictions is
580 Id. § 189; see Reese, supra note 564, at 324-25.
581 It is a mistake to point to § 206, quoted in note 577 supra, as an example of a

rule which has been refined to definite terms and which therefore demonstrates that other
rules covering other issues can eventually be so developed. It is obvious enough that an
issue which involves no more than a detail of performance should be governed by the lex
loci solutionis. But about most other issues, one cannot be so certain. Moreover, § 206 is
by no means as precise as it at first appears. There remains ample room for argument
whether a particular issue involves a detail of performance, or is more correctly regarded
as a question of the extent of the performer's contractual obligation.
182 See Prebble, Part I, notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
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infinite. Just as each contract is individually prepared, so should it
be individually judged. Any attempt to formulate preconceived choice
of law rules must surely result in even more serious problems of fitting
facts to principles than would be encountered in the case of standard
form contracts.
A final difficulty with Professor Reese's proposal is this: rules governing contracts are overwhelmingly of a private law nature. This area
of the law involves few state policies and interests, apart from a general
desire to hold parties to fairly concluded bargains. This policy cannot
easily be refined into choice of law rules of even general applicability.
Leaving the development of the law to the operation of precedent
overcomes this problem, for in individual cases courts are more able
to judge how state policies and interests will be affected by their decision. But the development prospectively of any but the most obvious
choice of law rules for specific, narrow areas of contract law seems
hardly feasible.
English courts tried to develop such rules but realized that the
effort was counterproductive. 5 3 In an easy case, the most significant
contact can be picked out without the aid of a rule. In a hard case, a
presumption is apt to cloud the issue. By concentrating upon one piece
of evidence, a court prevents itself from fairly considering the possible
significance of other contacts.
Nor does Cheshire's view-that presumptions should be used as
a last resort when all else fails-have any more merit for American
courts than for English ones. 58 4 In fact, the contrary is true. American
courts, with their rule-selecting approach to choice of law, are more
able than English courts to evaluate fully the significance of each particular contact in terms of the results to be produced in a particular
case. This rule selection will often be a difficult process, but it could
be an abdication of responsibility for a judge to wash his hands of the
whole operation and decide a choice of law problem by reference to a
"last resort" presumption. There would certainly exist several possible
presumptions from which the judge could choose, depending upon the
result he wished to reach, and the choice of any one over the others
would necessarily involve a measure of caprice.
3. The Lex Validitatis
a. Statement of the Issues. When the issue before a court is the
essential validity of a contract, or of a clause in a contract, the court
is faced with a particular question: in making its choice of law, should
583 Cf. id., notes 23-27 and accompanying text.

584 This point is mentioned ex abundante cautela. The writer is unaware of any suggestions that American courts should use presumptions in this last resort fashion.
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it favor the law under which the contract is valid simply because that
law validates the contract? If so, how can the court justify this preference for validation?58 5
Although the question of validation may arise in a variety of contexts, in America it has specifically been associated with the issue of
usury. Courts favoring a laissez-faire approach to commercial contracts
have sometimes been reluctant to declare a contract invalid merely
because it provides for interest slightly above that permitted by possibly applicable anti-usury laws. One way to avoid striking down such
a contract is to apply some other law under which the contract is
valid.58 6
A bias towards the lex validitatis may be rationalized under several theories. 87 Most obviously, it can be said that the parties are
presumed to have intended that the contract be governed by the law
under which it is legally effective. Such a presumption is appropriate
in deciding whether a case may be regarded as a "category two" type,
and therefore treated as one in which a choice of law intention may be
inferred. 588 But where the parties clearly have not considered the choice
of law issue, this rationalization runs into the same objections that have
caused the demise of the presumption approach in other contexts.8 9
It has been argued that a presumption in favor of validity is so
obvious that it necessarily differs in kind from, for example, a presumption in favor of the law of the flag in a contract of sea carriage. 59 0
Weintraub hints at such a conclusion: "Unless [the parties] are engaged in some ridiculous charade, their intention is that every promise
they have made in the contract be enforceable." 591 By itself, this state585 The situation that arises when a contract is valid under one potentially applicable
law and invalid under another has been discussed in other contexts. See Prebble, Part I,
notes 435-51 and accompanying text (express choice); notes 652-58 and accompanying text
irrfra (capacity to contract); notes 677-79 and accompanying text infra (formalities).
586 The usury issue is distinct from the question of validation of other types of contracts. It is discussed separately at text following note 680 infra.
587 The lex validitatis theory should not be confused with the maxim ut res magis
valeat quam pereat. This principle of construction of contracts was utilized by several of
the judges who delivered opinions in the Tunisienne case in order to show that the inappropriate clause of the contract (see notes 642-43 and accompanying text infra) should
be construed as an effective express choice of French law. See Compagnie Tunisienne de
Navigation S.A. v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A., [1971] 1 A.C. 572, 608, [1970] 3
All E.R. 71, 95-96 (1970) (Lord Diplock). Confusion may result in calling the choice of law
rule favoring the lex validitatisan application of ut res magis valeat quam pereat, although
literally the maxim is appropriate.
588 See note 489 and accompanying text supra.
589 See notes 522-35 and accompanying text supra.
590 See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
591 Weintraub, supra note 535, at 406.
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ment is unassailable. But it does not follow that the parties must have

intended to contract with reference to a lex validitatis.There may well
have been a mistake. This point is reinforced when it is realized that a
defense of invalidity is unlikely to form part of the real issue between
the parties. Rather, the potential defense will probably have been discovered by a legal adviser after the dispute has arisen. 592
A more defensible rationale for a presumption in favor of the
lex validitatis might be that application of the validating law "better
serve[s] business convenience. 593 Under the significant contacts test, a
transaction is held to be governed by the law most significantly connected with it, not because the parties are presumed to have intended
this, but because this is the most reasonable and sensible solution. Likewise, where there is no evidence from which intent may be readily inferred, it is arguably the reasonable and sensible solution that the lex
validitatis should govern, for it is most convenient that parties should
be held to their apparent bargains. 94 However, this analogy demonstrates the basic weakness of applying the lex validitatis test to a contract where intent is neither expressed nor inferable. English and
American law already contain rules to cover this issue: the rules of
the significant contacts test. Although both English and American
courts often reach the same result when applying the test, this is not
always so.
b. Opinions of Scholars. The idea of a lex validitatishas proved
592 Suppose in Tunisienne the defense had been lack of privity, and that this defense
would succeed at English law, but not at French law. Should the plaintiff be able to argue
that on the issue of measure of damages French law should apply, because at English law
the whole contract is void for an,unrelated reason? The defendant could reasonably contend that he had always preferred the English law of damages, and it is simply the plaintiff's misfortune that neither party considered the privity problem when the contract was
made. An issue-by-issue approach whereby different issues in the same contract might
arguably be governed by different laws is of only theoretical assistance here. Admittedly,
it is possible for the parties to have intended that English law should apply to the damages issue, and French law to the question of essential validity. But it strains credulity to
suggest that this conclusion may reasonably be reached by means of presumptions, without
the assistance of any choice of law stipulation.
593 G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLS OF CONFLICr OF LAWs 239 (3d ed. 1963). Stumberg, however, does not isolate this argument as a justification of the rule in its own right:

To apply the law which will uphold the contract... would ...

in carrying out

the purposes which the parties had in view in their negotiations, better serve business convenience by making their acts legally, that which they purport to be; i.e.
an enforceable promise.

Id. (footnote omitted).
594 For an argument that this reasoning is justified, if not mandated, by the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution, a fundamental goal of which is presumably to
promote business convenience, see Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on
State Choice of Law Doctrine,84 H-IRv. L. RLv. 806, 822 (1971).
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extremely attractive to American scholars, in particular to Ehrenzweig,
who writes:
The . . . Rule of Validation (lex validitatis) is in accord with
the general principle, prevailing in many other areas including
the conflicts law of wills and trusts, that "if the court has a reasonable choice . . . between applicable systems of law, it should

choose the one that results in legal 'validation.' 595

He adds:
Properly and reasonably, courts of all countries and all ages, with
a few clearly definable exceptions, have tended to uphold the parties' "validating intent" and have thus held bargain contracts
valid under any "proper law".... If any law "governs" the
validity of a contract, it is therefore the "lex validitatis," rather
59 6
than a lex contractus, or lex solutionis or lex gravitatis.

Ehrenzweig defends his position that choice of the lex validitatis
is in fact the rule in America by the use of elaborate arguments with
which it is difficult to quarrel, assuming one accepts his basic premises.
These are first that one should not look at what the courts say, but only
at what they do, and second that if the courts do anything inconsistent
with the lex validitatis principle they are acting erroneously and may
be ignored. 597 Neither of these premises is consistent with the operation of stare decisis in common law courts. Although the first, albeit
hardly a rule of law, is admittedly blessed by the jurisprudential school
known as American Realism, one feels that even Karl Llewellyn would
find accepting the second difficult. 598 Ehrenzweig's support for the lex
validitatis,contained in one of the most scholarly of modem treatises,
must unfortunately be dismissed as wishful thinking rather than legal
exposition. 599
595 A. EHRFNzwEiG, CONFLICrS IN A NUTsHETLL 165 (2d ed. 1970), quoting A. CORBIN,
CoNnRAcrs § 548 n.9 (Supp. 1964).
596 A. EHRENzwEiG, supra note 539, at 458 (emphasis in original).

597 The vast majority of the decisions that have purported to rely, and that have
therefore been cited as relying, on any one of the so-called imperative rules of
contracting, performance, or intention, will be found to belong in one of the following categories: cases in which there was no difference, existing or alleged, between any of the potentially applicable laws, cases in which the choice of law was
expressly or impliedly agreed upon without interference,... cases in which there
was no question of choice of law presented at all, and finally, cases involving questions of procedure ....
Id. at 465-66 (footnotes omitted). Ehrenzweig thus dismisses some 42 cases he cites as examples. Several of these, notably Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), are
regarded by most scholars and modem courts as furnishing the foundation for the modem
law in this field.
598 See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 59 (1960).
599 Cf. R. LEFLAR, AMEICAN CoNFLIcrs LAw 369 (2d ed. 1968): "No random sampling
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Ehrenzweig has recently been joined by Weintraub, who argues
cogently that the choice of law rule for all cases in which the issue is
contractual validity should be a rebuttable presumption in favor of
the lex validitatis0 0 His arguments are compelling, and the rule he
proposes may well be superior to that of the Restatement (Second) sections 187 and 188. For example, he avoids the Restatement (Second)'s
inconsistency in ignoring an express choice of law where that law would
invalidate the contract. But he (as distinguished from Ehrenzweig)
rightly concedes that his rule is a proposal, and not law.
c. Cases on the Lex Validitatis Theory. Chief Justice Parker
recently summarized the English law when delivering judgment for
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Etler v. Kertesz:
I do not think that [there is] any general rule to the effect that the
proper law of a contract as between the laws of two countries, by
one of which it would be valid, and by the other it would be invalid, should be presumed to be in the country where the contract
would be valid. Under certain circumstances such a consideration
might have some weight viewed together with all the other evidence from which intention might be inferred.601
Parker speaks in terms of presumption and inferred intention.
From this it might be concluded that the validity test in English cases
will be invoked only when the court is attempting to infer an actual
intent to make a choice of law, and not when it has abandoned that
approach and continued to the third stage of the English test-seeking
the law of the closest and most real connection. 602 This conclusion is
correct, as far as it goes. But remembering the history of the presumption approach to choice of law, and considering that English courts
accord a larger place to inferred intention cases than do American
courts, it is believed that an English court may give some weight to a
presumption of validity in cases where American courts would apply
a strict significant contacts test.
On the other hand, when an English court has classified a case
as "category three," for purposes of the application of the significant
contacts test, it could not rationally consider a presumption of validity,
of American cases can be conclusive, since the selection of the sample determines what

will be shown." Without taking sides, Leflar collects and discusses other scholarly work on
the theory of the lex validitatis.Id. at 367-70.
600 Weintraub, supra note 535, at 421. Weintraub discusses certain tests, including
anachronism and likelihood of unfair surprise, which may be used to determine whether
a presumption should be rebutted in a particular case. Id. at 422-27.
601 26 D.L.R.2d 209, 222 (C.A. 1961). See also DicEy & Moius 708.
602 For a discussion of the three stage English test, see note 488 and accompanying
text supra.
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since theoretically it is not concerned with the content of competing
rules.603 This is, of course, not inconsistent with the English conflicts
theory under which a court considers content of rules in order to infer
contractual intention. In such a case, the court is really construing the
terms of a contract, which may or may not choose a certain law, rather
than making the choice itself.
American courts do not face the same difficulty quite so acutely
under their rule-selecting approach. Nevertheless, the validation theory
poses problems. When a court is employing the significant contacts
test, it has ex hypothesi determined that the parties had no expressed or
inferable intent as to choice of law. How therefore can it be significant
that the contract, or a part of it, is valid by only one of two or more
competing laws? There is no neat answer.
A definite history of judicial support exists in America in favor of
a lex validitatis approach to choice of law. But the reasoning in the
cases 6° is not in harmony with the modern conflicts theory and
with practice.
The view taken by the Restatement (Second) on the question of
the lex validitatis has undergone certain changes since the Tentative
Draft was first put to the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute in 1960. Originally, the Restatement (Second) favored validating contracts where reasonably possible. To this end, the Tentative
Draft listed as one of the "[i]mportant factors in determining the state
of [the] most significant relationship," 60 5 or contacts, "[t]he law under
which the contract will be most effective." 60 6
In the final version of the Restatement (Second), validity and invalidity are not expressly offered as contacts to be considered. But in
weighing contacts, validity, expressed as "the justified expectations" 607
603

This classification may naturally be a little blurred. It could be, for example, that

the possibility of a reference to the presumption of validity might be what causes a court
to type a case as category two rather than category three.
604 See, e.g., Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 137 (1882).
605 RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 332(b), comment b (rent. Draft
No. 6, 1960).
606 Id. at 33. When this provision was discussed by the Institute in 1960, that criticism
which emerged was directed towards encouraging the Reporter to adopt "the principle
... that a contract is valid if it is valid by the law of any jurisdiction with which it has
any significant contacts." 37 ALI PRocamiNGs 505 (1960). Far from acting on this suggestion, the Reporter and his advisers appreciably cooled towards the lex validitatis doctrine in preparing the Official Draft of the Restatement (Second) for the Institute's 1968
meeting. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 200 (Proposed Official Draft
1968).
607 REsrATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 6, 188, comment b at 576-78.
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of the parties, is, inter alia, an important element in determining the
relative significance between one contact and another.
In 1968, the Institute approved section 188 without commenting
on this change, or on the lex validitatis theory generally. 608 This change
of heart may be significant. The lex validitatis doctrine reflects a laissezfaire attitude toward private contracts. Modern, socially protective
legislation often uses the law to invalidate contracts and thus to
shelter individual members of society from the predatory tactics of
some sections of the business community. The choice of law rule
adopted in the Restatement (Second) reveals a measure of sympathy
for this type of legislation. The rule in its final form retreats somewhat from the earlier position, which was more favorable to the principle of freedom of contract. The influential American Law Institute
probably considers that the lex validitatis doctrine, if not on the wane,
at least has attained the zenith of its effectiveness as a factor in the
choice of law process. The Restatement (Second) does, however, adopt
a policy in favorem negotii, halfhearted though it may be.
The Restatement (Second)'s rule appears to be derived from language of the Supreme Court in Kossick v. United Fruit Co.,6 09 where
the Court expressed concern for the parties' "justified expectations":
It must be remembered that we are dealing here with a contract,
and therefore with obligations, by hypothesis, voluntarily undertaken .... This fact in itself creates some presumption in favor
of applying the law tending toward the validation of the alleged
contract 10
4. Cases Involving Three or More Jurisdictions, Where Two or
More Have the Same Rule on the Disputed Issue
In Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v. Compagnie
d'Armement Maritime S.A., 611 the court was faced with three possibly
608 45 ALI PROCEEDINGS 497-502 (1968).
609 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
610 Id. at 741, citing Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882), and Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, Part One: Validity, 59 COLUM. L. Rly. 973 (1959). Kossick
was not strictly a conflict of laws case, since it involved a choice between state and federal
maritime law. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the Court felt that the same principles
applied.
Neither the Restatement (Second) nor the Supreme Court in Kossick considers the
argument that a party's expectations cannot be "justified" if he merely hopes that his contracts will be legally binding, without turning his mind to the law by which these aspirations are to be realized.

611 [1971] 1 A.C. 572, [1970] 3 All E.R. 71 (1970).
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applicable laws: English, French and Tunisian. Lord Reid observed
that
[u]ntil [the case reached the House of Lords] it appears to have
been assumed that France and Tunisia could be treated as one
country or as having the same system of law ....
"[N]either side
contended for any other system of law" than French or English
law. On that basis when one comes to weigh the various factors
which tell in favour of French or English law being regarded as
the proper law, the fact that Tunisia was to be regarded as the
place of performance of the contract would be put in the scale
for French law....

But I wish to reserve my opinion as to how

far in a case of this kind it is proper to disregard the fact that
two countries are separate and independent countries, each with
its own system of law, on the ground that those systems are or
have recently been closely associated, or that their systems of
law
612
are very similar but both very different from English law.
Of the remainder of Their Lordships, only Lord Diplock adverted
to this problem:
As I have already said, for the purposes of this transaction
France and Tunisia may be regarded as sharing a common system
of law ....
Clearly French law was the system of law61with
which
3
the contract had its closest and most real connection.
The position in England may be unclear, but according to the
Restatement (Second) there is no doubt in the United States:
When certain contacts involving a contract are located in two or
more states with identical local law rules on the issue in question,
the case will be treated for choice-of-law purposes as if these contacts were grouped in a single state.614
This assessment appears to be consistent with the authorities 15
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see the justification or the need for this
rather rigid formulation of the rule. To take a somewhat stylized
3 All E.R. at 73-75.
Id. at 609, [19 70] 3 All E.R. at 96. This holding would seem to resolve the question left open by Lord Reid; unfortunately, what Lord Diplock had "already said" was
that "[f]or the purposes of a commercial contract of this kind I would be prepared to
assume that the parties regarded France and Tunisia as subject to a common system of
law." Id. at 602, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 90.
614 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 186, comment c.
615 See, e.g., G.B. Mechael v. SS Thanasis, 311 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (action for
damage to cargo of copra). One reason for the Thanasis court's choice of United States
maritime law over English law was that another potentially applicable law, Liberian law,
was presumed to be the same as American. Cf. Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d
541, 545 n.14a (2d Cir. 1956): "As the tort rules, pertinent here, of New York, Delaware
and Arkansas are doubtless substantially similar, there would be no need to choose one
or the other."
612 Id. at 583-84, [1970]
613

CHOICE OF LAW & CONTRACTS

1973]

example, suppose that under the contacts test a case is found to be
significantly connected with jurisdictions X, Y, and Z in the proportions of forty-nine, twenty-six, and twenty-five respectively. The laws
of Y and Z are the same on the issue at bar, but that of X differs. Is it
reasonable to say that the Y-Z law necessarily governs? Surely, the
similarity of the laws of Y and Z should be a factor for consideration
in the choice of law process, but it should be no more than this.
The same argument should also be persuasive in England. Theoretically, of course, English courts do not, or should not, look at the
contents of the laws of X, Y, and Z before making a choice of law
decision, and the problem under discussion should not arise. But the
House of Lords does not appear to be concerned with that difficulty,
as may be seen from the Tunisienne case. In fact, any small step by
English courts towards flexibility rather than rigid jurisdiction selecting is to be welcomed.
However, for English courts to adopt for these cases a standard
practice like that advocated by the Restatement (Second) would be a
mistake. Different considerations must apply in different cases. For
example, when jurisdictions Y and Z are closely related-for example,
American states, or France and a former French colony-there is a much
stronger argument for treating them as one and for totaling their contacts with the case than when X and Y are, for example, Greece and
Japan. In the latter situation, the similarity between the two countries
on the issue at bar is much more likely to be coincidental than the
result of a shared policy regarding the area of law under consideration,
a policy that ought, perhaps, to receive some recognition even in the
choice of law processes of English courts.
5. In England, Is the Contact with a Country or with a System
of Law?
One loosely speaks of the English rule as seeking the law with
which the contract has its closest and most real connection. The term
"law" is not entirely appropriate. In a jurisdiction-selecting choice of
law system, a court is not choosing a particular law, since it does not
take cognizance of the actual content of any of the conflicting laws to
which its attention has been called. As Lord Reid states in Whitworth
Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller & Partners Ltd.:
Two slightly different tests have been formulated: "the system of
law ...

with which the transaction has its closest and most real

connection" (per Lords Simonds in Bonython v. Commonwealth
of Australia [1951] A.C. 201, 219) and "with what country has the
transaction the closest and most real connection" (per Lord Den-
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ning in In re United Railways of Havana and Regla Warehouses
Ltd. [1961] A.C. 1007, 1068). It has become common merely to

to refer t9 the system of law but I think the two tests must be combined for all are agreed that the place of performance is a relevant
and may be the decisive factor, and it is only in a loose sense
that the place of performance can be equated to the system of law
prevailing there ....
In the present case the form of the contract may be said to
have its closest connection with the system of law in England but
the place of performance was in Scotland and one must weigh the
relative importance of these two. 616

Lord Denning, who was partly responsible for the birth of the
"country" version, 617 later repudiated that version in favor, of a "system
of law" approach. 618 His second thoughts express the better rule. First,
there is the problem of federal countries. Clearly, if the choice of law
is between France and Illinois the word "country" is inappropriate.
But, more importantly, "country" gives an unfortunate twist to the
significant contacts rule in the hands of a judge who does not approach
a case with his mind entirely open as to the relative importance of the
various contacts he will be called upon to consider.
In the hands of a sophisticated judge, the verbal distinction should
not be significant. Whatever law is eventually chosen will be the law
of some country, or at least of some state. If a jurisdiction-selecting
court bears in mind that it is selecting rules to decide a case, and not
simply attempting to tie a particular contract to the soil of a specific
country in pursuit of some undisclosed and possibly irrelevant purpose,
then that court's task of evaluating different contacts will be just as
efficiently performed whether it is looking for the country or the system of law having the closest connection to the contract.
The passage quoted from Lord Reid's speech in Whitworth illustrates that English judges will not necessarily bear these matters in
mind. His Lordship gives the word "country" a significance that could
not have been intended when it was originally used in judicial
formulations of the significant contacts test. Lord Reid does not consider "country" as defining the jurisdictional sphere of a certain body616 [1970] 1 A.C. 583, 603-04, [1970] 1 All E.R. 796, 799.

Lord Reid's opinion that the two tests are "slightly different" is not unanimously
shared. Lord Hodson said: "I do not myself see that this variation of language is important,
although in some contexts one word may be more appropriate than another." Id. at 606,
[1970] 1 All E.R. at 801.
617 See In re United Rys. of the Havana & Regla Warehouses Ltd., [1961] A.C.
1007, 1068.
618 Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller & Partners Ltd., [1969]
1 W.L.R. -377, 381, [1969] 2 All E.R. 210, 212 (C.A.).
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of rules; rather, he emphasizes the word's geographical aspect as referring to a specific section of the world's surface. The result is that in
his application of the significant contacts test, he considerably overemphasizes the lex loci solutionis. Of course, the construction contract
at issue in Whitworth was geographically most clearly connected to
Scotland. But it is law and not geography that must regulate the rights
of the parties. Lord Reid ultimately found himself admitting that the
contract was most closely connected with the system of law of England,
although deciding that the proper law of the contract was Scottish
19
law.6
Lord Reid was alone in taking this view in the Whitworth case. 620
Judges in other cases would not be likely to overemphasize the role of
the place of performance. Nevertheless, Lord Hodson's lack of concern
621
at the distinction between the two versions of the choice of law rule,
and the failure of the rest of the House of Lords to mention this problem 622 is unfortunate. To formulate the rule in terms of the closest
connection with a particular country is to invite the unwary judge to
give unwarranted weight to the locus solutionis, or, in appropriate
623
cases, to the locus contractus.
6. Contracts Containing a Clause Selecting an Arbitral Forum
The similarity of the significant contacts rule as applied by the
courts in England and America has come about in spite of the different fundamental approaches to the choice of law problem prevailing
in the two countries. Although the Restatement (Second) section 188
logically follows from the principles of interest analysis, the proper law
concept is only one, albeit the most sensible, of a number of possible
rules which might have been adopted by a jurisdiction-selecting choice
of law system such as England's. The flexibility of the English rule is
by no means mandated by the English approach as a whole. Conse619 See text accompanying note 616 supra.
620 Lord Wilberforce, the only other member of the House of Lords to agree with

Lord Reid that the proper law was Scottish law, found that the contract was most dosely
connected with the Scots system of law. [1970] 1 A.C. 615-16, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 808-09.
621 See note 616 supra.
622 Of the others of Their Lordships, Lord Guest made no reference to "country" or
"system." [1970] 1 A.C. at 607-09, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 802-04. Viscount Dilborne (id. at 611,
[1970] 1 All E.R. at 805), and Lord Wilberforce (id. at 614, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 808) adopted
"system" without comment. Until Whitworth, the leading case on "country" or "system"
was Rossano v. Manufacturers' Life Ins. Co., [1963] 2 Q.B. 352, [1963] 2 All E.R. 214 (1962).
The criticism of Whitworth made here is consistent with the views expressed in that case.
623 This section has dealt with what is obviously a purely English problem. The
American rule-selecting, issue-by-issue approach simply looks for the particular rule with
the closest connection to the issue, rather than for a whole country or a legal system.
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quently, it is not surprising occasionally to find certain rather strict
choice of law rules under English law which, applied mechanically,
have the potential for producing results as unresponsive to the true
interests of the jurisdictions and the parties involved as any American
vested rights decision. However, it appears that English courts are not
unaware of this problem, and, in the area of contracts at least, have
now accepted that in different cases the same connecting factor should
not necessarily be given the same weight.
This development is exemplified by the recent abandonment by
the House of Lords of the rule qui elegit judicem elegit jus. The effect
of the rule, according to the English courts, was to make a choice of
arbitral forum tantamount to a choice of the law of that forum to
govern the parties' contractual obligations, absent a specific choice of
law clause. The Court of Appeal so held in three cases: Tzortzis v.
Monark A/B, 624 Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James
Miller & PartnersLtd.,625 and Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation
S.A. v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A.6 26 In Whitworth, the
Court of Appeal applied the converse of the qui elegit rule and, finding
that the proper law of the contract was English law, held that the law
governing the arbitration in Scotland was also English law. The House
of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal. Although the majority agreed
that the proper law was English, the House held that the parties were
at liberty to choose, and had in fact chosen, another law to govern the
arbitration procedure.
In Tunisienne the problem arose more directly. There, a French
company entered into a tonnage contract with a Tunisian company to
carry oil for the Tunisian company between two ports in Tunisia. A
number of trips over a period of several months were planned. An
English standard charterparty form rather than a form for a tonnage
contract was used, although it was not really appropriate. Several
amendments were made in the form, but as signed it included clause
thirteen, which specified that the agreement was to "be governed by
the law of the flag of the vessel carrying the goods," 627 and clause
eighteen, which provided that "[a]ny dispute arising during the execution of this charterparty [should] be settled in London, owners and
charterers each appointing an arbitrator .... For the purpose of en628
forcing awards this agreement shall be made a rule of court."
624 [1968] 1 W.L.R.
and accompanying text.
625 [1969] 1 W.L.R.
626 [1969] 1 W.L.R.
827 [1971] 1 A.C. at
628 Id.

406, [1968] 1 All E.R. 949 (C.A.); see Prebble, Part I, notes 334-38
377, [1969] 2 All E.R. 210 (CA.).
1338, [1969] 3 All E.R. 589 (C.A.).
601, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 89.
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The shipowners had insufficient ships of their own available to
perform the contract. Thus they chartered ships of other owners and
registry to fulfill their obligations. Disputes arose, and arbitration in
London commenced. The arbitrators found that at the time of the
signing of the contract the parties intended "at least primarily" 629
the oil to be carried in ships owned by the French company. They
found that French law governed the contract, and thus raised the issue
of measurement of damages, which was the crux of the case. Their
award was stated as a special case for decision of the High Court on the
issue of choice of law. The alternatives were French or English law,
since Tunisian law was considered to be identical to French law in
material respects. It was agreed that English procedural law governed
the submission. 3 0 Lord Justice Megaw upheld the arbitrator's choice of
law. The Court of Appeal reversed his decision, holding that the choice
of London as the arbitral forum amounted to a choice of law. The
House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal.
In the House there was, as was the case in Whitworth, considerable discussion of the rules for determining the proper law of a contract, which of course were directly in point in this case. In particular,
the force of clause thirteen of the contract was extensively canvassed.
(It could clearly not take effect literally, since during the first four
months of the contract the French company had utilized ships of Norwegian, Swedish, Liberian, French, and Bulgarian registration.) But
for the purposes of the present discussion, the most important parts of
Their Lordships' speeches in Tunisienne are those dealing with the law
on the effect in the choice of law process of a forum-selecting arbitration clause, and especially their attempted reconciliation of the decision
with pre-existing law. Lords Wilberforce and Diplock in particular
went to great pains to explain away the effect of earlier decisions of the
House of Lords and other English courts. One might object to their
treatment of several of these cases. One example was Lord Diplock's
treatment of the speech of Viscount Dunedin in N. V. Kwik Hoo Tong
31
Handel Maatshappijv. James Finlay and Co. Ltd.
The Kwik case involved an application to serve a High Court writ
out of the jurisdiction. Such service may be permitted by the court in
an action on a contract to be governed by English law by its terms or
by implication. 632 The issue in the Kwik case was whether the contract
629 Id. at 583, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 74.
630 The issue, of course, was hardly open to argument in view of the provision that
"[f]or the purpose of enforcing awards [the] agreement shall be made a rule of court." Id.
at 601, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 89. See note 688 and accompanying text infra.
631 [1927] A.C. 604.
632 See Prebble, PartI, note 836 and accompanying text.
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in dispute was so governed. The defendants contended that they relied
on a particular custom of a certain Javanese port relating to the antedating of bills of lading, and that this custom clearly was not governed
by English law, but by the law of Java. The plaintiffs pointed to the
arbitration clause in the contract, which read: "Any dispute arising
out of this contract is to be settled by arbitration of London brokers
in the usual manner, and this submission may be made a rule of the
High Court of Justice.

'68 3

Viscount Dunedin's speech in Kwik included the following statements:
The sole question, therefore, is whether the words of the [arbitration] clause quoted lead by implication to suppose that the contract is to be regulated by English law.
...It seems to me that what the parties here did was to submit
their possible disputes to a forum which was an English forum,
and that they, therefore, impliedly consented that the law which
was to regulate their decision was the law of that forum. That
does not mean that everything that would have to be decided
would necessarily be decided by English law. It means that the
underlying law was the law of England, but if by appropriate,
that is to say relevant, averment, it was alleged that any incident
of the contract fell to be determined by a foreign law, then the
English tribunal would proceed to inquire into that law as a
question of fact and give judgment accordingly.
I am therefore of the opinion that there is here in the words
of the order a clear implication that the matter should be adjudged according to English law. 634
Lord Diplock in Tunisienne had some difficulty in explaining
away these unequivocal words. He concluded that "[i]n this context
by 'underlying law' [Viscount Dunedin] may well have meant no more
than what I have called curial law." 6 5
This lip-service is in fact the only attention Lord Diplock pays
to the "context" of Viscount Dunedin's remarks. Clearly Viscount
Dunedin by "underlying law" meant proper law, and in referring to
the determination of any incident by foreign law he was merely referring to the long accepted choice of law rule that specific minor details
of performance are governed by the lex loci solutionis. A custom as
to bills of lading at the Javanese port of shipment could be a minor
detail of performance, and the fact that this custom should be governed
by the law of Java is in no way inconsistent with a holding that the
638 See [1927] A.C. at 606.
634 Id. at 607-08.
635 [1971] 1 A.C. at 606, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 94.
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proper law of the contract is English law. Furthermore, it is a strained
interpretation to say that a contract by its terms or by implication to
be governed by English law means a contract that may be governed by
foreign law, but which provides for submission to arbitration according to English procedure. Such an unlikely suggestion had never been
made before the Tunisienne case reached the House of Lords.
What may be inferred from this rather cavalier treatment of earlier
decisions by the House of Lords in the Tunisienne case? Certainly, the
House did not expressly overrule Kwik. Lord Wilberforce goes no
637
further than to call the case "ambiguous"'6 36 and "misunderstood,"
while for Lord Diplock it is "not... in conflict" with the Tunisienne
decision. 38 The views of both Their Lordships are debatable, and it is
certainly arguable that in Kwik and Tunisienne the English courts are
faced with two inconsistent holdings. Given a traditional view of precedent, a court in the future may be free to choose between the two
cases, and in fact to decide to return to the Kwik rule. For two reasons,
however, this is unlikely.
First, in Tunisienne the House of Lords made it very clear that it
did not regard its decision as inconsistent with Kwik. In the past, such
an assertion might have been taken at less than face value, for when
the House of Lords was bound by its previous decisions, it was naturally
more inclined to draw somewhat fanciful distinctions in attempts to
reconcile current opinions with past precedents. But since 1966, the
Lords have been free to overrule their earlier cases. 63 9 They chose, however, not to overrule Kwik. Thus, it might be somewhat difficult to
argue, in the face of strong statements by Lords Wilberforce and Diplock, that Kwik and Tunisienne are in fact in conflict.
Second, it is difficult to conceive of a case where the court would
be tempted to return to the strict qui elegit rule found in Kwik. The
most likely candidate for this regression would be a case involving a
contract containing an arbitration clause selecting an English forum,
but without other significant contacts with England, in which the court
nonetheless desired to hold that the proper law of the contract was
English. In these circumstances, even under the Tunisienne rule, the
court could simply decide that on the facts the most significant contact
was the arbitration clause, and that therefore English law governed.
This conclusion is reinforced by Lord Wilberforce's discussion in
636

Id. at 597, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 85.

637 Id. at 598, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 86.

638 Id. at 605, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 93.
639 See Practice Note, [1966] 3 All E.R. 77.
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Tunisienne of Naamlooze Vennootschap Handels-en-TransportMaatschappi] "Vulcaan" v. A/S J.Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi.640 There,
Lord Maugham had held that
the appellants being a Dutch company and the respondents Norwegian shipowners, there was a good reason, if not a necessity
for selecting the law which should apply to any future disputes,
and the submissions of such matters to the arbitration of two
persons in London and of an umpire who in case of difference
was to be nominated by the directors of the Baltic Mercantile
and Shipping Exchange showed clearly that English law and procedure were to be applied. 641
Lord Wilberforce commented:
There is nothing here which requires qualification or explanation.
I fully accept that, especially where the parties are of different
nationality and there is no other relevant factor, a clause providing
for arbitration in a third country is a strong indication which, because there is no other, may be called conclusive, in favour of the
proper law of that country. 642
It appears that the Tunisienne rule in effect incorporates the Kwik
rule, although making it more flexible. On appropriate facts, a court may
still decide, as it could under the Kwik rule, that a contract's proper law
is the law of the arbitral forum, despite the fact that there is no other
contact with that jurisdiction. At the same time, the court is no longer
compelled to reach this conclusion. 643 There is consequently no need
for the English courts to return to the Kwik approach, and one may be
confident that Tunisienne accurately expresses the English rule in
this area.
The qui elegit rule has never been a problem in America. Where
an arbitration clause has been before a court, the issue has almost
always been the validity of the clause rather than, assuming its efficacy,
what law the arbitrator should apply.6 " The reasons are historical.
Arbitration clauses have been enforceable for a shorter time in America than in England. 645 Further, the general rule in the United States
is that questions of law are for the arbitrator; there is no provision for
640 [1938] 2 All E.R. 152 (H.L.).

641 Id. at 156.
642 [1971] 1 A.C. 572, 599, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 87.
043 Of course, according to the reasoning adopted by Lords Wilberforce and Diplock
in the Tunisienne case, courts never were compelled to reach that conclusion.
644 See, e.g., cases discussed in Heilman, Arbitration Agreements andi the Conflict of
Laws, 38 YALE LJ. 617 (1928).
645 For a survey of the current state of arbitration legislation in the United States, see
Note, The Federal Arbitration Act in the State Courts: Converse Erie Problems, 55 CORNELL L. RPEV. 623, 624-25 n.1 (1970).
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one party to compel an arbitrator to state a case for judicial opinion,
646
either in federal or state arbitration statutes.
Nevertheless, there is a discernible tendency in the United States
for arbitrators to apply rules of law, and consequently to make choice
of law decisions. 647 The issue may arise as to what effect a clause selecting an arbitral forum should have on this decision. Without the benefit
of American authority,648 the Restatement (Second) takes the sound
view that
[p]rovision by the parties in a contract that arbitration shall
take place in a certain state may provide some evidence of an intention on their part that the local law of this state should govern
the contract as a whole. This is true not only because the provision shows that the parties had this particular state in mind; it is
also true because the parties must presumably have recognized
that arbitrators sitting in that state would have a natural tendency
to apply its local law. 649
This passage also states the rule of Tunisienne, which gives some
cause for gratification. English courts may be criticized for a mechanical application of the significant contacts test which does not do justice
to the full potential of its flexible approach to choice of law problems.
The House of Lords in Whitworth and Tunisienne is by no means
immune from such criticism. Nevertheless, when it came to the central
646 See id.; Prebble, Part I, notes 429-34 and accompanying text.
See Prebble, Part1, note 433 and accompanying text.
648 It might be thought that the analogous case of a choice of judicial forum would
provide some authority. There are of course numerous American cases on jurisdiction by
prior consent. See, eg., National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 US. 311 (1964); Washington v. Superior Ct., 289 U.S. 361 (1933). But no cases have been found where the significance of a jurisdiction-selecting clause was considered in relation to a choice of law
problem. A court should probably treat a clause selecting a judicial forum in the same
manner as is suggested in RESTATEMENT (SFcoND) § 218, comment b at 719. But see M.
WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATONAL LAW 437-38 (2d ed. 1950):
Perhaps it is correct to distinguish between the submission to a regular court of
a foreign country and the arbitration clause. In the former case it may be justifiable
to construe the clause to the effect that the foreign court should apply its own
conflict rules in order to find the proper law of the contract. In the case of an
arbitration clause such reference will hardly ever correspond to the presumptive
intention of the parties. If, for example, they refer the matter to arbitration by
the London Corn Exchange they probably expect the arbitrator to decide it just
as if it were a purely English case, i.e., to apply English municipal law as he understands it. The task of finding out which law the High Court would apply to the
case is beyond what should be demanded from an ordinary arbitrator.
649 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 218, comment b at 719. The Reporter cites the decision
of the Court of Appeal in Tunisienne. Id. at 720. To the extent that the greater includes
the lesser, this citation may perhaps be defended. Of course, the Court of Appeal gave far
greater weight to the arbitration clause than does the Restatement (Second). The Court
applied the qui elegit rule, which makes the arbitration clause virtually conclusive as to
choice of law. See notes 629-30 and accompanying text supra.
047
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issue in the two cases, the effect for choice of law purposes of a forumselecting clause, 50 the House unanimously adopted a flexible approach,
and rejected the mechanical formula of qui elegit judicem elegit jus.
The rather slow development of the English proper law rule thus
appears to be continuing. If English courts have not embraced the
advanced theorizing found in America, at least they are bringing a
certain measure of rationality to the problems of choice of law.
7.

The Significant Contacts Test Illustrated by Some Particular
Issues in, and ParticularTypes of, Contracts

a. ParticularIssues. The focus of this study is upon the essential
validity and effect of contracts. At this point, however, three particular
issues-contractual capacity, contract formalities, and usury-which
arise in both the United States and England will be discussed briefly.
The issues of contractual capacity and formalities requirements of
contract law have been chosen for two reasons. First, they go to the
validity or enforceability of the contract, and are therefore closely
related to the main study of essential validity. Second, they illustrate
the workings of the significant contacts test in America, and also some
of the limits upon the role of the proper law in England. 651
After capacity and formalities, the issue of usury will be considered. Although consideration of this issue may touch upon contractual validity, its chief interest lies in the variety of significant
conflicts problems that are likely to arise in usury cases, especially in
relation to public policy. Furthermore, American courts have traditionally solved choice of law problems in usury cases by somewhat exceptional means. Specifically, these cases are often solved by a variation
of the lex validitatis theory, even by courts which observe the vested
rights principle.
i. Capacity to Contract. In England, it appears to be accepted
that "[a] person's capacity to enter into a contract is governed by the
system of law with which the contract is most closely connected."65 2
Judicial authority is somewhat sparse. A number of cases support
the lex domicilii of the parties as governing capacity to enter contracts, but most of these cases involved the validity of marriage or
marriage settlements, with judges delivering opinions purportedly ap53
plicable to contracts generally.6
650 The matter was, of course, considered in reverse in Whitworth, with the argument
proceeding from the question of what was the proper law to the issue of what law governed
the arbitration.

651 See Prebble, Part I, notes 315-19 and accompanying text.
652

DIcEy & Moiuus 744 (footnote omitted).

053 See, e.g., Sottomayor v. De Barros No. 1, [1877] 3 P.D. 1, 5 (C.A.). For other cases,
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The most significant difference between the rule governing capacity and that governing questions of essential validity is that party
autonomy is not part of the capacity rule. This prevents the "strange
result" that would otherwise follow when "in the absence of proof
of an evasive intent, an infant could, by agreeing to the choice of a
system of law as the proper law of the contract, confer contractual
654
capacity upon himself."
This argument was not accepted by the editors of the Restatement
(Second). Under sections 198(1) and (2), "[t]he capacity of the parties to
contract is determined by the law selected by application of the rules
of §§ 187-188," and "[t]he capacity of a party to contract will usually
be upheld if he has such capacity under the local law of the state of
his domicil." This rule means that at least prima facie, parties may
obtain contractual capacity for themselves by a choice of law clause.
This freedom, however, will naturally be more limited than the parties' freedom of choice in relation to other issues that may arise in
contract cases. In particular, the public policy limitation upon contractual autonomy 6 5 may be expected to play a significant role. 56
By refusing to permit the parties' choice to govern issues of capacity, English law avoids the need to consider this issue in terms of public
policy. If questions of capacity are regulated by the legal system most
closely related to the contract, it would be unreasonable for English
ideas on capacity to override the rules of that system merely because
657
England is the forum.
The view of English law taken here is well illustrated by the
Ontario case of Charronv. Montreal Trust Co.658 In that case, a husband and wife, domiciled in Quebec but residents of Ontario, where
the husband was employed, entered into a separation agreement that
was, under Quebec law, void for want of capacity of the parties. On
the husband's death, the wife sued his executor in Ontario for arrears
under the agreement, which was valid under Ontario law. Delivering
the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in favor of the wife,
Lord Justice Morden first discussed as tests of capacity the lex loci
see DxcE, & MoRus 746. Of course, in the matrimonial sphere the importance of domicile
is far greater than in the area of commercial contracts.
054

DiCEY & Momus 745 (footnotes omitted).

655 Prebble, Part I, notes 355-81 and accompanying text.
656 See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) § 198, comment b at 632.
057 Cf. DIcEY & Moxes 745. A consequence of this feature of the English rule is that
the domicile of contracting parties becomes less important than it is in America. This is
a reversal of the older cases of both countries, when capacity in England was thought to

be governed by the domiciliary law, and in America by the lex loci contractus.
658 15 D.L.R.2d 240 (1959).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:635

contractus and the parties' lex domicilii, with the second standard, in
particular, being dismissed as "unrealistic."6 5 9 Rather, he held:
The solution to this problem, in my opinion, is that adopted by
the learned writers on private international law and [is] to decide
that a party's capacity to enter into a contract is to be governed
by .

.

. the law of the country with which the contract is most

substantially connected. 660

He actually went so far as to say that "whether [the husband] was
domiciled in Ontario or Quebec at the time of the separation agreement is ... immaterial." 661
Lord Justice Morden was entitled to find that in weighing the significant contacts to discover with which provincial legal system the separation agreement was most closely connected, the parties' domicile was of
so little consequence that it could be ignored, although in a separation
agreement case such a course seems a little extreme. But it was too
sweeping to disregard completely the question of domicile as a factor
to be weighed. 662 In underemphasizing the importance of domicile,
however, Lord Justice Morden highlighted two points that may be made
in relation to his judgment. First, the Charroncase concerned a separation agreement. If the parties' domicile is so unimportant in such a
transaction, a fortiori, in a commercial contract English law may be
expected to de-emphasize the role of domicile in deciding with which
law the contract is most closely connected. In particular, English courts
are unlikely to be moved by any presumptions in favor of capacity in
terms similar to those of the Restatement (Second) section 198(2).663
The origins of section 198(2) may be traced to the Currie school
of interest analysis. 664 Currie argued that where A, domiciled in state
659 Id. at 244.
060 Id. at 244-45, citing G. Cansnn, PRivATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 221-24 (5th ed. 1957);
A. DicEy, DicEY'S CONFLICT OF LAWS 769-74 (7th ed. J. Morris ed. 1958); J. FALCONBRIDGE,
ESSAYS IN THE CONFLICt OF LAWS 383-85 (2d ed. 1954).
661 15 D.L.R.2d at 242.
662 But see DIcEY & Moius 745:
In times of easy and rapid transport and great mobility of persons it would
often lead to inconvenience and to injustice if the validity of an ordinary contract

made in one country was allowed to depend on the law of the foreign domicile of
one party with which the other party could not be expected to be familiar. It
would be strange if a person aged twenty-two, who was domiciled in a country
by whose law he lacked capacity, could escape liability for the price of goods, not
being necessaries, bought by him in a shop in London. It would be equally strange
if an English court allowed a domiciled Englishman of nineteen to plead his infancy in answer to an action on the contract made under a foreign law under
which he had capacity.
663 See text following note 714 infra.
164 See Prebble, PartI, note 166 and accompanying text.
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X, where he has contractual capacity, contracts with B in state Y, where
A does not have capacity, the contract should be enforceable, because
X has declined to protect A, its domiciliary, and Y has no interest in
protecting him; therefore, the interests of both states in upholding the
bargain should prevail. 665 This type of reasoning has not met with
favor in England, at least in the present context. Dicey and Morris
argue that
English law should govern the capacity to enter into an English
contract, wherever the contracting parties are domiciled, and irrespective of the question whether a person would have had capacity
according to his personal law but is a minor according to English
law, or whether he is an infant according to the law of his domicile
but capable of contracting by the rules of English law. 666
In context, it is evident that Dicey and Morris are not concerned merely
with contracts that are most closely connected with English law, but
that they feel that the principle enunciated is of general applicability,
no matter to which system of law the contract is most significantly connected.
Assuming that the rules expounded in Charron667 and Restatement (Second) section 198 are correct for their respective jurisdictions,
the issue of capacity presents an unusual contrast between American
and English law. The English rule is simply a straightforward application of the significant contacts test, with the result that, theoretically
at least, it is possible for English courts to take a rather flexible approach
to cases where issues of capacity arise. A court following Restatement
(Second) section 198 has a more arduous task. First, it must decide
whether to recognize the parties' choice of law clause, if any. And here
the reasons for nonrecognition will be stronger than in the case of
most issues of contract law. Second, the court is instructed that in cases
where a party's domiciliary law does accord him capacity the domiciliary law will generally prove decisive on this issue.
With regard to cases where a party's domiciliary law denies him
capacity, one may infer from the Restatement (Second) that here, also,
the domicile of that party should be considered a most significant, and
in many cases determinative, contact for choice of law purposes. 668
065 B. CURRIE, SELECrED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT
666 DiCEY & MoRius 746 (footnote omitted).

OF

LAws 87-127 (1963).

667 Charron v. Montreal Trust Co., 15 D.L.R.2d 240 (1958).
668 This inference is drawn from the citation of Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 289 Ore. 1,
895 P.2d 543 (1964), in the Reporter's Note in support of § 198. See REFrATEMENT (SEcOND)
§ 198, Reporter's Note at 634. In that case the Oregon Supreme Court held invalid for
lack of capacity a contract between an Oregon "spendthrift" and a California domiciliary,
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However, American law, as stated in the Restatement (Second), is
dear. Where incapacity by the domiciliary law is alleged, the domicile
factor is not conclusive. The regular significant contacts test must be
applied, but with domicile being given emphasis. A corollary to the
importance accorded to domicile as a connecting factor in capacity
cases is the following proviso contained in a comment to section 198,
a proviso which typifies an attitude considerably at variance with the
English belief that generally speaking rules of capacity should not be
treated as manifesting strong state policies or interests.
[R]ules [of capacity] frequently embody a sufficiently strong
policy to warrant their application under the circumstances stated
in § 188 to the sacrifice of that choice-of-law principle which favors
application of a law which would uphold the contract in order to
.protect the justified expectations of the parties. 669
ii. Formalities of Contracts. Any discussion of English choice of
law rules relating to formalities of contracts must be preceded by a
caveat: according to Leroux v. Brown,670 any vestiges of the Statute of
Frauds of 1677 that remain in force in England are characterized as
procedural, not substantive. Nearly all Statute of Frauds problems before the English courts must now be determined by the lex fori. In
Leroux it was held that section four of the Statute, which is the section
governing all contracts to which the Statute applied, except contracts
for the sale of goods, was purely procedural and thus did not affect "the
solemnities of the contract." 67' This conclusion was based upon the
difference in wording between section four and section seventeen, the
sale of goods section.6 72 The latter was held to be substantive.
Since 1954, the Statute of Frauds has applied only to contracts of
guarantee and contracts for the sale or other disposition of an interest
in land. In both cases, the relevant provision is framed in terms of section four, that is, "no action shall be brought." 673 Thus issues raised
on the ground that the interest of California in having its validating law applied was not
"clearly more important" than the interest of Oregon. 239 Ore. at 16, 395 P.2d at 549.
669 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 198, comment b at 632.
670 138 Eng. Rep. 1119 (CA. 1852).
671 Id. at 1129.
672 Section 4 read, in relevant part: "[N]oe action shall be brought [upon certain specified types of contracts] unlesse the agreement upon which such action shall be brought
or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writeing .... " An Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes, 29 Cha. 2, c. 3, s. 4, at 775 (1677). Section 17 read, in relevant
part: "[N]oe contract for the sale of any goods wares or merchandises for the price of ten
pounds sterling or upwards shall be allowed to be good except . . . that some note or
memorandum in writeing of the said bargaine be made and signed by the partyes to be
charged .... " Id. s. 17, at 777.
673 In 1894, § 17 was repealed and re-enacted as § 4 of the Sale of Goods Act of 1894,
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by pleas of these provisions are necessarily characterized as procedural.
In America, the techniques of interest analysis have made this sort
of mechanical characterization obsolete. 7 4 Questions of formalities
are all treated in the same way. Under the Restatement (Second), "[t]he
formalities required to make a valid contract are determined by the law
selected by the application of the rules of §§ 187-188, [and f]ormalities
which meet the requirements of the place where the parties execute
the contract will usually be acceptable." 675 In England, apart from
Statute of Frauds questions, it seems that a contract will be formally
valid if it satisfies the requirements of either the place of making or
the proper law.670 Although they are phrased differently, the effect of

these two rules is in fact much the same.
The English rule, providing for an alternative reference to two
possible validating laws, illustrates the modem tendency in both countries to avoid striking down otherwise unexceptionable bargains on
grounds of lack of form alone. As Arthur Corbin states: "If a court is
convinced that the contract was made as alleged and that there has been
no fraud or perjury, it has no sympathy for a party whose only excuse
677
for repudiation is the lack of a statutory formality."
The Restatement (Second) section 199 may be expected to follow
a similar philosophy. In cases where there is no express choice of law,
the Restatement (Second) correctly states that the most significant con56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, at 357. In 1925, § 4 of the Statute of Frauds was repealed and re-enacted
as § 40(1) of the Law of Property Act of 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, at 58, insofar as the
section concerned the disposition of any interest in land. In 1954, the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act of 1954, 2 9- 3 Eliz. 2, c. 34, at 116, repealed § 4 of the Sale of
Goods Act, and § 4 of the Statute of Frauds, except insofar as the latter related to contracts of guarantee.
674 The important American cases to 1965 are collected and discussed in Currie,
Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds:Arn Inquiry into the Rule of Validation, 18 OKLA.
L. REV. 243 (1965). For a more extensive discussion, see R. HEILMAN, Tm CONFLICT OF
LAws AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDs (1961).
675 RFsrATEMENT (SEcoND) §§ 199(l), (2).
076 DicEy & MoRRIS 749-54. Compliance with the lex loci contractus is undoubtedly
sufficient. Current opinion is, however, that it is also unnecessary. See id. Ehrenzweig believes that the American rule is also one of alternative reference, with contracts able to
qualify as formally valid by one of several rules:
[C]ontracts having foreign contacts quite generally have been upheld by American
courts where such contracts have satisfied either the formality requirements of the
forum, or those of another jurisdiction provided that the state of the validating law
had sufficient contacts with the transaction to justify application of its law.
Ehrenzweig, supra note 610, at 876-77 (footnotes omitted); see A. EH1RENZWEIG, supra note
539, at 470-75. This purported application of Ehrenzweig's general rule of validation for
contract cases has been soundly criticized insofar as it claims to state the law as it actually
is applied by the courts. See Currie, supra note 74, at 243-44.
677 2 A. CORBIN, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 293, at 69 (1950).
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tact with the issue of formality is probably furnished by the place of
contracting. Dicey and Morris observe:
Questions of form are less likely than questions of substance to
have been considered by the parties in the course of the negotiations preceding the contract because they are of smaller interest to
them. Such questions turn up, as it were, suddenly when the
moment of completion arrives and when legal advice on them
must be available on the spot. Hence, in making their contract, the
parties must be able to rely on such legal advice as is available
in the place where they are and such advice (and assistance) is not
necessarily obtainable
with regard to any formalities except those
678
of the local law.
In cases where the parties have gone to the trouble of adopting a
choice of law clause, it may be generally expected that they will also
ensure that their contract complies formally with the chosen law. In
these cases, their contract would be valid under either the English or
the American rule. Where a contract is formally invalid under a stipulated governing law, but valid under the lex loci contractus, the English
rule of alternative reference will uphold it. In this situation the contract will probably also be upheld by a court applying the Restatement
(Second), for where a chosen law invalidates a contract, the Restatement (Second) directs the court to ignore the stipulation for that law
and to apply the principles of section 188.679 Thus, assuming the case
is not "unusual," the contract will be valid under section 199.
The foregoing discussion of formalities has been concerned with
the traditional formal requirements that have been imposed upon contracting parties by different laws, such as the Statute of Frauds, stamping laws, notarization rules, and rules on the transfer of corporate
stock. When originally enacted, such laws reflected strong social policies, policies designed to prevent fraud and perjury, to provide reliable
evidence of transactions, and to encourage individuals to deliberate
or to seek advice before binding themselves to important contracts.
These policies are still important. Nonetheless, English courts
have developed an alternative reference rule, and American courts are
also unsympathetic to pleas of informality. The explanation is, of
course, that many of the older laws on formalities, if applied, would
tend to frustrate rather than to further the objects of justice and social
6 80
policy.
678 DICEY & MoRRs 750 (footnote omitted).
679 I-TATEMENT (SECOND) § 187, comment e at 565-66.
680 The type of formalities rule that has been the subject of discussion here is not the
only sort that exists. In many jurisdictions there is a body of comparatively modern legis-
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iii. Usury. The issue of usury has traditionally held a unique
place in the choice of law process in America. Courts have, it seems, not
considered usurious rates of interest quite as objectionable as have
legislatures, and have made efforts to uphold contracts rather than to
avoid them under possibly applicable anti-usury statutes. Consequently,
an alternative reference rule was developed early. In Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co.,6 1 the United States Supreme Court held that
a possibly usurious contract should be judged by the law more favorable
to the lender of the laws of the place of making and of the place of
performance. Even Beale agreed with this rule, finding it an exception
to the general vested rights principle.68 2 The rule was refined in other
cases, so that when every conceivably applicable law would penalize
the lender to some extent, the least severe penalty would be applied.
Thus, rather than void the contract, the court might reduce the rate
68 3
of interest.
The flexibility of the alternative reference rule in Seeman has a
certain modem flavor, which is somewhat spoiled by the requirement
that the reference be to one of two laws, that of either the place of
making or of performance. These jurisdictions may have no other
connection with the contract. Other jurisdictions (for example, the
place of negotiating) may have at least as substantial a relationship with
the transaction. To remedy this deficiency, there has developed a
parallel line of authority holding that the alternative reference can be
to any law with a vital or substantial connection to the case. 8 4
While the alternative reference rule as developed promoted contractual certainty, it might appear that in some cases the interests of
the borrower were unduly sacrificed to those of the lender, or that
strong policies of interested states against high rates of interest were
overridden. A final gloss on the rule thus developed: a usurious conlation, passed to promote the same social objectives as the Statute of Frauds. A good
example is legislation on credit sales. Statutes in this area often require details of price,
rate of interest, and the rights of purchasers to be set out in writing. Such laws not only
represent strong public policies on the part of the legislatures involved, but are dearly
designed to combat current, as opposed to seventeenth century, problems. These modern
statutes are therefore treated differently than the more conventional formalities rules by
courts in both England and America. The courts of neither country will allow parties to
evade such laws by stipulating for some other governing law, or by manufacturing contacts, particularly the place of making. See DicEY & Moaus 753; RrATEmEN (SECOND)
§ 199, comment c at 635.
681 274 US. 403 (1927).
,82 2 J. BEALE, CoNFLiCt OF LAws § 347.4 (1935).
683 See, e.g., Union & Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Evans, 8 Tenn. App. 63 (1928).
684 See, e.g., Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., 128 Minn. 30, 37, 150 N.W. 229, 232
(1914).
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tract would be struck down if its interest rate greatly exceeded the allowable rate at the place of making or performance, for otherwise the
lender would be not so much obtaining the benefit of a liberal choice
of law rule, but actually evading a law that should apply to his busi85
ness6
The Restatement (Second) section 203 has retained this traditional
choice of law rule 80 in its essentials:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of
usury if it provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a
state to which the contract has a substantial relationship and is
not greatly in excess of the rate permitted by the general usury law
of the state of the otherwise applicable law under the rule of
§ 188.
The following gloss on the rule is added in an official comment: "If a
contract would be usurious under the general usury statutes of all
states to which it has a substantial relationship, the forum will apply
687
the usury statute of that state which imposes the lightest penalty."
Some commentators believe that this clear leaning toward upholding contracts rather than protecting borrowers in section 203 exhibits a laissez-faire attitude to the forces of the marketplace that is out
of tune with modem thought and practice. 8 8 Ehrenzweig, in particular,
believes that the issue of usury is one in which the general policy in
favor of validating contracts should not (and, he claims, does not) apply.
Courts should attempt to protect the economically weaker party, and
not allow the lender to shop for a law under which he might maximize
his interest. 689
In most states the law is uncertain in this area, as it is in
other areas where the issue is choice of law in contract. 960 On policy
See London Fin. Co. v. Shattuck, 221 N.Y. 702, 117 N.E. 1075 (1917).
686 The interpretation of the cases adopted here is not universally accepted. Leflar,
for example, contends that in the United States usury fundamentally is treated no differently from other issues going to the essential validity of contracts. See R. L.FLAR, supra
note 599, at 378-79.
087 REWTATEMENT (SECOND) § 203, comment d at 653. The Restatement (Second) further
085

notes that an express choice of law by the parties "will not secure application of a law
that would not otherwise be applicable to sustain a contract against the charge of usury."
Id., comment e at 653-57. This is because, considering the liberality of § 203, any other
law chosen could hardly have a substantial relationship with the contract, and its provi-

sions, if more liberal to the lender than those of any law possibly applicable under § 203,
would almost certainly be contrary to the policy of those laws.
688
689

See, e.g., R. LEr LAR, supra note 599, at 379.
A. EHRENzwEiG, supra note 539, at 482-85.

690 New York is probably an exception. See, e.g., Chrisafulli v. Childs, 33 App. Div.
2d 293, 307 N.Y.S.2d 701 (4th Dep't 1970). But see notes 694-95 and accompanying text

infra.
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grounds, the arguments would appear to favor the Restatement (Second) and not Ehrenzweig.
In cases in which one of two possibly applicable laws will hold
the contract valid and the other will void it for usury, the rates of interest allowed by the conflicting laws will not vary by much. The policy
of the state that would allow the lesser rate of interest will not be
greatly offended if the slightly higher rate permitted by the other state
is charged. In cases in which the state with the greatest interest in the
transaction would regard the interest charged as so excessive as to be
beyond all bounds then the exception provided for in section 203
comes into play.
Ehrenzweig's view insufficiently isolates the issue of usury from
other contractual questions which should be considered separately.
A typical example of a usurious contract is an extortionate consumer
credit agreement containing, perhaps, unconscionable terms providing
for repossession of goods by the seller or judgment by cognovit note.
One's visceral reaction is that choice of law rules should be fashioned
to penalize lenders engaging in such business practices, and if the rules
on usury can be applied to this end, so much the better. However, the
rules on public policy, adhesion contracts, and the exception in section
203 should be sufficient to protect the borrower in this type of situation.
As far as usury is concerned, it does not seem reasonable to strike down
a contract merely because it provides for interest slightly above the rate
permissible under a possibly applicable law.
Ehrenzweig is perhaps principally concerned with the "typical"
usurious contract described above. In fact, many contracts which might
be attacked as usurious are negotiated at arms length, and there is no
reason to suppose that the borrower is in a significantly weaker position
than the lender. Ehrenzweig's rule provides protection for small borrowers that might be better obtained from rules on public policy. His
broad principle could at the same time be less than fair to those
lenders engaged in ordinary commercial transactions. The recent New
York case of Chrisafulli v. Childs6 91 provides an example.
In Chrisafulli, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that a promissory
note executed by them was void, because the interest provided therein,
ten percent, exceeded the six percent permitted under New York law.
The conflicting law of Pennsylvania also limited interest to six percent,
but merely penalized the lender by making any excess irrecoverable,
rather than by voiding the entire transaction as did the New York law.
The note was to finance part of the sale .of some machinery by Penn691 33 App. Div. 2d 293, 307 N.Y.2d 701 (4th Dep't 1970).
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sylvania sellers to the plaintiffs, whose place of business was in New
York. The sellers had arranged with the defendants to make the loan
to the plaintiffs, who were represented throughout by counsel.
The court considered applying the significant contacts test simpliciter, but finally utilized the Restatement (Second) section 203,
giving judgment for the defendants for the amount still owing on the
note, plus interest at six percent.69 2 To have voided the contract would
have produced a windfall for the plaintiffs. 693
It is uncertain whether Chrisafullisettles the law in New York. In
stating the possible choice of law rules it might apply, the court did
not reject all other rules in favor of section 203. Rather, it "prefer[red]
to decide" 694 the case according to section 203 because "the application
of [that] rule would produce a just result." 695 One cannot therefore be
sure whether the court in Chrisafulliwas following what it believed to
be the correct New York rule where usury is in issue, or was merely
deciding that section 203 is applicable to arms-length transactions
where there is clearly no possibility of overreaching or other economic
pressure by the lender.
In England, the question of usury is no longer a live issue. Since the
Usury Laws Repeal Act of 1854,696 there has been no restriction on the
terms that may be agreed to between a borrower and a lender for the
payment of interest. The ordinary principles of contract law apply with
one exception, which relates to professional moneylenders as defined
by the Moneylenders Acts of 1900-1927.97 Transactions of moneylending by moneylenders may be reviewed by the courts if the terms are
harsh, unconscionable, or otherwise such that a court of equity would
give relief. 698 However, until the rate of interest reaches forty-eight
percent per annum a presumption of harshness does not arise. This
presumption is open to rebuttal by the lender. 699
As a result of the Usury Laws Repeal Act, 700 there are no reported
English cases on the conflict of laws where English law has been applied
to a question of usury. Nor do there appear to be any cases where an
692

Id. at 297, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 705.

693

Id.

694 Id.
,695 Id.

17 & 18 Vict., c. 90, at 113.
See, e.g., Moneylenders Act of 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 51, s. 6, at 157; Moneylenders
Act of 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 21, ss. 10(3), 19(3)-(5), sched. 2.
698 Moneylenders Act of 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 51, s. 1, at 155.
699 Moneylenders Act of 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 21, s. 10(1), at 316-17. The Moneylenders Acts are quite obviously not in the same spirit as American anti-usury laws.
700 17 & 18 Vict., c. 90.
696
697
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English court has applied the anti-usury laws of an American state (or
of any other jurisdiction) to a contractual dispute. The usury issue seldom, if ever, arises in international conflicts cases. However, a fairly accurate guess may be made as to the choice of law rule an English court
would follow if a foreign anti-usury statute were pleaded in a case before it.
In England there have been numerous conflicts cases on the question of rate of interest, as opposed to the narrower issue of usury. The
typical situation is where a moratorium law, or a reduction of interest
statute, is passed as an economic measure by, for example, the country
of the lender's place of business. In such a case, the rate of interest is
governed by the proper law of the contract.7 01 Consequently, the interest-regulating statute may or may not be applied to the loan.70 2 Because
England since 1854 has shown no particular interest in regulating
usury, there appears to be no reason why foreign anti-usury laws should
be treated any differently, with regard to choice of law, than any other
laws regulating interest rates. It is submitted with some confidence,
therefore, that the application of anti-usury laws in English courts depends upon the proper law of the contract.
b. Particular Types of Contracts. Just as certain contacts are
more significant with reference to certain issues than others, so do different contacts have varying degrees of significance depending on the
type of contract involved. This is true both when determining the governing law pursuant to section 188 of the Restatement (Second), and
when an English court is endeavoring to discover the proper law of a
contract without the aid of a specific choice of law clause. The Restatement (Second) sections 189-97 list several important types of contracts,
analyzing them to demonstrate in each case which contact is likely to
be the most significant. No attempt will be made to duplicate that
study; to expand upon it would involve an excessively lengthy disquisition.70 3 However, a few examples will be given in order to demonstrate
the operation of the significant contacts test as applied to certain of the
types of contracts identified by the Restatement (Second).
i. Sale of Land. Contracts for the sale of land provide one of the
best examples of both English and American choice of law rules in
operation. Under Restatement (Second) section 189:
The validity of a contract for the transfer of an interest in land
701 See, e.g., Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance and Gen'l
Mut. Life Assurance Soc'y Ltd., [1938] A.C. 224, [1937] 4 All E.R. 206 (P.C. 1937).
702 Id. See also cases collected in DicEY & MORRIS 847.
703 For example, one work is devoted entirely to conflicts involving life insurance
contracts. C. CARNAHAN, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1958).
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and the rights created thereby are determined, in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties, by the local law of the state
where the land is situated unless, with respect to the particular
issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under
the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in
which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
The rule adopted by Dicey and Morris, although couched in different terms, is to the same effect: "A contract with regard to an immovable is, in general, governed by its proper law. The proper law of
such contract is, in general, though not necessarily, the law of the coun-

try where the immovable is situate (lex

situs)."'704

Both the American and the English authorities accept that the autonomy principle (in England as part of the proper law doctrine) applies to land sales. Further, in the absence of an express choice of law,
or if there are reasons for ignoring such a choice, the significant contacts test applies. Generally, the situs of the land will be the most significant contact, and this will point to the law to be followed pursuant
to either Restatement (Second) section 188 or the proper law doctrine.
At the risk of stating the obvious, the reasons for the importance accorded to the lex situs are that it "furthers the choice-of-law values
of certainty, predictability and uniformity of result and, since the state
where the land is situated will be readily ascertainable, of ease in determination of the applicable law." 70 5 There may, of course, be occasions when other contacts are of sufficient importance to override the
7 06
situs contact.
704 DIcEY & Moams 786 (footnotes omitted). The rules of both Dicey & Morris and the
Restatement (Second) that are quoted here cover more than merely the sale of land. However, these rules do not purport to apply to conveyances of land, but rather to contracts
for the sale of land. The validity and effect of conveyances are determined by the law that
the lex situs would apply.
705 RESTATEmENT (SECONDm)
§ 189, comment c at 588.
706 An example is suggested by the Restatement (Second):
In state X, A and B, who are domiciled in that state, enter into a contract
for the transfer by A to B of an interest in land located in state Y. The contract
is invalid under X local law because of A's minority. It is valid under the local
law of Y, under which law A has capacity to contract. A fails to complete the
transfer, and B brings suit against A for breach of contract in a Z court. Among
the questions for the Z court to decide is whether X's interest in the application of
its rule of incapacity is outweighed in the particular case by the value of protecting
the justified expectations of the parties by upholding the contract as buttressed by
Y's interest in the application of its rule of capacity.
RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) § 189, illustration 2.
The Restatement (Second) answers this question as follows:
The fact that A and B are both domiciled in X would lend support to the view
that X is the state with the dominant interest in the issue of capacity and that
accordingly its rule of incapacity should be applied.
Id. In England, a different answer might be given, because English courts decide issues of
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ii. Life Insurance. The area of life insurance offers an interesting
contrast between the attitudes of the English and the American judiciary as to what contacts are most significant. In the United States, life
insurance has proved a very fruitful field for conflicts litigation.7 07 The
great majority of cases have held the lex loci contractus to govern.
Nevertheless, no reason appears why modem interest analysis should
not replace the place of making rule in this field of contract law. New
York has adopted the significant contacts rule for life insurance cases, 70
and other states appear to be following suit.70 9 The Restatement (Second) would thus appear to be on firm ground in asserting that absent a
more significant contact the validity of such a contract is determined by
the law of the insured's domicile at the time application for the policy
was made.7 10 In England, the same basic significant contacts test is applied, but with quite different results:
(1) A contract of insurance is governed by its proper law.
(2) If an intention to choose the proper law has not been expressed
in the insurance policy and cannot be inferred from the circumstances, and if there is nothing to show that the contract is more
closely connected with another system of law, the contract is governed by the law of the country in which the insurer carries on his
business, and, if he carries on his business in two or more countries,
by the law of the country in which his head office is situated. 711
Why is it that in America the most significant contact is considered
to be the domicile of the insured, while in England it is generally the
domicile of the insurer? In those insurance cases involving choice of
law problems, courts are faced with interests of both the insurer and
the insured, which are not really capable of reconciliation by any practical compromise. It is simply a question of choosing one law or the
other.
capacity by the law most significantly connected to the contract and not necessarily to the
particular issue. Therefore, although X is the state most interested in the capacity issue,
an English court might well apply Y law if it feels that Y law is the law most closely connected to the contract as a whole. English reluctance to view the capacity as raising issues
of public policy which might override Y law lends weight to this conclusion.
707 See cases collected in R. LEFLAR, supra note 599, at 380-83; cases cited in Paul &
Plain, Choice of Law in Life Insurance Litigation, 4 FORUM 1, 2 (1970).
708 Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970); Fleet Messenger Serv.
v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 315 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1963); cf. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.
v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d 1, 143 N.E.2d 357, 163 N.Y.$.2d 626 (1957).
709 See, e.g., Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
319 F.2d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1963); United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Cody, 286 F. Supp. 552,
553 (W.D. Wash. 1968); Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, 70 Wash. 2d 893, 899,
425 P.2d 623, 627 (1967).
710 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 192.

711 DicEY & Moams 810 (footnotes omitted).
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In favor of the law of the domicile of the insured is his usual position as the economically weaker party on the receiving end of an adhesion contract. In favor of the law of the company's place of business,
however, is the consideration that
[i]n insurance, the multitude of contracts concluded by the company constitutes a unity-statistically, economically, and legally.
The analysis of risks on the basis of which premiums are calculated
is safe only when all policies in force in one group are governed by
the same rules of law. 712
Furthermore, the "adhesion contract" argument cuts both ways. For
certainty and predictability, it is arguable that the complex and standardized life insurance contracts of one company should be governed
by the same law.
A final argument also points to the law of the company's place of
business: it may be in the interest of the insured to have his contract
tied to the law of the home office of the insurer. 13 In some cases, life
insurance with a foreign insurer is purchased as a protection against
economic vicissitudes at the domicile of the insured, in the hope that
the more stable foreign currency will protect his investment. Economic
regulations adopted by the insured's domicile, if applied to the insurance contract, are liable to reverse any advantages he might otherwise
have gained.7 14
The reasons for English courts' acceptance of the arguments in
favor of the law of the insurer stem from a difference in the types of
problems that have arisen in English life insurance cases as compared
with American ones, and from a different attitude toward the regulatory
legislation governing insurance contracts found in most jurisdictions.
Claims against insurance companies in American courts have
tended to involve the defendant's reliance upon policy provisions
which are outlawed by an arguably applicable law, frequently the law
of the forum, which is also the law of the domicile of the insured.7 1 5
In leading English cases, however, insurance companies have tried to
712 Lando, Scandinavian Conflict of Laws Rules Respecting Contracts, 6 Am. J. COMe.
L. 1, 16 (1957).
713 These arguments in favor of the place of business of the insurer are detailed in
Unger, Life Insurance and the Conflict of Laws, 13 INT'& CoVp. L.Q. 482, 483-89 (1964).
Unger also notes that insurance companies generally hold assets in many jurisdictions and
that consequently they should be protected from forum shopping. But this argument does
not necessarily favor the application of the law of either the insurer or the insured; rather,
it supports the adoption of the same choice of law rule in all jurisdictions.
714 See, e.g., Varas v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 204 Pa. Super. 176, 203 A.2d 505 (1964);
Rossano v. Manufacturer's Life Ins. Co., [1963] 2 Q.B. 352, [1962] 2 All E.R. 214 (1962).
715 See, eq., cases cited in note 708 supra.
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rely upon exchange control legislation at the domicile of the insured
in order to avoid payment under the policy according to the law of the
jurisdiction where the head office of the defendant is located.7 18 Consequently, if both American and English courts prefer to protect the
economically weaker party in life insurance cases, this result will be
more frequently brought about by applying the law of the insured's
domicile in America, and of the insurer's head office in England.
Further, English international insurance business may be viewed
as one aspect of English economic colonialism, or as invisible exporting, depending upon one's point of view. England provides many financial services to persons in other countries, and the tendency has been
for parties to favor English commercial law to govern these transactions. 717 Just as head offices of English shipping and financial houses
have exported their law with their services, so may insurance companies be expected to do. The American interstate insurance business
is rather different. Insurance companies frequently have large offices
in many, if not all, states, each of which wants to regulate any insurance
business conducted with its citizens. The same reason for domination
by the law prevailing at the home office does not therefore exist.
English courts appear to take what would be regarded in America
as an old-fashioned view of legislation aimed at protecting the insured
from the insurer's superior bargaining power, at least when an English
domiciliary is involved. Such legislation would be regarded as indicative of a strong forum policy which would override the normal conflicts
rules in any event. 718 The English Insurance Companies Act of 1958,
for example, applies "to all insurance companies, whether established
within or outside Great Britain, which carry on within Great Britain
insurance business."71 9 Consequently, at least in the case of insurance
business transacted in England with English domiciliaries, English
courts would reach the same conclusion as their American counterparts
720
where the issue was regulated by protective legislation.
716 See, e.g., Rossano v. Manufacturer's Life Ins. Co., [1963] 2 Q.B. 352, [1962] 2 All
E.R. 214 (1962). This paragraph is somewhat generalized. There have been numerous cases
before American courts where defendant insurance companies have argued that Cuban
exchange control regulations apply to their contracts with ex-Cuban domiciliaries, the
plaintiffs in their turn claiming that the law of an American state governs. See, e.g., Varas
v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 204 Pa. Super. 176, 203 A2d 505 (1964).
717 Cf. Vita Food Prods. Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C. 277, 290-93,
[1939] 1 All E.R. 513, 521-22 (P.C.) (N.S.) (Lord Wright).
718 See Dicxy & Mo~ans 812.
719 Insurance Companies Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 72, s. 1(1), at 1075.
720 Legislation regulating insurance contracts and containing choice of law provisions
is, as might be expected, not uncommon in America. See C. CARNAHAN, supra note 703, at
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Finally, it should be mentioned that the right of parties to determine the law governing the agreement may in some cases be circumscribed. Insurance agreements may be regulated as adhesion contracts
in order to protect the rights of the weaker party.7 2' These regulations
could be rather easily evaded if the parties to an insurance contract
were allowed to choose not to be governed by them. Thus, interest
analysis, as interpreted by the Restatement (Second), refuses to recognize choice of law provisions in life insurance contracts unless the law
chosen is more favorable to the insured than is the conflicting law, or
unless the insured had a genuine choice in the matter by being offered
two or more possible laws to choose from, or by being represented by a
group of one kind or another which, because of its superior bargaining
position, is able effectively to represent his interests.7 22 English law appears, however, to permit autonomous choice of law in life insurance
723
will
contracts, although recognizing that the public policy exception
72
have unusual force in these cases. A
iii. The Uniform Commercial Code, and a ParticularExample of
Contracts Subject Thereto: Sale of Chattels. Where a contract expressly stipulates for a governing law, the choice of law rule mandated
by the Uniform Commercial Code is essentially similar to that followed
by jurisdictions which follow the autonomy principle. 725 But where
there is no express or inferable choice, the rule is quite different from
the usual significant contacts test. Under section 1-105(1) of the Code,
substantive Code provisions will simply be applied "to transactions
726
bearing an appropriate relation to [the forum] state."
An official comment to section 1-105 attempts to justify this extreme forum-favoring provision, but does not offer much help on the
question of what constitutes an "appropriate relation":
124-25. This type of legislation is very unpopular with modern conflicts scholars, since it
inhibits the free operation of interest analysis. See, e.g., Leflar, Choice-Influencing Con.
siderations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 267, 272-79 (1966). The rule in the REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) § 192 somewhat misleadingly ignores this legislation, although of course all

choice of law rules in the Restatement (Second) must be read subject to § 6(1).
721 See Prebble, Part I, notes 382-88 and accompanying text.
722 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 192, comments e-l.
723 See Prebble, Part I, notes 355-81 and accompanying text.
724 See DICEY & Moms 812.

725 See Prebble, Part 1,notes 461-78 and accompanying text.
726 It should be noted that there are in the Code certain specific choice of law rules
that apply to particular contracts, e.g., bank deposits and collections, and bulk transfers.
These specific rules vary even more from the flexible norm of the significant contacts test.
They are critically discussed in Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Commercial
Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 114 (1951).
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Where a transaction has significant contacts with a state which
has enacted the Act and also with other jurisdictions, the question
what relation is "appropriate" is left to judicial decision. In
deciding that question, the court is not strictly bound by precedents established in other contexts. Thus a confict-of-laws decision
refusing to apply a purely local statute or rule of law to a particular
multi-state transaction may not be valid precedent for refusal to
apply the Code in an analogous situation. Application of the
Code in such circumstances may be justified by its comprehensiveness, by the policy of uniformity, and by the fact that it is in large
part a reformulation and restatement of the law merchant and of
the understanding of a business community which transcends
7 27
state and even national boundaries.
Assuming that such advice is followed, it appears unlikely that a
comprehensive body of precedent could grow up around the meaning
of "appropriate," even as that term is used specifically in the present context. Of course, there may be occasions when trial courts make singularly erroneous decisions, holding, perhaps, that some quite insignificant contact between the forum and the transaction furnishes an
"appropriate relation," or, although less likely, refusing to apply the
Code to a contract clearly significantly connected with the forum state.
Through appellate review of such decisions judges might be able to
formulate some outside guidelines to the meaning of "appropriate."
Generally speaking, however, each case is the subject of "judicial decision," which presumably means that its facts will be considered on their
own.

The operation of the Uniform Commercial Code section 1-105(1)
may be illustrated by the case of a simple sale of goods with multistate
or multinational connections, since the Code also applies to such transactions. 728 If no express choice of law has been made, and this case
comes before a court in a Code state, then the Code will be applied if
the sale bears an appropriate relation to the forum. Such a relation, in
the case of a simple sale, could include the place of delivery, the place
of business of the seller or buyer, or the place of the negotiation of the
contract, depending on the circumstances of the case.
Under the most significant contacts test, the sales transaction
would be examined, and one law only would be chosen as the law most
closely related to the issue at bar. Generally speaking, this law would
probably be that of the place of delivery. In fact, the Restatement (Sec727 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
728

See id. §§ 1-105(1), 2-102.

1-105,

Comment

3.
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ond) section 191 states the choice of law rule for the sale of chattels in
these terms:
The validity of a contract for the sale of an interest in a chattel
and the rights created thereby are determined, in the absence of
an effective choice of law by the parties, by the local law of the
state where under the terms of the contract the seller is to deliver
the chattel unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other
state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated
in § 6 to the transaction and the parties,
in which event the local
7 29
law of the other state will be applied.
Although discussion of the Uniform Commercial Code, with its
specific and mandatory choice of law rules, does not lend itself to exhaustive comparison with English rules, for completeness it may be
mentioned that the sale of chattels is in English law quite an ordinary
type of contract, to be governed as to validity and effect by the proper
law.

730

VI
REFERENCE BY THE FORUM TO FOREIGN CHOICE OF LAw RULES

The role of renvoi 731 in the conflict of laws has been widely
treated.73 2 The general utility and the logical conundrums associated
729 This rule is of little more than academic interest. However, it does demonstrate
the difference between the forum-favoring rules of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
significant contacts test of the Restatement (Second). But the Restatement (Second) is of
course wrong in saying that § 191 contains the American choice of law rule governing
contracts for sale of chattels. That rule is found in § 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The mistake of the Restatement (Second) is somewhat surprising, since the Restatement (Second) notes the "well-nigh universal adoption of the Code by states of the United
States." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 191, comment c. It may be inferred from the Restatement (Second) that the Reporter and his advisors are under the impression that the choice
of law provisions of the Code are not applicable to international conflicts of law: "In any
event, choice-of-law problems involving the contracts dealt with here will continue to
arise involving this country's foreign commerce." Id. In this case § 191 would be correct
as far as such litigation is concerned. If this inference is correct, the Restatement (Second)
is mistaken. Section 1-105(1) expressly covers transactions involving contacts with "another
state or nation."
730 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais, [1884] 12 Q.B.D. 589, 53 L.J.Q.B. 156, 32 W.R.
761 (CA.). See also cases collected in DicEy & MoRass 791 n.32.
731 "Renvoi" is used in this article to include either remission, transmission, or both,
as appropriate.
732 Allemes, The Problem of Renvoi in Private International Law, 12 GRonus 63
(1927); Falconbridge, Renvoi and Succession to Moveables, 46 L.Q. Rav. 465 (1930); Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 190
(1910); Schreiber, The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law, 31 HARV. L. REv.
523 (1918). For the best general treatments of renvoi in England and America respectively,
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with the doctrine 733 will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that generally speaking there is considerable uncertainty as to the functions of
73 4
renvoi.
Most English and American courts and writers are in agreement
735
that "the principle of renvoi finds no place in the field of contract."
One reason is that to apply renvoi in contract actions would render
even more uncertain the already difficult choice of law problems presented by these cases, without providing any compensating advantages
of justice or convenience. The doctrine would also almost certainly defeat the intention of the parties.7 36 As Ehrenzweig has pointed out:
Once the fictitious regime of the lex contractus is replaced,
as it must be, by a general recognition of party autonomy, renvoi
must be wholly rejected. It would clearly be absurd to argue that
where the parties have intended application of a foreign law they
have also intended application of those rules of the "whole"
foreign law which deny their own applicability by referring to
another law. Such reasoning
would deny effect to the very inten73 7
tion that it invokes.
Nevertheless, renvoi continues to present problems in the contract
field both in England and in America. The difficulties can be traced to
three main sources: the judicial history of renvoi, the post-Bealean consee DICEY & Moams 53-71, and A. VON MEHREN & D.

TRAUTMAN,

THE LAW OF MULTISTATE

(1965).
733 Nor will whether there are any strictly "logical" difficulties at all with renvoi
and its so-called circulus inextricabilis be explored. See Cowan, Renvoi Does Not Involve
a Logical Fallacy, 87 U. PA. L. REV. (1938); Cowan, Indeterminacy in the Conflict of Laws,
in THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTAcrS 142 (U. Mich. Law School Summer Inst. on Int'l & Comp. L. ed. 1951).
PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICr OF LAWS 509-52

734

"The truth would appear to be that in some situations the doctrine [of renvoq

is convenient and promotes justice, and that in other situations the doctrine is inconvenient and ought to be rejected." J. MoRIus, CASES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 24
(4th ed. 1968).
735 In re United Rys. of the Havana & Regla Warehouses Ltd., [1960] Ch. 52,
96-97, 115 (C.A. 1958); see Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir.
1955); cf. Rosencrantz v. Union Contractors Ltd., 23 D.L.R.2d 473 (1960). This statement
is true, even with regard to contracts for the transfer of interests in land. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) § 189. However, where the issue is the validity and effect of a conveyance of an
interest in land, in order to ensure that its decision will be respected a court should
apply the same rules as would the lex situs; that is, the foreign court theory of renvoi
should be followed. See note 801 and accompanying text infra. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §
223 reads: "(1) Whether a conveyance transfers an interest in land and the nature of the
interest transferred are determined by the law that would be applied by the courts of
the situs. (2) These courts would usually apply their own local law in determining such

questions."
736 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 187, comment h.
737 A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 539, at 338.
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flict of laws revolution, and the English adherence to the pre-interest
analysis, jurisdiction-selecting approach to choice of law.
A.

Renvoi in America
1. Cases

Contrary to current practice, American courts historically did not
hesitate to invoke renvoi in contract cases. Generally, the reason for
this was a desire of the court to temper the effect of some otherwise applicable mechanical choice of law rule. The most celebrated of these
7 33 In that case, the
cases is University of Chicago v. Dater.
plaintiff
loaned a sum of money to a married woman domiciled in Michigan on
the security of property in Illinois. Parts of the transaction occurred
in each state. At the time, married women had contractual capacity in
Illinois, but not in Michigan. In an action on the loan against the woman,
the majority of the Supreme Court of Michigan decided the case on the
assumption that the loan contract was governed by the law of Illinois.
It found, however, that Illinois would decide the question of capacity
according to the law of the woman's domicile, which in this case was
Michigan. The court, therefore, held the contract unenforceable.
While cases of the Dater vintage739 may be dismissed as having
been decided by courts whose eyes had not been opened to the theories
of interest analysis, the same cannot be said of two more recent cases
before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Although the net
result of the two cases is probably to confirm that renvoi has no place
in the law of contract, they do demonstrate that even sophisticated
judges aware of the modem approaches to the conflict of laws may
support the use of renvoi in contract cases.
The first case is Mason v. Rose.740 This case concerned an agreement executed in England between Mason, an actor, and Rose, a producer, to participate in a film-making joint venture. Mason sued in
New York for a declaration that the agreement was legally ineffective
for indefiniteness, and therefore not binding. It was agreed (as was
hardly open to question) that New York conflict of laws rules should
decide the applicable law.7 41 The choice was between the law of En738 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936).
739 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954); Duskin

v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp. 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 829
(1948); Ellis v. Crowe, 193 Ark 255, 99 S.W.2d 568 (1936). Cambell v. Sheraton Corp. of
America, 363 Mo. 688, 253 S.W.2d 106 (1952); Mandelbaum v. Siberfeld, 77 N.Y.S.2d 465
(N.Y. City Ct. 1944).
740 176 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1949).
741 Id. at 488.
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gland, where the alleged contract was executed, and that of California,
where it was to be performed. The majority of the court held that the
New York rule pointed to England as the lex loci contractus.742 How-

ever, the majority then proceeded to consider how an English court
would decide the case, referring to the English rules for finding the
proper law of the contract.
An English court, it was decided, would define the proper law of
the contract as either the law presumably intended by the parties, or
the law with which the transaction had its most real connection.7 43 Was
this California or English law? The court decided that it was not necessary to answer this question, for under the laws of both California and
England the alleged contract was unenforceable for vagueness. 7 4 Nonetheless, the majority judgment in Mason v. Rose furnishes a clear example of renvoi in practice. 745
Circuit Judge Frank, although concurring in the result, was dissatisfied with the reasoning of the majority. Noting that there was a
false conflict between the laws of England and of California,7 4 he simply held that the agreement between Mason and Rose was not a binding contract.7 47 In view of his later judgment in Siegelman v. Cunard
White Star Ltd.,748 it is interesting to note that his concurring opinion
in the Mason case denounced the majority opinion as "unnecessarily
' 49
stirring up the hornets' nest of renvoi along the way."
Siegelman involved a contract of passage from New York to Cherbourg aboard an English ship. One clause of the printed conditions on
the ticket stated: "All questions arising on this contract ticket shall be
decided according to English law with reference to which this contract
750
is made."
Upholding the choice of English law as governing the contractual
dispute that had come before the court, the majority was adamant that
[t]he provision must be read as referring to [English] substantive
law alone, for surely the major purpose of including the provision
742 Id.
743 In 1949, when Mason v. Rose was before the New York Court of Appeals, both
these formulations were correct. See notes 504-08 and accompanying text supra.

176 F.2d at 488-89.
Here, renvoi by transmission: from New York to England, and then, following
English conflict of laws rules, to California.
746 Frank did not use the modern terminology. For a discussion of the false conflict
concept, see Prebble, Part I, notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
747 176 F.2d at 491.
748 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
749 176 F.2d at 491.
750 221 F.2d at 209.
744
745
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in the ticket was to assure Cunard of a uniform result in any
litigation no matter where the ticket was issued or where the litigation arose, and this result might not obtain if the "whole" law of
England were referred to.751
Judge Frank dissented, stating that the clause referred to English law
as a whole, and not merely to its domestic rules.7 5 2 Consequently, while
the current rule in the United States is probably represented by the
judgment of the majority in Siegelman, the dissent of Judge Frank in
that case, and the Mason decision, indicate that the position is not absolute.
2. Renvoi and the Vested Rights Doctrine
Despite University of Chicago v. Dater,753 the modem rejection of

renvoi in contract cases is not a departure from traditional learning.
The first Restatement excluded the doctrine from any consideration
not only in contracts, but in nearly every other field touched by the
conflict of laws3 54 This attempt failed, as witnessed by Dater and similar cases, 7 55 for reasons both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, a

rejection of renvoi is inconsistent with a strict application of the vested
rights doctrine.
Although the renvoi doctrine is rejected by the Restatement on
principle, the notion of "enforcement of foreign-created rights"
and of the so-called Conflict of Laws "jurisdiction" of any state to
create "rights" for "recognition" or "enforcement" by another
state, is one of renvoi, for the conception is that the law of the
forum enforces the identical right "created" by the law of the
other state, referring to the particular case at hand, including its
Conflict of Laws features .... To speak of "recognition" or "enforcement" of "foreign created rights" presents the dilemma of
56
either renvoi on the one side or misdescription on the other
194.
203.
277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936).

751 Id. at
752 Id. at
753

rESrATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (1934).
755 See, e.g., cases cited in note 739 supra.
756 Lorenzen & Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, 83 U. PA. L. REv.
555, 560-61 (1935). See also W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT
OF LAws 374-75 (1942): "mThe apparent complete rejection of [the renvoi] theory in the
754

tort and contract cases by Professor Beale, Professor Goodrich, and the Restatement, can
be supported only by an abandonment of the 'vested rights' theory."
This rejection of renvoi is reconcilable with and was probably compelled by other basic
theories of the first Restatement. The Restatement was of the view that the conflict of
laws could and should be reduced to a relatively small body of rules that could be applied
to numerous situations, and that the chief and only important policies of the conflict of
laws should be the encouragement of uniformity and predictability of result, and the
avoidance of forum shopping. See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 732, at
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The Restatement's rejection of renvoi was also likely to be disregarded in practice. A British observer studying American contract
cases, at least before the recent trends in the conflict of laws began to
be reflected in judicial decisions, might expect that renvoi would be
needed to play a greater part in mitigating the effects of the mechanical
American choice of law rules as found in the first Restatement than
would be required of it in England, with that country's more flexible
doctrine of the proper law.757 Renvoi could serve as an escape route for
7
a court faced with an inflexible and unacceptable choice of law rule.

58

B. Renvoi in England
1. Minor Cases
Because the English proper law doctrine escaped the stranglehold
of Bealeism, there has never been the same necessity for English courts
to resort to renvoi in contract cases. Nevertheless, support can be found
for the doctrine in a small number of cases.
Although the decision in New Brunswick Railway Co. Ltd. v.
British and French Trust Corp. 59 does not depend upon application of
513. Renvoi is largely in conflict with these values, because it immediately introduces
complexity into a case and promotes particularization rather than generalization of rules.
Because of such particularization and, especially, its requirement of consideration of the
specific rules of the potentially relevant legal systems before a final choice of law has
been made, renvoi has been described as a Trojan horse for the issue-by-issue approach
of interest analysis. Id.
757 Cf. Falconbridge, Renvoi in New York and Elsewhere, 6 VAND. L. REv. 708,
716-21 (1953).
758 This escape-route approach has not lacked scholarly support. Notably, Professor
Erwin Griswold argued for the wider use of renvoi in Anglo-American law. See Griswold,
Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1938). While Griswold did not explicitly contend that renvoi was a suitable tool for the solution of contract cases in general, he gave
as an example of the type of situation where renvoi would be useful the case of a
principal's alleged ratification of his agent's unauthorized contract. Id. at 1200. Griswold
notes:
It is generally said that where a contract is made without authority in state X
and the principal subsequently ratifies it in state Y, the validity of the contract
is governed by the law of X, even though the principal was always in Y....
Might there be value in an approach which said that the principal's act was
governed by the law of Y where he acted, but the "whole law" of Y in such a case
might well refer to the law of X?
Id. More important, Griswold expressly approved of the majority's reasoning in University of Chicago v. Dater. See id. at 1208. Writers less conservative than Griswold are
also willing to recognize that in jurisdictions maintaining a Bealean approach to the
conflict of laws, judicious use of renvoi can prevent otherwise unsatisfactory results.
See, e.g., von Mehren, The Renvoi and Its Relation to Various Approaches to the Choice
of Law Problem, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARAnvE AND CONFLCTS LAW 380, 385-89 (K.
Nadelmann, A. von Mehren &J. Hazard eds. 1961).
759 [1939] A.C. 1 (1938).
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the renvoi doctrine, since the two laws involved (English and Canadian) were, in relevant respects, the same, a dictum of Lord Romer appears almost unwittingly to use renvoi reasoning.
For in the case of a contract which is governed by English law,
but which provides for its performance in a foreign country, a
term is to be implied in the contract that such performance shall
be regulated by the law of that country, i.e., the lex loci solutionis,
and there being no evidence that Canadian law differs from our
law in this respect it is to be assumed that this rule prevails in
Canada.7 60
Lord Romer is probably wrong in stating that performance of a
contract is governed by the lex loci solutioni.761 However, the point to
be emphasized is that his Lordship refers to the lex loci solutionis not
by virtue of an English forum choice of law rule, but because he be7 62
lieves that he is directed to do so by the proper law of the contract.
Ocean Steamship Co. v. Queensland State Wheat Board763 was an
appeal against an order setting aside a District Registrar's order granting leave to serve a writ out of the jurisdiction pursuant to Order XI
Rule 1(e) of the Supreme Court, which provides that a writ may not be
served outside the jurisdiction unless the contract is, by its terms, to
be governed by English law.764 The contract involved was incorporated
into a bill of lading issued in Queensland. One clause of the bill
expressly chose English law as the governing law of the contract,
but another clause provided that the Australian Sea Carriage of Goods
Act,7 65 was to be incorporated into the agreement. Under section nine
of the Australian Act, the law of the place of shipment (here Brisbane)
governed the contract; any contrary provision was null and void.
In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal first referred to the
English law explicitly chosen, and, construing the contract under English law, found that in fact the intention was that Australian law
760 Id.
761

at 44.

See Morris, The Eclipse of the Lex Loci Solutionis-A Fallacy Exploded, 6 VAND.

L. REv. 505, 531 (1953).
762

In Wanganui-Rangitikei Elec. Power Bd. v. Australian Mut. Provident Soc'y,

50 Commw. L.R. 581, 604 (Austl. 1934), a comparable case, Mr. Justice Evatt stated quite
definitely, and, it is submitted, wrongly, that

although the law of country A is the proper or governing law of the contract,
and the law of country B may be referred to in order to determine the method
and incidents of performance of the contract, this is because the law of country
A itself requires or concedes that the methods and incidents of performance
should depend upon the law in force at the locality of performance, that is,

country B.

[1941] 1 K.B. 402, [19 4 1] 1 All E.R. 158 (CA. 1940).
764 This rule is the equivalent of an American long-arm statute.
765 Sea Carriage of Goods Act of 1924, 4 Commw. Acts 1901-1950, at 3921 (Austl. 1953).
768
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should govern. 7 6 The result, in effect, was that the parties were held to
have stipulated for renvoi to apply to their contract by express choice.
A contract including such a stipulation constitutes an orthodox exception to the general rule that renvoi has no place in contract cases.7 67 In
the facts and decision of Ocean Steamship, however, one finds little to
commend this exception. Clearly enough the contractual incorporation
of the whole of the Australian Sea Carriage of Goods Act was a mistake,
and the shippers, who had drawn up the bill of lading, most probably
intended merely to incorporate the Hague Rules7 68 attached to the
Act, under which the choice of English law would have been quite
valid.
2. The Vita Food Products Case
In Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd.,769 Lord
Wright, delivering the advice of the Privy Council, stated:
There is, in their Lordships' opinion, no ground for refusing to
give effect to the express selection of English law as the proper
law in the bills of lading. Hence English rules relating to the conflict of laws must be applied to determine how the bills of lading
770
are affected by the failure to comply with s. 3 of the Act.

If Lord Wright's reference to English rules of the conflict of laws
was an attempt to introduce renvoi into contract cases, his endeavor
was successfully turned aside in a very close analysis of the case published the following year.77 1 No subsequent English cases or academic
studies have cited Vita Food Products as authority for such a proposition. The facts of the case certainly do not support a rationale based on
renvoi, since all the provisions of English law upon which the case was
ultimately decided 772 were applied as part of the proper law of the
contract.
One simple explanation of Lord Wright's words is that they were
a mistake.7 7 3 A possible cause for such a mistake is suggested by Falconbridge, who feels that Lord Wright may have unintentionally referred
to the conflict of laws rules of England as part of the process of deter[1941] 1 K.B. at 416, [1941] 1 All E.R. at 165.
This exception, of course, owes its existence to the autonomy theory. See notes
802-28 and accompanying text infra.
768 See [1941] 1 K.B. at 412, [1941] 1 All E.R. at 160.
769 [1939] A.C. 277, [1939] 1 All E.P. 513 (P.C.) (N.S.).
770 Id. at 292, [1939] 1 All E.R. at 522.
771 See Morris & Cheshire, The Proper Law of a Contract, 56 L.Q. RFv. 320, 333-84
(1940).
772 These provisions were simply part of the English common law of contract.
766

767

778 Dicar & Moms 695 n.25.
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mining what effect should be given in English law to a contract assumed to be illegal in the place where it was made. 774 Some authorities
hold this to be a question for English domestic law when the proper
law of the contract under litigation is English. 7 5 This argument may
seem to involve a measure of sleight of hand, for if English law refers
to foreign law, it would certainly appear that English choice of law
rules are involved. However, it is contended that such rules are of a
different character than those applied by a court as part of the lex fori,
and cannot truly be called rules of the conflict of laws. The utility of
this explanation lies in the context of an English case on a contract
whose proper law is foreign, and which is illegal under the lex loci contractus. In such a case, if Falconbridge is correct, the English court is
not bound by its own choice of law rules to take any notice of the illegality, unless the proper law would do S0.776 Nevertheless, in English
cases it is common enough to find references to illegality under the lex
loci contractus, references made pursuant to supposed choice of law
rules of English law as the lex fori. Such references may be either mis777
taken or intentional.
Falconbridge's explanation has some attraction, but if Lord Wright
did indeed merely make a slip, it was a rather persistent mistake, for
His Lordship also appears to have taken the same view on the previous
page of the report. 778 It is more likely that he was classifying the English rules on illegality of a contract by the lex loci contractus as "con7 79
fiictual" rather than domestic.
If there did exist any serious suspicion that Lord Wright had
introduced renvoi into contract cases, this was completely dispelled
by a unanimous Court of Appeal in In re United Railways of the
Havana & Regla Warehouses Ltd.,78 0 affirming that renvoi has no place
in contract cases before English courts.
Insofar as they are claimed to lend support to an argument for the
use of renvoi in contract cases, from an English point of view, New
774 See Falconbridge, supra note 757, at 404.
775 See G. CHEsmRE & P. NoPTH, supra note 482, at 226-29.
776 At this point, it will be observed that Falconbridge's view raises a problem,
for the process here suggests itself as renvoi-reference from the English forum, to the
proper law, and on to the illegality by the lex loci contractus. But recent English authority
clearly holds that renvoi has no place in contract law. See In re United Rys. of the
Havana & Regla Warehouses Ltd., [1960] Ch. 52 (CA. 1958).
777 G. ChIEsHn= & P. NORTH, supra note 482, at 226-29.
778 See [1939] A.C. at 291, [1959] 1 All E.R. at 522.
779 See Kelly, LocalisingRules and Different Approaches to the Choice of Law Process,
18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 249, 259 (1969).
780 [1960] Ch. 52 (CA. 1958). The court did not itself give reasons, but it adopted
the arguments of Morris and Cheshire. See Morris & Cheshire, supra note 771, at 335-34.
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Brunswick, Ocean Steamship, and Vita Food Products deserve only a
brief mention as historical anomalies. Lord Wright's dictum in Vita
Food Products has been discussed in some detail in order to emphasize
by contrast the extraordinary respect accorded it by American opinion.
While current orthodoxy in both England and America rejects the
renvoi doctrine in contract cases, America, not England, is more likely
to incline away from this view. 78 ' In the Reporter's Notes in the
Restatement (Second), the Reporter cited Vita Food Products7 2 and the

Tennessee case of Duskin v. Pennsylvania-CentralAirlines Corp*7S3 as
"[t]wo exceptional cases to the contrary" 78 4 of the general view that
renvoi does not apply in contract cases.
The specific reliance by the Reporter on Vita Food Products is
surprising in several respects. First, the facts of the case, as correctly set
out in the Reporter's Note,78 5 show that the facts involved no question
of renvoi. Second, it is clear that the Reporter was aware of the English
treatment of Vita Food Products, because in the Sixth Tentative Draft
of the Restatement (Second), the predecessor to the section of the Official Draft under consideration, he cited both Dicey788 and Falconbridge78 7 on the question of renvoi.7 8 Third, University of Chicago v.
Dater78 9 was not cited even though it clearly constitutes better author7 0
ity for the use of renvoi than Vita FoodProducts. 1
781 See notes 757-58 and accompanying text supra. But see Peterson, Conflict Avoidance Through Choice of Law and Forum, 45 DENVER L.J. 20, 26 n.15 (1968):
I]he normal assumption seems to be that the law referred to by a choice of
law clause is the local law of the designated state or country.... This may be a
safe assumption from the American point of view, but there is some danger
in assuming that it holds true in other countries. The leading English case on
stipulations as to governing law [i.e., Vita Food Products] interpreted such a
clause as adopting the whole law, including the conflict of laws rules of the
designated country.
782 Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C. 277, [1939] All E.R. 513
(P.C.) (N.S.).
783 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 US. 829 (1948).

784 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

§ 187, Reporter's Note, comment h.

Id. § 187, Reporter's Note, comment f.
786 A. DICEY, DicEy's CONFLICr OF LAws 581 (6th ed. 1949).
785

787

J.

FALCoNRIDGE,

supra note 660, at 142.

§ 332, Reporter's Note (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1960).
789 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936).
790 Oddly enough, Dater is cited in the Reporter's Note to § 332 of the Tentative
Draft. This section is applicable when there has been no express choice of law by the
parties. Dater did not, of course, involve such a choice, and that may be the reason
why the Reporter preferred not to cite it in his note to § 187 of the Restatement
(Second) proper, since § 187 deals with cases involving an express choice of law. But
unlike § 332 of the Tentative Draft, § 188 of the Restatement (Second), which also deals
with cases where there has been no express choice of law, does not consider renvoi,
788 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW

702
C.
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Modern Unorthodox Theories in the United States
In view of the somewhat ambivalent attitude underlying the "no

renvoi" orthodoxy of the majority in Siegelman v. Cunard White Star
Ltd.,791 it is not surprising to discover that renvoi is by no means dead

in America as far as contract cases are concerned. Resort to renvoi is
advocated in several situations.
As the theories and techniques of interest analysis spread to more
conservative jurisdictions, courts will occasionally resort to the renvoi
doctrine as one of perhaps several transitional measures by which
some semblance of the integrity of the old Bealean rules may be maintained while the courts move toward what are now seen to be the

true policies of the conflict of laws.

92

The result may be an approach

7 9
not dissimilar to that taken in University of Chicago v. Dater.
This

revival should be short-lived as more states transfer fully to the reasoning of the modernists.

There is some support, however, for according a more permanent
position in contract cases to renvoi, both generally and in certain

specific situations. Roger Cramton and David Currie, for example,
ask whether "the Siegelman court [was] correct in construing the
contractual choice of law provision as referring solely to England's
internal law rather than to its 'whole law' (including relevant conflict of laws rules and principles)?" 70 4 While the learned authors do
not answer their question directly, one may infer from the context
795
that they are by no means sure that the answer should be "yes."
and consequently does not refer to Dater. Since renvoi is not mentioned elsewhere in
the chapter on contracts, it is surprising that § 187 of the Restatement (Second) cites
only Vita Food Products and Duskin. The arguments for and against renvoi do not
change much whether or not there is an express choice of law (as opposed to an express
choice of renvoi, see notes 802-23 and accompanying text infra), and Dater is after all the
most celebrated American case on the subject.
The treatment of Vita Food Products by Peterson (see note 781 supra) and the Restatement (Second) may be compared with the treatment accorded by Levin, Party Autonomy:
Choice of Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46 GEo. L.J. 260, 261-62 (1957): "There
have been two cases [Vita Food Products and Duskin] in which the parties had made [an
express choice of law] only to have the courts make the reference to the 'whole law of
the jurisdiction, and reach the final governing law through use of a renvoi doctrine."'
See Johnston, Party Autonomy in Contracts Specifying Foreign Law, 7 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 37, 88 (1966); cf. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 203 (2d Cir.
1955) (Frank J., dissenting): "It is significant that [Vita Food Products) . . . construed a
clause in a bill of lading providing, 'This contract shall be governed by English law,' to
require the application of English conflict rules to such a contract .
791 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955).
792 See A. VON MEHEN & D. TRAUTmAN, supra note 732, at 550.
793 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936).
794 R. CAMTON & D. CutuE, CONFmaCr OF LAws, CASES-COMMENTs-QUSTXONS 163
-(1968).
795 Id.

1973]

CHOICE OF LAW & CONTRACTS

Developing this theme further, Arthur von Mehren and Donald
Trautman believe that a categorical answer cannot be given to the
question of whether an express choice of law should be treated as
a choice of the whole of that law:
Individuals contracting without legal advice usually are not thinking of particular domestic-law rules and principles; instead, they
are probably indicating confidence in a particular legal order.
Their stipulation for a governing law may then be taken as a desire
to have the transaction regulated as it would be by the indicated
legal system's courts. If so, the stipulation would include conflicts
rules.
On the other hand, if the contract has been worked out by
lawyers or by businessmen in a position to be aware of domestic
rules, the stipulation is probably designed to render applicable
known and preferred domestic rules. Under these circumstances
the stipulation would presumably refer to the indicated system's
domestic-law rules alone. If, however, the contract was concluded
between persons engaged in a given trade, with developed trade
practices, and the trade was accustomed to litigate its problems
in the courts of the jurisdiction whose law was stipulated, the
intention might well be to have the matter handled as it would be
by those courts, including their rules respecting choice of law. 79 6
It is difficult to see merit in this viewpoint. Rarely will "[i]ndividuals contracting without legal assistance" be sufficiently sophisticated
to consider inserting a choice of law clause in a contract; where such
a stipulation is found it may well be inferred that it was made by
well-informed persons. This choice is most likely to be the result of
an awareness, for example, of the English formalities rules, or of the
American Uniform Commercial Code, and not to be based upon any
comparison of possibly applicable legal systems as a whole. But where
ill-informed, unsophisticated laymen for some reason insert a choice
of law clause in a contract, their "confidence in [the] particular legal
order" chosen would certainly receive an unpleasant shock were that
"legal order" to apply foreign law to their contract. Likewise, it is
difficult to follow the reasoning of the last sentence of von Mehren
and Trautman. Surely if a trade is "accustomed to litigate its problems in the courts of the jurisdiction whose law was stipulated," the
last thing one would expect those courts to do when faced with a contract choosing their own law is to apply renvoi.
While Cramton and Currie, and von Mehren and Trautman see
a role for renvoi in cases where there has been an express choice of
law, Russell Weintraub finds that the doctrine is suited to the solution of cases where the parties have not so clarified their intentions.
796

A. VON MmEHEN & D. TRAuTmAN, supra note 732, at 530.
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In an elaborate study, the main purpose of which was to suggest a
better choice of law method for issues relating to the validity of contracts than the Restatement (Second)'s, 7 7 Weintraub also considered
choice of law where the issue is construction of the terms of the contract 798 and the parties have made no express choice.799 Weintraub
would solve these cases as follows: First, eliminate all "false conflict"
situations, and apply the law of the "truly interested" state whenever
possible. 0 Second, in true conflict cases, if one law is "anachronistic,"
apply the other. Third, if the case is still not solved, the sole remaining values are uniformity and simplicity; therefore, apply the foreign
court theory of renvoi.8 0 Fourth, if it is discovered that the foreign
court also adheres to total renvoi, or if it transpires that there are two
or more potential foreign courts with different rules, apply the lex
fori. Weintraub's argument for turning to renvoi at the third stage,
that is, when there is no false conflict and neither of the competing
laws could be termed "anachronistic," rather than searching for the
law with which the issue has the most significant contacts, as required
by section 188 of the Restatement (Second), has a certain superficial
appeal. The issue, he said, is by definition one of construction; none
of the courts whose rules are potentially applicable would have had
any objection to the parties' having initially spelled out their obligations in detail in the same terms as the rules in force in any of the
other states. Therefore, it does not matter that the issue is more significantly connected with one law than with another, and a court
should simply attempt to obtain such uniformity as is possible.
There are several flaws in this argument. First, Weintraub's
choice of law rule is recommended for general use, but the more
797 See R sTATEMENT (SECOND) §§

187-88.

798 Issues of construction, in this sense, are issues where, as between two or more
potentially applicable laws, there will be a different result, but where there is no particular
public policy involved either way. Thus, such issues could be solved in advance, even
under domestic law, by the parties' spelling out their intentions in full. The law relating
to such issues serves essentially a gap-filling function. Rules relating to frustration are
an example. Such cases, of course, form a significant proportion of contract conflicts
cases litigated.
799 Weintraub, supra note 535, at 431-32.
800 For a discussion of false conflicts analysis, see Prebble, Part I, notes 140-58 and
accompanying text.
801 Under the foreign court theory, the forum hypothetically places itself in the
position of a court of the jurisdiction to which there has been a reference, and acts as
it believes that court would act in the case at bar, applying whatever rules of substantive
law, choice of law, and renvoi the foreign court would apply. See, e.g., In re Annesley,
[1926] Ch. 692. See also G. CEHI.RE & P. NORTH, supra note 482, at 58-75. The foreign
court theory breaks down, for obvious reasons, if it is discovered that the foreign court
also ascribes to it.
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courts that adopt total renvoi pursuant to stage three of the rule, the
more frequently stage three must be ignored as a circulus inextricabills is created. Second, there is some temptation for a court to discover such a circulus in order to apply the forum-favoring rule of
stage four, without having to go to the length of denouncing the competing rule as "more anachronistic" than that of the forum. Third, a
significant contacts test has an inherent justice to it; the most closely
related rule is applied. But Weintraub's method, from the point of
view of justice, is quite arbitrary.
D. Renvoi and Autonomy
1. Practical Considerations
Although the arguments of von Mehren and Trautman, and
Weintraub may have little effect upon the courts, the same cannot
be said for another proposal: that contracting parties should be free
to stipulate for the whole law of any chosen jurisdiction.
The Sixth Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Second),8 02 which
concerns law chosen by the parties, made no mention of a choice possibly including the choice of law rules of the designated law, al80 3
though the comment to the rules did contain such a reference.
However, the Official Draft provided that "[i]n the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the local law of the
state of the chosen law."80 4 The editors of Dicey agree:
In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the parties must
be deemed to have intended to refer to the domestic rules and not
to the conflict rules of their chosen law, and the connection with a
given legal system is a connection with substantive legal principles,
and not with conflict of laws rules.8 05
One can take some comfort from the strong presumptions against
a finding that the parties have stipulated for renvoi found in both
the Restatement (Second) and Dicey. But there are strong arguments
that there should never be such a finding, and, furthermore, that an
S02 RysrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332(a) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
803 Id. § 332(a), comment h at 24. Cavers, who may not have read the relevant

comment, complained that the effect of the Draft provision might be to prevent contracting parties from stipulating expressly for renvoi, which, he felt, was contrary to
the autonomy theory. See Cavers, Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on
Contracts,in XXTH CENTURy COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW, supra note 758, at 363.
804 REsTATUMENT (SEcOND) § 187(3). The change from the Tentative Draft appears
to have been caused by certain remarks of Professor Robert Braucher. See 37 ALI PRoGEEDINGs 475-78 (1961).
805 DicEy & Momus 695; cf. id. at 62.
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express and explicit choice of the "whole" law should not be honored,
even by a court that otherwise accepts the autonomy doctrine.
Only one English case 06 has been found in which the court interpreted the parties' stipulation as if it were an express choice of
renvoi. In that case, Ocean Steamship Co. v. Queensland State Wheat
Board,8 07 the court admitted that its judgment probably defeated the
08
intention of the parties.

An American case involving a similar problem was Duskin v.
Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp.80 9 Duskin involved a poorlydrawn standard form contract under which Mr. Duskin was employed
by Penn-Central as a pilot. Duskin died through the alleged negligence of the company in a landing accident in Alabama. The company's defense to his executrix's wrongful death action was that the
suit was prohibited by Pennsylvania workmen's compensation legislation. Duskin, in fact, signed two form contracts with Penn-Central,
each containing choice of law provisions. The first, the standard PennCentral employment contract, referred questions of workmen's compensation to the state of the employee's residence. Duskin later signed
a special contract for flying personnel, superseding the first contract,8 10
under which all matters relating to the employment contract, including workmen's compensation, were to be governed by the law of
Pennsylvania. Duskin was domiciled in Oklahoma at the time of contracting, and in Tennessee at the time of the accident.,1 Although
the forum, Tennessee, still adhered to the vested rights doctrine, and
although the contacts with Pennsylvania were at best tenuous, the
court had no difficulty in respecting the autonomy of the parties and
upholding the choice of Pennsylvania law.8 12 But by its terms, the
Pennsylvania workmen's compensation legislation clearly did not apply to Duskin, who was killed in Alabama.8 13 The company's defense
806 The contention of the Restatement (Second) that Vita Food Products is another
example is not accepted. See note 790 supra.
807 [1941] 1 K.B. 402, [1941] 1 All E.R. 158 (C.A. 1940).
808 Id. at 412, [1941] 1 All E.R. at 161; see notes 763-68 and accompanying text supra.
809 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948).
810 Id. at 729. The terms of neither contract are given in the report.
811 Id.
812 Id. at 730.
813 Id. at 731.
This Act shall . .. not apply to any accident occurring outside of the Commonwealth, except to accidents occurring to Commonwealth employes .. . engaged
in duly authorized business of the Commonwealth, and except accidents occurring to Pennsylvania employes whose duties require them to go temporarily
beyond the territorial limits of the Commonwealth, not over ninety days ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1 (1952). Duskin clearly fell outside both exceptions.
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therefore failed. The court, purportedly still pursuant to the parties'
contractual stipulation, turned to the Pennsylvania choice of law rule
applicable to tort actions, 14 which pointed to Alabama, the place of
the accident. 15
While one's pleasure at seeing Duskin's estate swollen by the
unwilling bounty of Penn-Central leads to a certain sympathy for
the court's decision, this case provides no support whatever for an
argument that resort to renvoi may assist a court to effectuate the intention of the parties to a contract. Duskin himself may never have
read his contract, let alone formed an intent concerning its governing
law, 8 16 but the intentions of Penn-Central in subjecting the contracts
of its more hazardously employed personnel to the workmen's compensation law of Pennsylvania are clear enough.
2. Doctrinal Considerations
By an ill-considered interpretation of the autonomy theory it is
possible to justify recognition of an express contractual stipulation for
renvoi. However, to uphold such a stipulation is to run counter to other
values that should be found in choice of law rules, not least that these
rules should be reasonable. According to the Restatement (Second):
The forum will not apply the chosen law ... if the parties had no
reasonable basis for choosing this law. The forum will not, for
example, apply a foreign law which has been chosen by the parties
in the spirit of adventure or to provide mental exercise for the
judge.8 17
It is certainly difficult to see any reason, apart from those mentioned
in this quotation, for stipulating for renvoi in a choice of law clause.
If A and B want their contract to be governed by the law of X, there
is no advantage in choosing the law of Y whose conflict of law rules,
assumedly, point to X in the relevant circumstances. They may expressly stipulate that most of the contract be governed by Y's law, but
that some issues be subjected to the law of X.
A more basic doctrinal criticism is that while the autonomy doctrine is now accepted in England, and is almost certainly the majority
rule in America, 818 its victory over vested rights thinking was not
167 F.2d at 732.
Pennsylvania subsequently adopted the modern approach to choice of law in tort
actions. See Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
816 Cf. 167 F.2d at 731.
817 RrAsr
m!ENr (SECOND) § 187, comment f.
818 See Prebble, Part I, notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
814
815
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achieved by chance but because of its easily demonstrable superiority
over the old rules. Eschewing reference to legal theory, the Reporter
of the Restatement (Second), in the year that the tentative draft of
the contracts chapter was published, justified acceptance of the doctrine, asserting that in multistate contracts, allowing the parties to
choose the law to govern their relationship is the only way to attain
certainty as to the applicable rules, and that in upholding this choice,
a court saves itself the otherwise arduous task of deciding what law to
819
apply in subsequent litigation.
Although judicial recognition of clauses specifying that the domestic law of a certain state or country shall govern a contract may
be warranted, this reasoning does not necessarily justify allowing the
parties to stipulate for renvoi. It is scarcely tenable to maintain that
renvoi can promote certainty in commercial and other types of contracts, and of course it cannot be argued that the doctrine could have
the effect of relieving the courts of the task of solving choice of law
questions. Quite the reverse effect is an almost inevitable result when
820
a renvoi question is raised in any conflicts case.
The rejection of the traditional techniques of renvoi in contract cases by both Bealean and post-Bealean orthodoxy is thus well
founded.82 1 Except perhaps as a judicial teething ring for use in hith819 See Reese, supra note 534, at 51. These, in fact, were the grounds upon which
the majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955), that subject to certain
limitations, the parties were free to "stipulate the law by which the validity of their contract is to be judged." Id. at 195 (emphasis in original); accord, Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co.
v. Amerotron Corp., 339 Mass. 252, 158 NY,.2d 875 (1959).
820 It is not argued that the use of renvoi is never justified, but simply that it is
not justified by any tendency to produce certainty or to simplify the task of the courts.
821 It has been suggested that there is one particular type of contract case which
should provide a role for traditional renvoi. See Comment, Party Autonomy-Past and
Present, 12 S. Tax. L.J. 214, 225-27 (1970). The author of the Comment argues that there
may be a profitable resort to renvoi to solve some choice of law problems in cases
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. He contends that the Code's general choice
of law rule, § 1-105(1), is drawn so as to leave certain lacunae, so that cases presenting
particular fact situations will simply fall outside any rule contemplated by the section.
Faced with such a case, a court will simply have to fall back on some other choice of
law rule, presumably of the common law.
The author also argues that when a court is implementing the rule it decides to
use, it should look to the whole of the law of the state indicated by the choice of law
rule, including the conflict of laws rules of that state. For present purposes, it is irrelevant whether the author correctly construes § 1-105(1), or whether indeed the section
does not cover certain cases. Assuming that he is right, however, and that there are possible
gaps in the coverage of the section, there does not seem to be any particular quality
inhering in cases under the Uniform Commercial Code that makes them any less
unsuitable for the application of the techniques of renvoi than other contract cases.
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erto old-fashioned courts which may find comfort in a short transitional phase between rejecting tradition and wholeheartedly adopting interest analysis, 22 the renvoi doctrine can be supported neither
in principle nor practice as a problem-solving device in contract ac23
tions in either England or America.
E. Section 8k Renvoi
One result of the American conflict of laws revolution has been
that renvoi, meaning a reference by the forum to the choice of law
rules of another state, has appeared in a new guise. This new renvoi
is explained in section 8, comment k, of the Restatement (Second) and
is for convenience here called "section 8k renvoi":
An important objective in choice-of-law is to accommodate insofar
as possible the interests of the states involved.... An indication
of the existence of a state interest in a given matter, and of the
intensity of that interest, can sometimes be obtained from an
examination of that state's choice-of-law decisions.
Section 8k renvoi differs from its traditional predecessor in three
fundamental respects. First, its use is consistent only with an interest
analysis approach to choice of law problems. While even traditional
renvoi may be a Trojan horse with a function basically inconsistent
with the jurisdiction-selecting formula of both Bealean and modem
English practice, section 8k renvoi in its unashamed perusal and assessment of the choice of law rules of another jurisdiction clearly has
8 24
no place in English law at present.
Second, however favorably its techniques are viewed, traditional
renvoi is a doctrine to which resort may only rarely be made. At the
very least, a court must be confronted with a case where the choice
of law rules of a jurisdiction, X, whose law is indicated, refer back to
the forum or to a third jurisdiction. Section 8k renvoi, on the other
hand, would always consider X's choice of law rules. Should a court
822

See note 792 and accompanying text supra.

823

An argument for recognizing express "whole law" clauses is slightly more tenable

in the United States than in England. Although it is difficult to see why English contracting
parties should bother with renvoi when they can choose different laws to govern different
parts of their contract, there is some suggestion that under American law parties may
stipulate for only one governing law. See Prebble, Part I, notes 452-59 and accompanying
text. If this suggestion is correct, an appeal to renvoi might be the only method whereby
parties could ensure that a contract liable to be litigated before an American court
would be governed by different chosen laws with regard to different issues. This argument
is weak. First, it is submitted that the American rule is not in fact as suggested in this
footnote, and second, if it is, then that-it cannot be supported. See Prebble, Part 1, note
460 and accompanying text.
824 Cf. Prebble, Part I, notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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using section 8k renvoi find, for example, that the rules of X are in
agreement with its own, then it will have found some evidence that
the policies of the forum and of X coincide on that particular issue.
Third, traditional renvoi is applied, if at all, only after an initial
choice of law has been made, as a late step in a court's reasoning that
may cause it to change its original decision. But, clearly "the question
posed by the [8k] renvoi approach [should] be asked at the very beginning, before the forum formulates its choice-of-law rule for the
8
case." ,25
While the techniques of section 8k renvoi should commend themselves to any court that has adopted interest analysis, 8 26 there appears
to be one clear limitation on the use of this new doctrine. Its purpose
is to assist the court in deciding what interest a second jurisdiction
has in a certain issue before the forum. Therefore, if this second jurisdiction is a state or country the relevant choice of law rules of which
are in no way based upon an analysis of its interest in the matter at
hand, then it seems that no meaningful information as to that state
or country's interest in the matter may be found by reference to its
choice of law rules.827 This point may be illustrated by a comparison
of the celebrated case of Bernkrant v. Fowler8 28 with the recent decision of the House of Lords in Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester)
Ltd. v. James Miller & PartnersLtd. 29
In Bernkrant, the Supreme Court of California upheld an oral
contract by one Granrud to forgive by will any moneys still owing at
his death on a sale of certain Nevada land. Granrud died domiciled in
California, where such a contract was invalid for informality; the court
found it to have been unexceptionable in Nevada. Chief Justice Traynor held:
It is true that if Granrud was domiciled here [in California] at the
time the contract was made, plaintiffs may have been alerted to
the possibility that the California statute of frauds might apply.
825 Von Mehren, supra note 758, at 390.
828 The modernists' rejection of renvoi as a cunning trick of the conservatives invented

to render the blindfold operation of Bealism more palatable, however, dies hard. A
court grappling with the new techniques of modem conflicts law may be tempted to
throw the renvoi out with the entire vested rights theory, as happened in Haumschild v.
Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 141-42, 95 N.W.2d 814, 820 (1959).
827 Possible exceptions may be found where the choice of law rule is statutory.

Through enactment of such a rule, the legislature, even of a jurisdiction-selecting forum,'
may signify an interest, or lack thereof, in certain issues.
828 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
829 [1970] 1 A.C. 583, [1970] 1 All E.R. 796. See notes 490-503 and accompanying text
supra.
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Since California, however, would have no interest in applying its
own statute of frauds unless Granrud remained here until his
death, plaintiffs were not bound to know that California's statute
might ultimately be invoked against them. .

.

. We conclude,

therefore, that the contract herein does not fall within our statute
of frauds ....

Since there is thus no conflict between the law of

California and the law of Nevada, we can give effect to the common policy of both states to enforce lawful contracts ...

without

subordinating any legitimate interest of this state.88 0
In view of this statement, should a future Granrud die in circumstances similar in all respects to those in Bernkrant,with the exception
that the plaintiffs choose to sue his executors on the verbal agreement
in, for example, Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania court can be assured
that the law of the testator's domicile, California, disavows any interest
in avoiding the contract.
By contrast, no such firm conclusions can be inferred from the
speeches of Their Lordships in Whitworth. That case at most reveals
that there is no principle of English public policy preventing parties
to a contract, in other respects governed by English law, from agreeing
that an arbitration on that contract held in another jurisdiction shall
be subject to the relevant procedural rules of that jurisdiction. But in
determining that Scottish law was applicable to this issue, Their Lordships did not consider, for example, whether this was because England
had no interest in the arbitration, or was because the parties' agreement or the locus of the arbitral forum overrode any interest that England had. The reason for this lack of clarity is simply that English
courts dealing with choice of law problems do not adopt the interest
analysis approach exemplified in Bernkrant v. Fowler.
With regard to jurisdictions which have adopted interest analysis
(or "functional analysis" as he calls his version of the modem reasoning), von Mehren is correct to say:
In a fully developed system of functional choice-of-law rules much
vital information would be stated in a jurisdiction's choice-of-law
rules. In such a system, these rules would be relatively particularized and nuanced; they should state fairly precisely whether
the jurisdiction wishes to regulate a given issue at all, and, if so,
under what conditions.... Choice-of-law rules based on a functional analysis should thus go far in clarifying the question whether
a true conflict exists. And, in those situations in which a true
conflict does exist, the choice-of-law rules will help ...

to define

that conflict precisely and will suggest each jurisdiction's dominant

concern or concerns.8 31
830 55 Cal. 2d at 596, 360 P.2d

at 910, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
831 Von Mehren, supra note 758, at 393.
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But the position where a state maintains conventional jurisdictionselecting rules is quite different:
[C]onventional choice-of-law rules are, for the most part, the
product of notions of analytic jurisprudence and territorial sovereignty coupled with overgeneralized policy desiderata of uniformity and predictability. As such, the bulk of them simply fail
genuinely to reflect the real interest of a state concerning the application of its domestic standards in concrete instances. Consequently, to the extent that conflicts rules are not a rational
embodiment of true transnational concerns . . . they cannot be

expected to offer any insight into the real interests asserted by the
community in question. The information they can provide as to
actual public concerns is, at best, by far subordinate to that
derivable from a scrutiny of the relevant foreign substantive
positions.8 2
In rebuttal it may be argued that even though the courts of a
Bealean jurisdiction do not phrase their judgments in terms of interest analysis, their actual decisions may be taken as expressions of the
relative concern of their state with the facts of particular cases and of
particular types of cases. This argument, however, is not compelling.
Judges applying the old rules not only speak in terms of vested rights,
but also reason in those terms. This method of reasoning means that,
except by coincidence, their decisions in conflicts cases are incapable
of reflecting the governmental interest of their state. Of course, one
can say that even Bealish judges, as state officials, are able to, and do in
fact, make decisions that demonstrate the concern or unconcern of their
state in particular cases, even though these decisions are reached irrationally. Consequently, courts of other jurisdictions would be justified in considering these decisions in applying the techniques of section
8k renvoi. But this argument also contains certain flaws.
First, a court that has adopted the sophisticated techniques of interest analysis should never permit itself to short-circuit the necessarily
difficult task of choice of law by referring to Bealish choice of law rules
that do not necessarily reflect either the interests of the state or of the
parties. Second, a court in a vested rights jurisdiction probably has no
intention for its choice of law rules to be referred to by other courts for
the purposes of section 8k renvoi. A court might reach a different conclusion on a choice of law issue if it suspected that its decision might
be used by other jurisdictions. But choice of law rules formulated by
interest analysis will be the product of courts that are aware of this
possible secondary utilization of their declared rules. The rules should
832 A. SHAPiA, THE INTmRsEr APPROACH TO CHoICE OF LAw 140.41 (1970).

1973]

CHOICE OF LAW & CONTRACTS

thus be formulated in such a way that another jurisdiction referring to
them through section 8k renvoi will do no violence to the philosophy
8 33
underlying those rules.

F. Localizing Choice of Law Rules
Their jurisdiction-selecting rather than rule-selecting approach
to conflicts problems prevents English courts from adopting section 8k
renvoi in contract cases. Choice of law through jurisdiction selection
presents a different problem which is consequently faced by English
but not by modem American courts. This problem relates to traditional
renvoi, and concerns the manner in which a forum should treat certain
choice of law rules of X, a second jurisdiction to which it has been referred by English choice of law rules. The X choice of law rules causing
the difficulty are of a particular type, variously described as "localizing"
or "particular" choice of law rules.6 3 4 They have been defined as "rules
whose sole function is to limit the application of the substantive laws
which they qualify to certain persons, events or transactions connected
in a specified way with the State of whose law they form part. ' s35
These rules are by their nature statutory rather than judge-made.
A localizing rule was considered by the Privy Council on appeal from
New Zealand in Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd.830 In this
833 Courts appear to be adopting the reasoning favored here, and declining to consider the conflicts rules of vested rights states for the purposes of section 8k renvoi. In
Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 NJ. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970), a Connecticut resident
was injured in an automobile accident in Iowa while a passenger in an automobile driven
by a New Jersey resident. The car was owned by a New Jersey corporation. An Iowa
guest statute provides that a host-driver is not liable to his passenger for ordinary
negligence. See IowA CODE ANN. § 321.494 (1966). The defendants pleaded, inter alia, the
Iowa guest statute as a defense. 55 NJ. at 513, 263 A.2d at 130. This defense was not
available under either New Jersey or Connecticut law. The court was therefore disposed
to find a false conflict between the laws of these two states. The plaintiff, however, argued
that since Connecticut still applied the lex loci delicti rule in tort cases, Connecticut would
allow the guest statute defense on these facts, and that consequently a true conflict existed
between the laws of New Jersey and Connecticut. The court rejected this argument:
[W]e see no reason for applying Connecticut's choice-of-law rule. To do so would
frustrate the very goals of governmental-interest analysis. Connecticut's choiceof-law rule does not identify that state's interest in the matter. Lex loci delicti
was born in an effort to achieve simplicity and uniformity, and does not relate
to a state's interest in having its law applied to given issues in a tort case.
Id. at 526, 263 A.2d at 137.
834 See, e.g., D. CAvEns, THE CHOIC-oF-LAW PRocEss 225-26 (1965) ("localizing rules");
A. NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPUS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 70-71 (1943) ("spaially conditioning rules'); De Nova, Conflict of Laws and Functionally Restricted Substantive Rules,
54 CALIF. L. R1v. 1569 (1966) ("functionally restricting rules'); Morris, The Choice of
Law Clause in Statutes, 62 L.Q. Rav. 170 (1946) ("particular choice of law rules').
835 Kelly, supra note 779, at 249.
830 [1938] A.C. 224, [1937] 4 All E.R. 206 (P.C. 1937) (N.Z.).
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case, a New Zealand local authority had borrowed money from an insurance company which was carrying on business in New Zealand and
Australia, and was incorporated in the state of Victoria. To secure the
loan, the authority issued debentures, secured by a special property tax, levied upon the authority's rateable property. Principal and
interest were repayable in Victoria. The Victorian Financial Emergency
Act of 193 1837 provided for the compulsory reduction of interest payments on mortgages,838 which were defined to include any "debenture
... issued.., by any public or local authority." 83 9 Although there
was no serious dispute that the law governing the substance of the
obligation was that of New Zealand, the borough council contended
that the payment of interest was a matter of performance, and that its
obligation was therefore reduced by the statute of Victoria, the locus
8 40 Lord
solutionis.
Wright, speaking for the Privy Council, gave this
dubious argument short shrift.8 41 Although the definition of "mortgage" in the Act clearly covered these debentures, the Judicial Committee held that the Victorian Act was never intended to apply to this
loan. First, the court argued that the presumption against giving extraterritorial effect to legislation without clear and precise words to that
effect suggested that the relevant section of the Act was not intended
to apply to a loan governed by New Zealand law and secured by New
Zealand land. Second, it noted that the context of the section clearly
indicated that it was intended to apply only within Victoria.42
The localizing rule that was held to limit the effect of the Victorian
statute differs from the familiar, two-sided choice of law rule in the
following respect: the latter serves to indicate to the forum a system
of law8 43 to be applied to the case at hand-a system which may or may
not be that of the forum. The former merely determines whether a
particular rule of a particular domestic legal system is intended to apply
to the type of case which has arisen.
The Mount Albert case suggests the correct treatment of localizing
choice of law rules. In Mount Albert, Lord Wright clearly treated the
localizing rule in question as part of the domestic law of Victoria, to be
applied as part of that domestic law should the relevant choice of law
837 22 Geo. 5, No. 3961 (Vict.).
838 Id. s. 19(l).
839 Id. s. 14(1).
840 [1938] A.C. at 239, [1937] 4 All E.R. at 218-14.
841 [1938] A.C. at 241, [1937] 4 All E.R. at 215. The decision itself was not based upon
his argument, however.
842 Id. at 248, [1937] 4 All E.R. at 215.

843 The vocabulary of the jurisdiction-selecting theory, rather than that of interest
analysis, is used advisedly. Cf. notes 849-51 and accompanying text infra.
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rule in fact point to Victoria.A44 In other words, His Lordship treated
this rule as if it were not part of the Victorian conflict of laws.
Mount Albert is, however, a deceptively simple case. Not only was
the Victorian Act implicitly inapplicable to the facts of the case, but
the correct choice of law rule did not refer to Victoria at all.s4 5 But if
the normal choice of law rule applied in New Zealand courts had been
to the effect that rate of interest is governed by the law of the place of
payment, in a case like Mount Albert the New Zealand courts would
face the question of whether to take cognizance of Victoria's localizing
rules.
That the answer is less clear than Lord Wright assumed is demonstrated by reference to Duskin v. Pennsylvania-CentralAirlines Corp. 4 6
There the choice of law rule applied by the court was that the contract
should be governed by the law specified by the parties. They chose
Pennsylvania law.84 7 It makes little sense to say, as the court said, that
they thereby chose not only the domestic law that a Pennsylvania court
would apply to a purely Pennsylvania case with similar facts, but also
the self-limiting rules of that Pennsylvania law.s4s
This problem of localizing rules has had little recent treatment
in American writing,8 49 but it has begun to generate some interest in
England.85 0 In the United States, the problem has been overtaken by
events-namely, the victory of interest analysis. The decision maker
who is an interest analyst assesses the choice of law rules of another
jurisdiction to determine whether they expressly or impliedly assert
any relevant state interest or policy of that jurisdiction. To such a
judge, a localizing rule which is attached to a statute may well be more
informative than an ordinary, two-sided choice of law rule, particularly
if the latter is part of a jurisdiction-selecting legal system.8 51
844 His Lordship's advice was, of course, that the choice of law rule pointed not

to Victoria but to New Zealand, contrary to the argument of the borough council.
845 See notes 836-42 and accompanying text supra.
846 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948).
847 See notes 809-15 and accompanying text supra.
848 Cf. note 813 and accompanying text supra.
849 The most recent article appears to be Danson, TerritoriallyLimited Statutes and
the Choice-of-Law Process, 1 HARv. J. LEGIs. 115 (1964).
850 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 779; Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International
Law, 111 Rcum. r.DEs ConRs 1, 54-62 (1964); Unger, Use and Abuse of Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 83 L.Q. Rxv. 427 (1967).
851 The localizing rule appears in fact to be tailored expressly for that father of
interest analysis, Brainerd Currie:
The rules we have proposed for incorporation into the laws of the respective
states are not choice-of-law rules in the traditional sense. They have at least
as much precision, but they lack that semblance of universal truth that would
facilitate their incorporation into a system aimed at achieving uniformity. They

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[V9ol. 58:635

In England the problem is more intractable. Where a court faced
with a case in contract is directed by an ordinary, two-sided choice of
law rule to apply the "law" of jurisdiction X, the court knows that
"law" does not include the general choice of law rules of X, for it
realizes that renvoi, at least as traditionally understood, has no place
in this case. s52 But,
[i]f the term "domestic law" indicates the rules of law applicable
in a purely internal case, then localising rules of the law indicated
by the general choice of law rule must be ignored and the substantive provisions which they qualify must be applied notwithstanding their imposed spatial limitations. If, on the other hand,
the term "domestic law" means the whole law of the indicated
country minus its general choice of law rules, cases may occur
where the substantive provisions must themselves be ignored since
localising rules, which qualify them and which require that result,
8
must be applied. 85
In practice, the answer may be different depending on whether
the relevant general choice of law rule points to the domestic law of
the forum. Where there is a relevant and applicable localizing rule of
the forum, the court will feel bound to give effect to it, as a command
of the legislature. This practical reason has served as a doctrinal justification as well.854 The better view would appear to be that consistent
with the evenhanded philosophy of English conflict of laws, 55 an
English court should treat localizing rules similarly whether or not
they are part of the legal system of the forum. However, the perhaps
illogical respect of English courts for statutory choice of law ruless56
will probably mean that an English court will respect such a rule of the
forum whenever English domestic law is indicated by a general choice
of law rule, no matter how the court regarded the foreign localizing
rule.85 7 Consequently, the debatable issue narrows to whether in an
do not say directly what law shall govern. They simply say that a particular
law is intended to govern in certain cases.
B. CUarM, supra note 665, at 116.
852 But see notes 763-67 and accompanying text supra.
853 Kelly, supra note 779, at 252-53.
854 Id. at 253-54.
855 Cf. Prebble, Part I, text following note 158.
856 See id., notes 362-64 and accompanying text.
857 But see Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960). In Zogg the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit restrictively construed the selflimiting provisions of the New York insurance statute (N.Y. INs. Lw § 155-2(d) (McKinney
1966)), and was thus able to hold that the provisions of that law regarding suicide by
insane insured persons applied to the case. A more liberal reading of the legislation might
have compelled the court to apply the less favorable (to the estate of the insured) law
of Massachusetts, where it was assumed, arguendo, that the insurance contract was made.
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English court, when the law of X is the lex causae, the "domestic law"
includes localizing choice of law rules of the X legal system.
To this question, the overwhelming answer of the academic community has been "yes." s58 As Rodolpho De Nova explained:
Applying a foreign "self-limiting" substantive rule on its own
terms-namely, only when the case at hand perfectly fits its
schema-is not paying obeisance to foreign rules of private international law, which is the essence of renvoi. .

. It is simply a

question of finding, within the "competent" foreign law, the correct rules of decision.8 59

But this barren logic assumes a negative answer to the question of
whether localizing choice of law rules are rules of the conflict of laws
-the very question under discussion. 801 Furthermore, De Nova's argument is reminiscent of the conclusion of Ernest Lorenzen and Raymond
Heilman that logically even traditional renvoi should be regarded as a
part of the vested rights doctrine.""' The distinction De Nova draws
between general rules of the conflict of laws and localizing rules is untenable. Each type of rule has, as part of its function, the task of determining whether certain rules of domestic law apply to the case at hand.
General choice of law rules not only choose law, but also may localize
the law of the lex causae s 2 It is scarcely reasonable to stigmatize the
application of foreign general choice of law rules as renvoi-to which
there must not be resort in contract cases-and at the same time to say
that applying foreign localizing choice of law rules is "simply a question of finding, within the 'competent' foreign law, the correct rules of
decision.

8 63

Moreover, De Nova's position should be criticized not

merely on the theoretical ground that these different treatments of the
two types of choice of law rules are incompatible. From a practical
viewpoint, his argument cannot readily be sustained.
858 D. CAvEas, supra note 834, at 226; A. NussmAum, supra note 834, at 71; De Nova,

supra note 834, at 1569; Morris, supra note 834, at 184. Contra, Kelly, supra note 779, at
266-70; Unger, supra note 850, at 442-43.

859 De Nova, supra note 884, at 1570-71 (emphasis in original).
860 A more precise formulation of the issue might be whether localizing choice of
law rules should be treated as if they were part of the conffict of laws.
S61 See Lorenzen & Heilman, supra note 756, at 560-61.
862 See Kelly, supra note 779, at 267-69.
863 The very use of the word "competent" is reminiscent of vested rights thinking. De
Nova obscures the similarity of function of the two types of choice of law rules by failing
adequately to distinguish between a rule of substantive law and its ancillary localizing
rule. This failure, in turn, virtually denies the existence of localizing rules, assimilating
them into De Nova's "foreign 'self-limiting' substantive rule." And, of course, denying the
existence of a thing is a convenient method of solving any problems allegedly connected
with it.
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The chief practical difficulty arises when a court, 64 referred by its
conflict of laws rules to the law of X, takes cognizance of an X localizing
rule under which an otherwise relevant X domestic rule would not
apply to the case at bar. The forum court, finding no applicable law
at all, must necessarily fill the void by reference to some catchall doctrine or choice of law rule. 65 The results, as seen in Duskin,6 6 are
likely to be unsatisfactory.
It is submitted, therefore, that the scholarly view that localizing
rules of foreign law should not be treated as conflict of laws rules cannot be sustained. But what of the authorities? First, against the opinion
of Lord Wright in the Privy Council decision in Mount Albert, 67 can
be weighed two Australian judgments of Lord Justice Evatt.8 6 Second,
although technically the advice of the Privy Council in Mount Albert, a
New Zealand appeal, is not binding on English courts, the opinions of
the Privy Council have a strong influence on English conflicts law.86 9
864 This section, of course, refers to English courts, and not to those courts that
have embraced the modem doctrines of functional analysis.
865 Rather than filling a suspected void, the forum could also be mistakenly treating
as a localizing rule a general rule of the conflict of laws of the foreign state which has
simply been enacted into legislation. This result can ensue from excessive deference to
statutory choice of law rules.
[I]t is not impossible for a localising rule, which is perfectly consistent with the
existing choice of law rules, to be inserted in a statute ex abundante cautela.
Can it seriously be suggested that such a localising rule in a foreign law must
be applied as part of the domestic law, yet the localising rule contained in the
foreign choice of law rule be ignored, especially when the latter would probably
have been used to imply an identical localising rule into the statute had one
not been expressed therein?
Kelly, supra note 779, at 270; cf. Leflar, supra note 720, at 272-79. Leflar condemns
spatially limiting provisions in statutes on the grounds that they are often ambiguous
and may encourage forum shopping. Such provisions are often found in legislation relating
to insurance. See C. CARNA5IAw, supra note 703, at 124-27. See also Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960); Danson, supra note 849, at 120-22.
856 Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948); see
notes 847-48 and accompanying text supra.
887 [1938] A.G. 224, [1937] 4 All E.R. 206 (P.C. 1937) (N.Z.).
868 Barcelo v. Electrolytic Zinc Co. of Australia Ltd., 48 Commw. L.R. 391, 433-35
(1932) (Evatt, J., dissenting); Wanganui-Rangitikei Elec. Power Bd. v. Australian Mut.
Provident Soc'y, 50 Commw. L.R. 581, 605 (1934) (Evatt, J.).
869 See Prebble, Part I, n.6.
Again, although the council's opinion on the effect of the law of Victoria was not
critical to its decision, undoubtedly Lord Wright's treatment of the Victorian law formed,
in his opinion, the rationale of the case. See [1938] A.C. at 242, t1937] 4 All E.R. at 214. Lord
Wright's opinion dealt with the relevant issues in reverse order. He first considered the
choice of law rule, and then the content of the Victorian domestic law, which is the logical
order of reasoning. But His Lordship's reference to the choice of law rule was merely to dismiss that issue as nonessential. His principal concern was with Victorian domestic law,
which, had he considered primarily the New Zealand choice of law rule, he would have
realized was not relevant to the case.
Learned opinion in England has become increasingly accustomed to dismissing some

1973]

CHOICE OF LAW & CONTRACTS

The scale may be tipped against Mount Albert by a more recent
case dealing with a similar issue. Adamastos Shipping Co., Ltd. v.
Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., Ltd.8 70 concerned law that had been incorporated into a contract. The contract, a charterparty, the proper
law of which appears to have been English, expressly incorporated the
United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).8 71 A dispute
arose between the charterers and the owners. The owners relied upon
certain provisions of COGSA. The charterers replied that the Act did
not apply since it is expressly limited to carriage starting or terminating at American ports,8 72 which was not the case here. The House of
Lords rejected the charterers' argument, holding that
[v]ery good reasons can be seen for the United States legislature
limiting its Act to goods carried under a bill of lading to or from
United States ports. [Those limitations] seem quite inapposite
when the Act is introduced contractually into a charterparty
8 73
covering a very wide range of ports outside the United States.
The opinion continued:
[O]nce one has come to the conclusion that the "Act" is being
incorporated in a contract to which it does not as an Act apply, one
prima fade rejects the limitations which are imposed in these
various Acts necessitated by the limits of the legislative jurisdiction
of the country concerned. One takes the geographical limits from
the contract.87 4
Adamastos Shipping, although not directly in point, may still be
strong authority. If parties expressly incorporating a statute into their
contract do not necessarily also incorporate the self-limiting rules of
that statute, a fortiori they should not be assumed to have included in
a choice of law clause the localizing rules of the law they chose to govern the contract. Consequently, one may predict with not unfounded
optimism that English courts will, in cases where this problem arises,
adopt what has been presented here as the better view. That is, in contract cases, and indeed in any
areas where renvoi is excluded ... reference to a foreign law is to
be taken as indicating the domestic law of the chosen country,
of Lord Wright's less tenable propositions that resulted from his forays into the field of
private international law. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 761, at 582 n.102:
This article has been severely critical of Lord Wright and mildly critical of Judge
Learned Hand, each of whom has now retired from high judicial office after a long
and distinguished career on the Bench. The writer desires to make clear that he
yields to no one in his admiration for the work of these two men in the sphere of
domestic law ....
870 [1959] A.C. 133, [1958] 1 All E.R. 725 (1958).
871 46 U.S.C. §§ 1800-15 (1970).
872 Id. § 1812.
873 [1959] A.C. at 180, [1958] 1 All E.R. at 748 (Lord
874

Keith).
Id. at 185, [1958] 1 All E.R. at 752 (Lord Somervell).
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[and] localising rules of the foreign lex causae must be ignored
and the otherwise relevant substantive provisions which they
qualify must be applied in the courts of the forum. 75
VII
A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE ENGLISH AND AMERIcAN RuLEs
It should by now be evident that the theoretical basis of the choice
of law process used by the majority of American courts is entirely different from that used in England. Three general questions present
themselves. Why is it that the theories of interest analysis have taken
root and grown in the United States but not in England? Second, are
the choice of law rules derived from interest analysis superior to the
jurisdiction-selecting rules of England? Finally, in the area of contract
law, do the different approaches found in England and America cause
significant differences in the results of actual cases, and, if so, should
such differences influence plaintiffs in choosing between available fora?
A.

The Development of Interest Analysis in the United States

The first of these questions is perhaps the most difficult to answer
because it involves trying to discern general features of the American
legal system that are both different from the English system, and different in such a way as to account for the growth of interest analysis
only in America. While such features may sometimes be tentatively
identified, it is often difficult to link them directly to the effects which
they are suspected to cause. Furthermore, it is not to be expected that
the new reasoning will remain excluded from English courts indefinitely. 8 6 Thus, the following suggestions are made somewhat hesitantly.
1. Academic Influence
Academics are more influential in America than in England. The
fundamental reason for this deviation from the familiar common law
tradition seems to lie in the federal system. In England, the Court of
Appeal and the House of Lords are unique and authoritative. They
each have a status and prestige unmatched in the United States except
at the level of the Supreme Court itself. 7 7 There are in America fifty
jurisdictions, each with its own court of last resort, to say nothing of
875 Kelly, supra note 779, at 270 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

876 Recent developments in the torts field suggest the opposite. See notes 895-911 and
accompanying text infra.
877 This may be of little import, however, since the Supreme Court does not often
concern itself with choice of law rules.
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the federal courts, each free within the wide limits of the Constitution
878
to decide what its own choice of law rules will be.
Of course, American courts are aware of the need for harmony
in the interstate legal system, and there is consequently a large measure
of uniformity of choice of law rules across the United States. Nonetheless, this uniformity is not so great that a decision of a particular court
can be accepted as finally establishing the law with the certainty of a
decision of the House of Lords or the Court of Appeal. Thus, as compared with the situation in England, one finds in America a sort of
vacuum when it comes to deciding who will determine what choice of
law rules are to prevail. Into this space have moved the American
scholars, who are able to speak with more authority than English academics, for they know that even if their proposals are directly contrary
to the views accepted by the majority of jurisdictions, there is a good
chance that some court, somewhere, will be impressed by, and adopt,
their arguments.
It is instructive in this respect to compare the role currently
played by American scholars with that assumed by scholars in civil law
jurisdictions.8 79 In France, for example, there was no French national
law before codification. Different districts had their own laws. French
scholars, in their attempts to rationalize the law, were thus able to
exert great influence upon the courts, an influence which was strengthened by academic contacts between France and other European countries, where similar processes were taking place. Since the development
of national laws in Europe, the original cause of the ascendancy of the
academics has faded, but through tradition and habit their importance
remains largely unimpaired. In England, on the other hand, the
King's courts have since the Middle Ages ensured that a single common
law is applied throughout the country, leaving little scope for scholarly
development of new rules of law.
In spite of the virtual nonexistence of a truly "common" law in
the United States, academics in America have generally been relegated
to the place customarily allotted to scholars in a common law system.
Apart from tradition, the fact that American scholars have only recently
begun to realize their potential under the federal system may also be
attributed to a rather uneven level of academic achievement until
comparatively modern times.8 8 0
878 Federal courts sitting in diversity must follow the choice of law rules of the state
in which they sit. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
879 See R. SCHLESIGn, COMPAIATiVE LAw: CAss-TEXT-MATERiAI.s 188-250 (3d ed.

1970).
880 It may not be entirely coincidental that, except for the work of Beale, the bulk of

722.
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There is much evidence that American scholars over the last two
generations have had significant influence upon the development of
American law. Interchange and contact between scholars and judges is
much more pervasive in America than in England. In fact, numerous
leading American scholars have become judges and seized the opportunity to put their theories on conflict of laws into practice while on
s81
the bench.
The relationship between American judges and scholars is most
apparent in the American Law Institute. The Institute's ex officio
members include all the judges of the Supreme Court, the chief justice
of the highest court in each state and of each United States Court of
Appeals, and the deans of member institutions of the Association of
American Law Schools. Additionally, there are up to 1,500 elected
members, a large proportion of whom are scholars. The Institute's
Restatements of the Law have become particularly influential in
America. Even the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 8 2 now almost
universally condemned for its fundamentally erroneous approach to
the whole choice of law process, was found persuasive by many jurisdictions at one time.
While the Restatements primarily attempt to explain what the
law is, their authors do not hesitate to endeavor to point the courts
in the direction they believe to be appropriate. Nowhere has this eduthe developments in choice of law that can be traced to academic prompting have occurred
since the establishment of the Erie-Klaxon rule.
881 Justice Story of the Supreme Court furnishes an isolated example from the nineteenth century. More recently, there have been Chief Justice Stone, elevated from the
Deanship of Columbia Law School to the Supreme Court (see Cheatham, Stone on Conflict of Laws, 46 COLUm. L. REv. 719 (1946); Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict
of Laws, 59 HAuv. L. REv. 1210 (1946)), and Judge Goodrich, who moved from the University of Pennsylvania Law School to a United States Court of Appeals judgeship, finally
to become Director of the American Law Institute. Professor Leflar switched from academic
life to the Arkansas Supreme Court, and back again, although he maintained a strong
connection with his brother judges through his position as Director of the New York University Law School's Appellate Judges Seminar. See Kenison, The Continuing Contribution,
of Robert A. Leflar to the Judicial Education of Appellate Judges, 25 ARK. L. Rav. 95
(1971). Justice Halpern, a former Dean of Buffalo Law School, was able from the position
of Associate Justice of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court to influence
strongly the development of interest analysis in that state in a number of leading cases.
See Lenhoff, Justice Halpern's Contribution to Conflict of Laws, 13 BUoFALo L. REV. 317
(1964). The most notable among these cases was Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). Finally, Professor Traynor, former Chief Justice of
the California Supreme Court, has been personally responsible for the judicial development of many of the theories and techniques of interest analysis. See Currie, Justice Traynor
and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1961); Ratner, Reflections of a Traynor
Law Clerk-With Some Emphasis on Conflict of Laws, 44 So. CAL. L. REv. 876A (1971).
882 RESTATEmENT OF CoNLcar oF LAws

(1934).
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cative function of the Restatements been more evident than in the field
of choice of law. This is partly because uncertainty as to what the law
actually is has resulted in less scope for pure "restatement," and more
opportunity for education, and partly because conflicts is a popular
field among academics. 883 These reasons, together with dissatisfaction
with the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, are undoubtedly also
responsible for the fact that the conflict of laws was one of the first
titles to which a second Restatement has been devoted. 8 4
In addition to influencing judge-made law, American academics
have played a considerable part in the development of statutory choice
of law rules. In England, the choice of law field is almost entirely composed of common law rules. This is not the case in America. Section
1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code 88 5 is of course a rule of supreme
importance, both for its own sake and for its influence upon the changes
that are occurring in other areas of the law. That section, like all of the
Code, is largely the work of academics. Their influence may be expected to grow in this respect, as the Uniform Commercial Code's follower, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, is enacted by more legislatures.88 6
The proponents of interest analysis, which itself is almost wholly
the product of academic theorizing, have thus found that their lines
of communication to courts were open. American academics, in contrast to their English counterparts, are in a position to propose fundamental and sweeping changes in the law, and at the same time to entertain realistic hopes that their proposals will not go unheeded.
2. Influence of European Thinking on England's Choice of Law
Rules
The second distinction between England and America which may
partly account for the lack of progress made by interest analysis theories
in England is the influence of Europe. In Western Europe, choice of
law rules, while not quite Bealean in character, are by and large rather
conservative. 8 7 Younger academics are aware of the American develop883 In both England and America, one has the impression that the discipline of the

conflict of laws is overpopulated by academics in relation to its importance vis-t-vis other
areas of the law.
884 This in itself has increased the potential for academic influence upon the development of choice of law rules.
885 See Prebble, Part I, text accompanying note 462.
886 The general choice of law provision of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code is
§ 1.201. To date, the Code has been adopted by Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah,
and Wyoming.
887 See R. ScHLEsiNGER, supra note 879, at 600-09.
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ments, but until now the modern American theories have had little
influence on European treatises and textbooks, and even less effect on
the decisions of continental courts.
English law is of course not generally influenced to any large
degree by continental law. However, English courts have always desired
that choice of law rules should be as uniform as possible among different jurisdictions.8 8s Also, a large proportion of English conflicts
cases concerns the applicability of the law of European countries. Consequently, the reluctance among English judges to depart from the
mainstream of European thought as applied to private international
law is not surprising.8 9 American courts, on the other hand, are not
particularly concerned with the choice of law rules used by Europeans.
3. InternationalScope of English Conflicts of Law
Most English conflicts cases involve international disputes, while
most American ones concern interstate disputes. This distinction does
not mandate any fundamentally different approach to the choice of
law processes adopted in the two countries, 90 nor does it cause any
generally perceptible difference in the results obtained in English or
American litigation.8 91 However, any suggestion that English courts
adopt interest analysis runs into the following problem. Interest analysis rests upon the assumption that courts will be able to deduce from
the laws of other jurisdictions the policies which those laws are calculated to promote. This process of deduction is proving difficult
enough in American interstate cases. To try to discover the policies
behind the laws of some totally alien system-for example, of some
Asian country, or even of a non-English speaking country of Western
Europe-would be that much more difficult.
4. English Rules of Statutory Interpretation
Interest analysis depends upon seeking the policy behind rules
of law, foreign and domestic. Where these rules are statutory, an American court can simply follow a procedure similar to that which it
would generally use in interpreting its own statutes, such as referring
to legislative debates or reports of investigative committees. Should
the English courts adopt interest analysis, there is little to stop them
from making a similar investigation. But practically speaking, this
888 Udny v. Udny, L.R. I Sc. & Div. App. 441, 452 (1869).
889 The entrance of the United Kingdom into the European Economic Community
may well increase this reluctance.
890 See Prebble, Part I, notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
891 See id.
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operation would be quite out of character. English courts are generally
unwilling to involve themselves with questions of governmental
policy. 92 This reluctance is exemplified by rules relating to statutory
interpretation. With few exceptions, English courts may not go outside
the words of an Act in attempting to construe it. Interest analysis would
compel consideration of both English and foreign extra-statutory material-a process which English courts would view with dismay. 9 3
5. Binding Nature of Precedent in England
The English concept of the binding nature of precedent is far
stronger than the American one. 894 This difference is probably another
result of the lack in the United States of any strictly "common" law,
or of any highly prestigious court to enforce that law. Thus, any movement so radical as a proposal to change the fundamentals of the choice
of law process would have to anticipate a slow rate of response from
the English courts.
Over the next few years, moves by counsel to introduce interest
analysis into English judicial reasoning will inevitably occur. Thus
far, the modernists have not been notably successful. In Boys v. Chaplin,895 Lord Denning tried to introduce a significant contacts test for
torts cases,896 but he was in a minority of one in this respect. On appeal,
two members of the House of Lords showed some sympathy for Lord
8 97
Denning's approach, referring extensively to American authority,
even though all agreed that the strict English rule should remain for
"normal" 898 cases because of its virtues of predictability and certainty.
For exceptional cases, where the strict rule does not sufficiently allow
the court "to take account of the varying interests and considerations
of policy which may arise when one or more foreign elements are
present,"8 99 Lord Wilberforce thought
892 See id., notes 117-33 and accompanying text.
893 See Gutteridge, A Comparative View of the Interpretation of Statute Law, 8 TuL.

L. REV. 1 (1933).

894 Consider, for example, the reluctance of the House of Lords in Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A., [1971] 1 A.C. 572,

[1970] 3 All E.R. 71 (1970), to overrule directly N.V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij
v. James Finlay & Co., Ltd., [1927] A.C. 604.
895 1971] 1 A.C. 356, [1969] 2 All E.R. 1085 (1969), aff'g [1968] 2 Q.B. 1, [1968] 1 All

E.R. 283 (CA. 1967).
896 11968] 2 Q.B. at 20, [1968] 1 All E.R. at 300; see Morris, The Proper Law of a
Tort, 64 HARV. L. Ray. 881 (1951).
897 [1971] 1 A.C. at 380, [1969] 2 All E.R. at 1094 (Lord Hodson); id. at 390-92, [1969] 2
All E.R. at 1103 (Lord Wilberforce).
898 Id. at 391, [1969] 2 All E.R. at 1103.
899 Id.
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that the necessary flexibility can be obtained from that principle
which represents at least a common denominator of the United
States decisions, namely, through segregation of the relevant issue
and consideration whether, in relation to that issue, the relevant
foreign rule ought, as a matter of policy ...to be applied. For this
purpose it is necessary to identify the policy of the rule, to inquire
to what situations, with what contacts, it was intended to apply;
whether not to apply it, in the circumstances of the instant case,
would serve any interest which the rule was devised to meet.900
Although these words could have come directly from a judge in a
modem American court, the other Lordships were unwilling to go
as far as Lord Wilberforce. Lord Hodson" 1 was somewhat sympathetic
to the American approach but Lords Guest 09 2 and Donovani 9 3 came
down strongly against any notion of the proper law of the tort, Lord
Donovan even seeming to think that the whole idea was a little unpatriotic.90 4 Lord Pearson was somewhat equivocal, but definitely did
not express approval for the new ideas. 90 5 Two leading English scholars
concluded, based upon a similar head-count, that "it is now beyond
controversy that [the most significant contacts theory as applied to tort
cases] can have no place in English legal thinking." 906 Certainly, by
traditional English principles of stare decisis, this assessment must be
07
correct. Nevertheless, in Sayers v. InternationalDrilling Co. N.V.,
Lord Denning held:
The issue raises an important question of private international
law ... [T]he claim by the plaintiff is a claim founded on tort.
In considering that claim, we must apply the proper law of tort,
that is, the law of the country with which the parties and the acts
done have the most significant connection. That is how I put it
in Boys v. Chaplin .... I think it is confirmed by what Lord
Wilberforce said . . . in the House of Lords [in the same case]
908

Too much should not be made of this passage. The majority of
the Court of Appeal in Sayers characterized the issue as contractual,
900 Id., [1969] 2 All E.R. at 1104.
90, Id. at 880, [1969] 2 All E.R. at 1094.

Id. at 881, [1969] 2 All E.R. at 1095.
Id. at 383, [1969] 2 All E.R. at 1097.
904 "There is no need here for such a doctrine-at least while we remain a United
Kingdom." Id. But perhaps Lord Donovan was scoring an innocent point off the legal
system of the United States.
905 Id. at 405-06, [1969] 2 All E.R. at 1115-16.
906 North & Webb, Foreign Torts and English Courts, 19 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 24, 25
(1970).
002
903

907
908

[1971] 1 W.L.R. 1176, [1971] 3 All E.R. 168.
Id. at 1180, [1971] 3 All E.R. at 166.
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and therefore simply applied the proper law of the contract. 09 Furthermore, regarding Lord Wilberforce's support of a significant contacts
test in Boys v. Chaplin,910 His Lordship was in the minority on this
issue, and he certainly was far from saying that the proper law approach
should be adopted as a general rule.
Perhaps the most that can be confidently predicted is that unless
Lord Denning is personally reprimanded by the House of Lords in a
future case, His Lordship will continue to apply his version of the significant contacts test in tort cases whenever the opportunity presents
itself.911
6. Lack of Vested Rights Influence in England
The final influence that militates against adoption of interest
analysis in England is that English choice of law rules were never quite
so divorced from reality as those touted during the American vested
rights era. In the United States, the serious inadequacies of Bealism
provoked an extreme response. But English rules, especially in the
contracts area, are generally at least practical, and in many instances
quite estimable. Consequently, one cannot expect the same vehement
reaction in England against the traditional rules as has occurred in
America.9 12
B.

The Superiority of Interest Analysis

The fundamental reason for favoring the current American approach is that rule selection recognizes the reality that by making
109 Id. at 1182, [1971] 3 All E.R. at 169; see Prebble, Part I, notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
910 [1971] 1 A.C. 356, [1969] 2 All E.R. 1085 (1969).
911 If this crusading by Lord Denning is ultimately successful, it will certainly not be
the first occasion that he has been able to impose his own ideas of the law upon the
English judiciary in the face of contrary precedents that at first seemed overwhelming.
For example, Lord Denning was largely responsible for the development of the English
version of promissory estoppel (see G. Crmxm & C. FirooT, THE LAw oF CoNTRhcr 77-88
(7th ed. 1969)), and for the recent liberalizing of the exclusionary rule of evidence relating
to claims of Crown privilege. See Linstead, The Law of Crown Privilege in Canada and
Elsewhere, 3 OTTAWA L. Rzv. 79, 100-04 (1968).
912 The traditional English choice of law rule for tort cases is the outstanding exception to this generalization. It is therefore not surprising that attacks upon English precedents have come in the torts area. It is significant that even Lord Wilberforce made
no reference to the principles of interest analysis in the two recent House of Lords cases
on contract, Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller & Partners Ltd.,
[1970] 1 A.C. 583, [1970] 1 All E.R. 796, and Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v.
Compagnie d'Armement Maritime SA., [1971] 1 A.C. 572, [1970] 3 All E.R. 71 (1970). If
interest analysis obtains any firm foothold in English courts in the near future, its influence
will probably be confined to tort cases, and even there it seems likely that the new theories
will be applied as the exception rather than the rule.
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choices of law courts are in effect deciding at least some of the substantive issues in the cases before them. The jurisdiction-selecting form
in which English choice of law rules are cast permits Cheshire to claim
that "the function of private international law is complete when it has
chosen the appropriate system of law. Its rules do not furnish a direct
solution of the dispute.1 913 In any particular case, if the choice of law
question is not material to the parties, why do they bother to go to
the expense of arguing it? Why not simply agree beforehand what law
the court is to apply?914 The reason is obvious: party A will benefit
from law X, party B from law Y. If, therefore, it is true that courts
engaged in the choice of law process are making substantive decisions,
they should be aware of the effect those decisions will have upon the
parties. Choice of law by jurisdiction selection is quite contrary to
this policy. Furthermore, rule selection is a valuable concomitant of
the issue-by-issue approach because it enables the courts to determine
a case upon the factual and legal issues actually relevant, rather than
by reference to general rules which attempt to govern large areas of
the law, but which meet with only mixed success.
While rule selection and the issue-by-issue approach, perhaps the
most important features of the doctrine of interest analysis, are valuable developments, other features of the modern American rules do
not appear to be so clearly advantageous. For example, the "better rule
of law" principle may lead to unjustifiable forum favoring. Also, the
true/false conflicts method of analysis raises problems. The identification of cases as genuine false conflicts-where the rules of both possibly applicable laws would lead to the same conclusion---could certainly be profitable, but the pitfalls for the unwary in attempting to use
this sophisticated technique appear so serious as to cast doubt upon the
practical value of false conflicts reasoning. The interest approach does
run the risk that undue weight may be attached to what a court considers to be the policies and interests of the forum state. The raison
d'9tre of conflict rules is to indicate to courts when they should employ
the laws of other jurisdictions. Considerations of public policy may
occasionally suggest to a court that it apply its own laws. But in the
contracts area, where jurisdictional rules are fairly loose and state
policies are often of comparatively minor importance, it should usually
be possible for courts to consider applying foreign law without worry913 G. CHESHIRE & P. NORTH, supra note 482, at 9.
914 Reference here is of course chiefly to contract and tort cases. In matrimonial cases,
for example, the parties would seldom have the opportunity to stipulate which law the

court is to apply.
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ing unduly about forum policy. The continued focus on policy considerations, which seems inherent in most versions of interest analysis,
works against this desirable result.
Since interest analysis is believed to furnish a superior approach
to the choice of law process than jurisdiction selection, modern American choice of law rules would seem preferable to those of England. But
in the area of contract law this generalization breaks down because of
the unusual nature of the English choice of law rule for contract cases.
The doctrine of the proper law is flexible enough to be as responsive
to the varying fact situations that may arise in different contract cases
as would be a choice of law approach based on interest analysis. Moreover, the rules for finding a contract's proper law are of proven practical value, while the significant contacts rule is a recent arrival in
American courts. Consequently, the latter is vulnerable to the wellmeaning ministrations of scholars who would seek to deprive it of its
flexibility by refining the significant contacts test into a collection of
particular rules covering relatively narrow types of fact situations. Such
a development would be retrogressive. The theoretical basis of the
English rule does not run the risk now facing the infant significant contacts test in America-the risk of being forced back into a straitjacket
of conceptualism, albeit a conceptualism that would show a considerable improvement over the discredited notion of the protection of
vested rights.
C.

The PracticalImpact of the Differing Approaches

Granted that the choice of law processes used by English and
American courts involve different fundamental philosophies, need this
essentially theoretical matter concern us from a practical point of view?
Are the differences between English and American choice of law rules
for contract cases sufficient to cause particular cases to be decided differently depending upon which country the plaintiff resolves to choose
as his forum?
For the bulk of cases, the answer to this question appears to be
"no." First, disregarding Bealean jurisdictions, courts of both countries
accept the autonomy principle. There are many serious exceptions to
the doctrine, but these are exceptions; fundamentally, the autonomy
rule is similar in England and America. Second, where there is no
express-choice of law, English and American courts both apply the significant contacts test, and, generally speaking, apply it in approximately
the same manner. In many of the more complex cases, however, there
will be found important and often predictable differences between the
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likely results of a choice of law decision taken by an English or by an
American court. These differences may be grouped roughly into two
categories: those caused by clear distinctions between the rules as
formulated by the courts of the two countries, and those which result
from merely a difference of emphasis between the rules, caused, for
example, by a larger or smaller area being governed by an exception
common to the rules of both countries.
Two areas where the rules clearly differ are capacity to contract
and the question of renvoi. It may be said without excessive oversimplification that in America the issue of capacity is usually governed
by the domiciliary law of the party whose capacity is in question. 915
But in England, capacity is referred to the system of law with which
the particular transaction, and the parties to it, are most significantly
connected. 916 Plainly, these rules could easily produce different results
in the same case, depending on where the action was commenced.
With regard to renvoi, one may draw some conclusions which
highlight important distinctions between English and American law
as far as their respective fundamental approaches to the choice of law
problem are concerned. First, although traditional renvoi appears to
have no place in the Anglo-American conflict of laws in contract cases,
there is one exception which touches American jurisdictions only.
That is, renvoi may perhaps find a role as a transitional tool in jurisdictions changing from vested rights reasoning to interest analysis. 917
Second, because of interest analysis, what has been termed section 8h
renvoi will find increasing use in American contract cases; this technique is clearly incompatible with the English approach to the conflict
of laws. 918 Finally, when in a contract case an English court is referred
by a general choice of law rule to a particular foreign lex causae, it will
probably ignore localizing rules of that law. Modern American courts,
however, will not ignore these rules, but will usually involve them in
the choice of law process by means of section 8k renvoi. 919
Such sharp distinctions as those seen in the areas of capacity to
contract and the use of renvoi are relatively rare. More common are
slight variances in choice of law rules which, in acute cases, may tip
the scale one way or the other, depending on whether an English or an
American forum is chosen. Three examples will suffice. In each case
it is assumed that courts in both England and America are open to the
915 See notes 655-56, 664-69 and accompanying text supra.
916 See notes 652-54, 658-63 and accompanying text supra.
917 See notes 792-93 and accompanying text supra.

See notes 825-27 and accompanying text supra.
919 See note 851 and accompanying text supra.

918
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parties from a jurisdictional point of view, and that the relevant Amer920
ican fora have adopted interest analysis.
One example involves a contract that appears to be most significantly connected to jurisdiction X. The contract contains no express
choice of law clause, but it is arguable that its terms raise a reasonable
inference that the parties intended the law of Y to govern. Party A
believes that the law of X favors him, while party B wants Y law to be
applied. Other factors being equal, A should try to have the case heard
921
before an American court, B before one in England.
The second example involves an action on a contract containing
an express choice of law clause. Party A intends to rely upon a certain
clause in the contract, valid under the chosen law, X, but ineffective
under the law of Y for reasons of public policy. In the absence of the
choice of law clause, Y law would clearly be applicable. Here, A should
favor an English court, his opponent an American forum. 92 2 This is

merely a particular example of the general observation that American
courts are more willing to listen to arguments based on public or state
923
policy than their English counterparts.

Third, the contract and all the issues under it that are liable to be
disputed are substantially related to jurisdictions X and Y (thus plainly
raising a conflicts problem), although clearly most significantly connected with X. However, the contract contains an express stipulation
that the law of Z should apply. Apart from this clause, the links with Z
are at best tenuous. Party A desires to sue party B for damages for nonperformance. B is expected to plead failure of a condition precedent,
in the circumstances a defense under X but not under Z law. On these
facts, A should sue in England, for an English court would be less dis92 4
turbed by the slender connection between the transaction and Z law.
On the other hand, if B's defense will be his lack of capacity under X
law (with Z law again favoring A), A should choose a forum in the
United States. On the issue of capacity, an English court would ignore
the stipulation for Z law, while it is possible than an American court
92 5
would respect the parties' choice.
920 Naturally, different considerations apply when the choice is between English law
and that of an American vested rights state.
921 See notes 501-02 and accompanying text supra.

922 See
ness of the
criticized at
9023See
924 See

Prebble, Part I, notes 373-81. However, it should be recalled that the willingRestatement (Second) to consider the public policy of non-forum states is
those pages.
Prebble, Part1, notes 104-39 and accompanying text.
id., notes 320-47 and accompanying text.

925 See notes 652-57 and accompanying text supra. It certainly would respect such a
choice if A sued in Z, Z being both B's domicile and an American state.
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CONCLUSION

A comparative study of English and American choice of law rules
for contract cases is not merely of theoretical interest. Where cases have
interstate or international contacts, legal advisers should be as aware
of differences between rules of the conflict of laws as they are of rules
of substantive law. With increasing interchange between the United
States and England, private international law cases involving these
two countries must proliferate, and it may be expected that progres.
sively more defendants will become amenable to suit in both countries.
In these circumstances, an astute counsel may often be able to enhance
the prospects of his client's cause by an informed choice of forum.

